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ABSTRACT 
 
The provision of education has been a core function legitimizing the modern nation-state. 
Behind education one finds the building of citizenship, between demands for social 
cohesion and national identification, as well as the preparation of the labour force for the 
national economy. The moulding of a working education system remains a key challenge 
for new states and states emerging from armed conflict. Qualitative and quantitative 
scholarly literature exploring the causal relationship between education and civil war 
leaves no doubt about the salience of education systems in conflict-affected states. 
 While a vast body of studies exists on education and violent conflict, less 
attention has been devoted to the role of education in peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
Above all, little research has been conducted into how externally promoted efforts at 
rebuilding education systems may affect (or fail to affect) the consolidation of peace. This 
study focuses on the ways in which a variety of international actors shape national 
education systems in states that have emerged out of armed conflict, and how these 
systems reflect and affect peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
 From these premises, I have conducted fieldwork in Kosovo and East Timor, two 
recent cases where major statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions have been 
launched. The research first has mapped education programming and reform by 
identifying the main actors that have been part of the process. Second, I have 
conceptualized the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of these reforms by analysing primary source 
documents and interviewing key local and international stakeholders. Finally, after 
identifying the emerging forms of education systems, I have critically analysed the ways 
in which externally assisted education have reflected and affected processes of building 
the state and consolidating peace. 
 The research has found that post-war reconstruction in both cases has led to the 
emergence of externally-driven and hybrid education systems whereby priorities are set in 
the intersection between local and international actors, often lacking coordination. 
Presenting features of extra-territoriality and de-nationalization, such education systems 
are a combination of global education policies and contextual local agendas. Rather than 
bringing the education system out of fragility, international interventions have determined 
and perpetuated a condition of dependency on international assistance. Humanitarian and 
stability imperatives have determined educational choices and priorities and education 
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has neither addressed nor transformed root causes of the conflicts, missing the 
opportunity to contribute to social cohesion, change and justice. 
Overall, education has been a marginal sector within the broader political 
economy of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and a mere reflection of the principles and 
practices that underpin them. Rather than impacting on such processes, interventions in 
education in Kosovo and East Timor have reflected, legitimised and enhanced the 
prevailing models of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and in doing so, have incorporated 
their dilemmas, pitfalls and shortcomings.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS: RELEVANCE, PUZZLE AND 
FOCUS 
 
 
Armed conflict swept Kosovo and East Timor during the second half of the 1990s: in 
a few months both countries saw the destruction of war and the onset of major 
international efforts at reconstruction. Kosovo and East Timor became testing 
grounds for the first all-encompassing international interim administrations under the 
aegis of the United Nations. The aim of both UN missions was to build both the state 
and peace. As local actors were deemed to lack the capacy to govern the state- and 
peace-building processes, the UN assumed full authority, with administrative, 
legislative and executive taks. Self-govenment would be gradually possible after a 
transitional phase.  
The path turned out to be less smooth than expected: at the end it saw the 
emergence of two fledgling independent states, whose population is among the 
youngest in the world. My interest in the role that education played in these 
processes is rooted in this historical circumstance, whereby new polities were 
internationally assisted in addressing the challenge of simultaneously building the 
nation and the state while ensuring domestic and international peace and stability.  
The provision of education has been one of the core functions of the modern state. 
Behind education one finds the imagining of the national community (Anderson 1991), as 
well as the building of citizenship and social cohesion: ultimately, education prepares the 
labour force for the national economy (Dale 1989). While in pre-modern times education 
was a prerogative of religious institutions, the rise of the modern state in Europe sees the 
state apparatus embark on its own education effort, sometimes parallel to religious 
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schools, colleges and universities, sometimes more assertively establishing its own 
education systems. The Western powers expanded through colonial conquest, exporting 
the state, including its education apparatus (Badie 2000).  
The congruence that historically exists between the emergence of the nation-state 
and the spreading of public education programs has been challenged by processes of 
globalization and new trajectories of  state-making, with the emergence of various forms 
of hybrid governance that pose a limit to both the autonomy and sovereignty of the state 
(Dale 1999). The relative decline in the number of civil wars registered since the early 
1990s is accompanied by the emergence of ‘post-interventionary societies’, that constitute 
a distinctive political space in which external agencies reshape the delivery of core 
services in a long-term perspective (Duffield 2008).  
Post-conflict education reform is, in this context, part of a wider process of 
building institutions and establishing a lasting peace in ‘fragile’ and post-conflict 
contexts: Kosovo, East Timor, and post-invasion Iraq are transformed into ‘governance 
states’ (Duffield 2008), namely polities that are (re-)constructed through a coordination of 
international efforts, with varying degrees of United Nations involvement. The set of 
changes associated with the process of (re-)building the state is typically conceived, 
supported, and implemented by a plethora of external actors (Jones 2012). In these 
settings, education is usually regarded as part of developmental activities – i.e., those 
programs that help to tackle the damage caused by armed hostilities, and assist in the 
reconciliation process in a perspective of long-term stabilization and peace.  
Only in recent years have UN agencies started to recognize the specific role that 
education plays in the precarious environment in which post-conflict peacebuilding 
processes take place. The multiplicity of roles that education plays in conflict and post-
conflict settings has come under scrutiny (Paulson 2008). The focus has shifted from 
‘education in emergencies and humanitarian responses’ (including the protection of 
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children) to the role that education has in the prevention of the relapse into violent 
conflict, and the contribution that it can make to  establishing a long-lasting peace.  
The debate on the complex nexus that exists among education, conflict and peace 
in postwar countexts has received growing attention both on the part of policy and 
academic milieux (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004). Leading international agencies 
have committed significant resources that has been earmarked for education 
reconstruction in emergencies, fragile states, and conflict-affected contexts. In education 
studies, some scholars have focussed on the nexus between education in war/post-war 
settings and social change, seeking to identify paths to sustainable peace (Novelli 2010; 
Novelli and Smith 2011; Breidlid 2010). 
A step ahead was the establishment in 2007 by the Geneva-based UN Global 
Education Cluster led by the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and 
Save the Children within the Peacebuilding Fund framework (PBF). Although education 
was not given priority in the PBF operational mode, subsequent developments, such as 
the objectives that were formulated in the Millennium Development Goals1 - and later re-
launched by the ‘Incheon Declaration Framework for Action Education for inclusive and 
equitable quality education and lifelong learning for all by 2030’ - offer a clear 
illustration of the increasing significance that the international community attaches to 
assisting the education sector in conflict and post-conflict settings.2 
In this regard, in 2011 the United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) called for a joint effort to unlock “[t]he full potential of 
education to act as a force for peace” (UNESCO 2011: ii). In a similar vein, growing 
recognition of the specificity of post-conflict contexts came from the World Bank (WB). 
In a 2005 report on education, one can read that: 
                                                
1 Moreover, education has been recognized as essential in order to reach other Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) such as health, nutrition, gender equality, child survival, environment 
sustainability and poverty reduction (DFID 2011: 22). 
2 Nevertheless, despite growing recognition of its role in emergency and humanitarian response, 
education still receives two per cent of global humanitarian aid (UNESCO 2011). 
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Educational programming in post-conflict societies cannot be business as usual. 
Education has a critical role to play in the wider reconstruction of the society, 
from building peace and social cohesion to facilitating economic recovery and 
getting the country onto an accelerated development track (World Bank 2005: 
27).  
 
Education and education systems have to do with conceiving the future of a nation, of a 
polity and its demos: it comes as no surprise that in deeply divided societies they 
represents a critical challenge for statebuilding. Here an apparent paradox emerges: the 
field of education rarely appears in peace agreements (Dupuy 2008). Post-war education 
has for long time been framed as an emergency and early reconstruction imperative, 
while its reform has been typically postponed to the medium and long term planning, 
when international aid funds tend to evaporate.  
Much of the existing literature on education and conflict has focused narrowly on 
an instrumentalist exploration of the role of education along the axis conflict/peace: the 
two faces of education – namely, that education can prevent war, but also foster violent 
conflict – and education as service delivery, consequently neglecting the complex links 
between education, statebuilding and peacebuilding. Moreover, one should consider that 
the large majority of studies on education and conflict are policy-oriented ‘grey 
literature’, which typically adopts a narrow, technically conceived problem-solving 
approach, and an unproblematized state-centric perspective, in which transnational power 
relations and their role/impact on nationally shaped policies are often overlooked (Novelli 
and Lopes Cardozo 2008). 
Having said that, it is a fact that in the past few years a growing number of 
scholars have embarked on the study of how education can contribute to broader social 
change, societal transformations and sustainable peace by acknowledging the many faces 
of education in war and post-war settings (Novelli 2010; Lopes Cardozo 2013; Pherali 
2013; Shah 2013; Breidlid 2013). Concomitantly, the focus on the role of education in 
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peacebuilding has become more explicit in the agenda of international agencies as well 
(Novelli and Smith 2011). Once the limitations of democratization, good governance, 
liberalization, and security (or perhaps ‘securitization’) became evident, education 
seemed to take center stage as next key policy concept, and as the new strategic sector for 
consideration when setting priorities for peacebuilding missions.  
Notwithstanding this, little research, if any, has empirically explored the link 
between the education sector under assistance/reconstruction in a given context, the type 
of state and the quality of the peace that such an effort reflects and constitutes. In other 
terms, while a vast body of literature today exists on education and violent conflict, less 
attention has been devoted to the role of education in peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
Above all, little research has been conducted on the type of the education systems that 
have been rebuilt (or reformed) in the context of statebuilding/peacebuilding missions. 
Accordingly, we know little about the specific role of international actors in this sector. 
This gap is evident in the literature dealing with post-war international 
interventions. The past two decades have seen a veritable proliferation of practitioner and 
academic debates over peacebuilding and statebuilding, focussing on the nature, 
processes and outcomes of international interventions in managing violent conflict, 
stabilizing weak and fragile states in the Global South, seeking to achieve peace in 
divided post-war societies. The means and practices adopted by international governance 
in leading entire nations through ambitious social engineering attempts have raised a 
number of issues regarding the boundaries, the porosities and the promiscuities of 
authority and sovereignty (Chandler 2010, Hameiri 2010).  In those debates regarding 
conflict, peacebuilding and statebuilding one sees virtually no engagement with and 
reflection upon the place and role of education, a circumstance that might implicitly 
suggest the drawing of a delinkage between education on the one hand and peace and 
state on the other.  
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While the virtual absence of education in the scholarly peacebuilding debate 
reflects a condition of marginality on the ground that many agencies are committed to 
overcome, one must note that the actual processes of building peace in weak and post-
conflict states provided plenty of space and rationales for substantial intervention on 
education. Although when discussing with an international official employed in a 
peacebuilding mission one is likely to hear the justification of the sidelining of education 
from the peacebuilding/statebuilding agenda on the basis of the idea that education is a 
‘national prerogative’ – i.e., a primary domain of sovereign states - the reality one 
encounters on the ground blatantly contradicts such a claim: one can speak instead of a 
conspicuous multi-spatial and multi-level engagement of international actors in education 
reform. This is most evident in that specific type of statebuilding context represented by 
post-war UN protectorates or interim administrations.  
The multi-scalar international commitment to education that one can observe in 
statebuilding interventions is to be understood as part of a process of a larger and more 
substantial change (one may say erosion) of the symbiotic relationship that historically 
exists between the state and education. Such an erosion is supported and complemented 
by discursive practices that define post-conflict and conflict-affected states as failed, 
weak, fragile entities, thus unable to provide/deliver basic services to their population – 
and being disqualified from sovreignty. Moreover, the chance is fuelled by broader 
processes of globalization, de-territorialization, decentralization, deregulation, 
privatization, and liberalization, all of which have a profound impact on national 
education. Finally, to understand ongoing transformations in the nexus state-education 
one needs to consider how policy statebuilding practices focus narrowly on formal 
institutions, thereby reducing the relationship between education and the state to one of 
service provision.3 
                                                
3 Without overlooking the role and impact of non-state actors/processes on education, my research is 
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The present research hypothesizes that the consolidated nexus between education 
and the state that one observes during the process of Western state formation is evolving, 
and that one can observe this change by studying new states emerging out of wars in the 
21st century. This thesis focuses on the ways in which a variety of international and local 
actors shape national education systems in new-born states, on those challenges that the 
making of education systems encounters in post-war settings today, and on the type of 
peace and state education reflects and constitutes.  
My research intends to look into the extent to (and the ways through) which 
agenda-setting in educational reform in unstable peripheries could illuminate the re-
articulation of wider global education agendas. It tries to do so by examining the specific 
context of communities and societies constituting themselves into sovereign nation-states 
in the aftermath of a war. The thesis is premised on a logic of comparison and contrast, 
which delves into how varying configurations of education systems reflect, affect and are 
affected by contingent processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding, contributing in one 
way or another to such processes. In examining the model and role of education in 
statebuilding and peacebuilding, it recognizes the complex interaction with and 
embeddedness of education in broader social, political and economic settings.  
To map changes and challenges I have conducted fieldwork in Kosovo and East 
Timor, two cases where major statebuilding and peacebuilding processes were launched 
in the end of the 1990s. I consider Kosovo and East Timor as best examples for exploring 
this field, given the fact that in these new states the commitment of international actors to 
building peace has been full-fledged and all-encompassing from day one.  
 
2. RESEARCH GOALS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
                                                                                                                                      
premised on the persuasion that one needs to bring back the issue of the state in relation to education 
and viceversa, in ways that takes into consideration the above-mentioned broader processes, the nature 
of the state, the functions of education therein, critically reflecting upon the changing and changed 
relationship between the two. 
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This is not a research project on ‘peace education’, nor one generically focussing on 
‘education and conflict’: rather, this is a project on the specific role of education systems 
in peacebuilding and statebuilding, and on the role of international actors therein. Peace 
education programmes (however they are defined or identified) and the relationship 
between education and conflict fall within the perimeter of this research, where I focus on 
the specificity of post-war settings or, better said, on the challenges and potentialities of 
building education systems in a context of peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
The research examines the moment of rebuilding education systems after the 
cessation of hostilities, a phase that is usually defined as ‘post-conflict’. However, I 
should specify that the post- prefix is a misnomen, since these societies even years after 
the war remain either conflict-affected (as is the case of East Timor) or conflict-frozen [or 
both, as it is the the case of Kosovo] (Junne and Verkoren 2005).  
In a seminal historical-sociological study, Green (1990) shed light on the role that 
education played in the process of state-formation and nation-building in three Western 
liberal democracies (UK, France and the US): he underlined that, as a state-led 
mechanism, education was employed to cultivate social cohesion, citizenship, and build 
national culture and identity. The construction of a national education system has, thus, 
been a key feature of state formation and cohesion: but how powerful and exemplary is 
this historical trajectory in shaping today’s course of new education systems? Can the 
building/re-building of education systems in those new states that today emerge from 
armed conflicts and civil wars perform the same functions?  
This research seeks to contribute to the development of a critical research agenda 
on education, conflict and peacebuilding (Novelli 2010). It seeks to explore the existence 
of externally induced models of education systems in post-conflict newly emerging states, 
first of all by studying the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of education aid and reforms as part of major 
international statebuilding efforts; it will then examine and analyse its implications for 
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statebuilding and peacebuilding. By adopting an approach that has both explanatory and 
interpretive intentions, the project also aims to shed light on how new policy agendas and 
transnational power relations are changing the state, and what role education plays in 
characterizing new states that have emerged out of war. 
By looking into education in terms of examining and analysing the roles and 
functions that it is expected to perform, I investigate the nexus between building 
education, building the state and building peace; finally, I reflect upon the implications 
for current practices of statebuilding, state formation and agenda- setting/making in 
education reform.  
My specific aim is to contribute to the study of a decade of international 
statebuilding, of which Kosovo and East Timor can be seen as important testing grounds 
that proceed in parallel, from a relatively unusual angle: education. What are the lessons 
that can be learnt about the role that education plays in statebuilding and peacebuilding 
and – more generally – what transformations can be observed in new states about the 
relation among state formation, education and peace? 
I should probably caution the reader about the fact that I do not aim to dissect 
statebuilding/peacebuilding interventions to find an answer to the question of whether 
they are successful or not in building states and consolidating peace, by highlighting the 
detectable contribution that education might make to such processes: this operation would 
involve benchmarking outcomes against a fictional, ideal-typical view of what states and 
peace should look like. By contrast, I intend to study the nexuses that exist between 
education, the state and peace by asking questions such as the following: what forms of 
statehood and peace process are interventions in education contributing to produce, 
consolidate and legitimize? 
The main research question, therefore, is: when a new state emerges under the 
aegis of international statebuilding, in a situation in which society is divided by a recent 
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history of armed conflict, what types of externally-assisted education systems have 
emerged, and how do they reflect and affect statebuilding and peacebuilding? Put another 
way, how does the building of education systems after today’s armed conflicts affect the 
building of new states and the building of peace? 
This research is articulated along three objectives, which try to respond to three 
aspects of the main research question, i.e., the model of education systems emerging, 
their relationship with peacebuilding and statebuilding, the governance of education 
reform and the role of international actors therein. First, it seeks to investigate, analyse 
and conceptualize the different models of education systems that have been promoted by 
international and local actors in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999-2014; it does so by 
keeping an eye on how the process has unfolded and the rationales behind given choices. 
As the empirical chapters will show, international and local actors have interacted in 
contingent ways in each of the settings explaining differences not just by merely referring 
to contextual differences. On the other hand, global discourses and agendas have played a 
role in explaining similarities in intervention or outcome despite the contextual 
differences. Most of the questions addressing the first objective do not only illuminate 
patterns in education reform, they also incorporate some elements of a social justice 
framework that will be useful when investigating the relationship between education and 
peacebuilding (as part of the second objective). More specifically, some of the questions 
that I will try to answer with regard to the politics and the process of education reform 
include: 
 
- In the emerging model of education what is the emphasis put on the different 
levels/forms/types of education (primary vs. higher education; formal vs. non-formal; 
private vs. public)?  
- What is the focus of curriculum development and content? 
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- Is it relevant for the students and the broader society?  
- To what extent the current system has assured equality in access (in terms of male vs. 
female; urban vs. rural)? 
- How is the 'employment issue' reflected in education? 
- How is education linked to the structure of the economy, and what economic 
structure does education reflect or legitimize? 
 
Second, it seeks to explore and examine the relationship between education, peace and 
state in a context of peacebuilding and statebuilding. It does so by looking at specific 
issues at the level of formal education – curriculum reform and content; the language 
issue; the degree of equal access of educational provision; the structure of educational 
provision – that have a link in contributing and constituting a peace process in terms of 
identity and nation building; social cohesion and justice; reconciliation; citizenship and 
skill building.  In addressing such a relationship, it tries to reveal what has been the 
understanding of peace(building) among different actors that have been involved in the 
education sector, and whether there has been a consensual understanding of it. Moreover, 
it tries to understand if (and what) peacebuilding principles have been incorporated in 
educational reform and programming. As part of this objective I seek to examine the 
relationship between education and the state in a context of statebuilding and longer-term 
state formaton. Some of the questions addressing the content of formal education and the 
broader functions of education are:  
 
- Has education interacted with (root causes of) the war? If so, how and in which ways 
is this reflected in curriculum reform? 
- Is education interacting with (or addressing) proximate micro-triggers of 
current/future violence? If so, how?  
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- Has the (post-) conflict specificity been reflected in educational 
reform/programming? If so, how? 
- Has conflict analysis been incorporated in educational reform? 
- Has education addressed existing divisions and cleavages in the society? If so, how? 
- Which aspects of peacebuilding has education directly and indirectly addressed? 
- What is education telling us about the type of peace that is being built? 
- How and what structures of power and social processes is education legitimizing, 
reinforcing, constituting, reproducing, or questioning? 
- Which functions is education envisaged to perform in new, small, peripheral states? 
- Whose interests it mirrors?  
- What does it tell about state/society and state/citizens relationships?  
 
Third, it aims at mapping the commitment and role of international actors in educational 
reform. In this regard, it seeks to understand if the approach to education by key 
international agencies has changed over a decade of debate and practice of statebuilding 
and peacebuilding. Furthermore, the ever-evolving relationship between the multiplicity 
of international and local actors in education governance is put under scrutiny. 
Ultimately, by looking at international practices as translated in local, post-conflict, 
protectorate-type settings, it reflects upon the articulation of global agendas that are 
shaping education reforms in precarious and conflictual peripheries. More specifically, 
the key questions focussing on the politics of education governance are:   
 
- How has the governance of education changed in a decade of international 
intervention? 
- In other words, what has been the role of international agencies and whether and how 
it has changed in more than one decade? 
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- Is it possible to identify patterns among different donors in terms of focus and type of 
assistance in the education sector? 
- Has the relationship between donors and local stakeholders changed over time?  
- If so, to what extent decisions and interventions have been determined by 
institutional strategies or individual choices/leadership?  
- What is the degree of consensus and/or confrontation within and among such 
institutions? 
- What is the role played by other social forces in terms of contesting or complying to 
dominant agendas and discourses? Can we identify sites of resistance and agency for 
social change and justice in which an alternative vision and discourse on education is 
elaborated? 
- What do the articulations of agendas in the peripheries tell us about the re-
articulation of agendas at the core? 
 
 
3. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The first chapter is divided into three parts. By focusing on the changed nexus state-
education, it reviews those strands of literature dealing with forms and modes of national 
education in a globalized world. It seeks to shed light on those macro processes such as 
pecebuilding and statebuilding within which post-conflict education reform and 
governance are embedded. While seeking to bridge existing debates that usually do not 
communicate with each other, it identifies conceptual building blocks that are relevant for 
the first part of my research question. As this part of the chapter shows, while the ways 
through which globalisation affects education is increasingly investigated, little or 
nothing has been said on how externally-driven processes of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding affect education.  
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By inverting the perspective, the second part of chapter one looks at how 
education affects macro-processes of war, peacebuilding and statebuilding. It develops a 
framework that guides my investigation as far as the second part of research question is 
concerned. By reviewing the literature on conflict, peace and social change, this part 
illuminates the multiple faces of education in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings 
and the multifaceted ways in which education can affect conflict and peace(building). 
Finally, the third part sets out the conceptual and analytical lenses for my empirical 
investigation.   
Chapter two presents the methodological framework and the research design of 
this thesis. It lays out the epistemological and ontological foundations of my research, 
which rests upon critical realism. The research combines different methods of inquiry: it 
develops a multi-sited based analysis of two case studies which are selected upon the 
international engagement to education reform in post-war statebuilding interventions, by 
comparing and contrasting engagement to education reform and governance. Empirical 
investigation makes use of ethnographic fieldwork based on semi-structured and informal 
interviews. Other methods of data collection and analysis include genealogical historical 
narrative with a focus on processes, cultural political economy analysis, conflict analysis 
and sensitivity to discursive practices.  
Chapter three sets the issue of the Kosovo conflict in its historical context. It 
particularly focuses on the international intervention in the aftermath of the war, by 
focusing on the peacebuilding and statebuilding models that the international community 
in interaction with local elites have produced on the ground. It highlights how a particular 
kind of conflict analysis had implications for the peacebuilding model that prevailed in 
Kosovo. It concludes that the main perspective that has shaped international efforts in 
strengthening state institutions and preventing the relapse into violent conflict has been 
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one in which the ethnic dimension has been emphasised, while the structural development 
problematique has been largely overlooked.  
This perspective has also implications for the reform of post-war education in 
Kosovo, as examined by Chapter four. In this chapter, education’s intertwinement with 
conflict causes and its centrality to processes of state formation and nation building is set 
within an historical perspective. Post-war education reform is then analysed with a 
specific focus on the role of international actors therein. A liberal peace strongly focusing 
on stability and security and an excessive emphasis on equal collective rights and 
extensive decentralised autonomy for the different communities, has made education 
segregation the de facto strategy of choice for international actors too, and the reality on 
the ground. While being one of the sectors most permeable to external intervention in 
post-war Kosovo (and, more specifically, one of the most marginal in the peacebuilding 
and statebuilding agenda), education has reflected and reproduced a model of segregated 
peace, a contested process of statehood set within a framework of externally-promoted, 
market-based limited state: in this context,  inter-ethnic interaction looks like a chimera. 
Moreover, a ‘reversed pattern’ of ethnic and spatial segregation of education makes this 
sector a rather problematic foundation for a just and sustainable peace.  
Chapter five moves on to the second case study, and starts by showing how, for 
most of its modern history, East Timor has been shaped by external actors and factors. It 
critically analyses external interventions patterns – within and outside the UN mandate – 
and it shows how statebuilding intervention was underpinned by lack of conflict analysis, 
a circumstance that led to a lack of peacebuilding and reconciliation activities in the first 
years of the international intervention. The narrow focus on liberal statebuilding has 
produced a state prone to cyclical political crisis, and a virtual peace that is disconnected 
by the everyday life experiences and welfare requirements of the Timorese citizens.  
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Chapter six looks into the politics of education reconstruction following East 
Timor’s infrastructural and institutional destruction by Indonesia. It then analyses the 
hybrid governance of local and international actors that have shaped education reform in 
post-conflict East Timor. More specifically, it investigates the relationship between 
education, peacebuilding and statebuilding by focusing on those conflictual aspects of 
curriculum reform such as language, history and religion. The chapter concludes that here 
too education has been on the margins of the peacebuilding/statebuilding process: the 
sector is today an example of complex hybrid governance, where the multiplicity of 
actors involved in various forms of intervention allow to see education as a site of 
contestation among different agendas.  
Finally, Chapter seven elaborates on evidence and insights stemming from both 
cases, putting in comparative perspective the hybrid governance of education reform, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. It shows that, despite the fact that similar international 
administrations were established (or better deployed), they led to different forms of 
statehood. Different conflict analysis assumptions and frameworks were employed in 
each case, yet in both – East Timor and Kosovo – peacebuilding amounts to a form of 
stability, or negative peace, rather than carrying the seeds of transformatory and 
empancipatory, positive peace. In both cases, education has been marginal to the 
peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas. Rather than affecting the state and peace, 
educations reflects and reinforces some of the pitfalls and the dilemmas of statebuilding 
and peacebuilding.  
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Chapter one 
 
Globalised Education between Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
 
This chapter is structured in three parts. First, I focus on the nexus state-education  in the 
context of globalisation and global governance, with specific attention to peacebuilding 
and statebuilding. I review those strands of literature dealing with forms and modes of 
national education in a globalized world: this means shedding light on those processes of 
international interventions aiming to build peaceful states within which education reform 
takes place (and which have an impact on education systems and programs). This review 
effort is particularly challenging, as it attempts to put into communication work that 
usually do not communicate across disciplines and thematic perimeters: the literature on 
globalisation (and education) on the one hand, and the literature on peacebuilding and 
statebuilding on the other. By addressing a gap, I believe that such an effort to build 
bridges has some merit of its own.  
The second part of the present chapter inverts the perspective, and looks at how 
education, in its turn, affects macro-processes of war/conflict, 
peacebuilding/statebuilding/state formation: its use for the purpose of this study lies in its 
developing a framework that guides my investigation as far as the second part of my 
research question is concerned (i.e., the kind of peace and state that education reflects and 
the ways it affects them). This part therefore reviews the literature dealing with education, 
conflict, peace and social change: it is about the multiple faces and facets of education in 
post-conflict and conflict-affected settings, and the multifaceted ways in which education 
can affect conflict and peace(building). Finally, the third part of this chapter, distils the 
conceptual and analytical lenses through which I will investigate the reform of education 
and the ways through which education reflects and affects the building of a just and 
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sustainable peace.  
 
 
 
 
Part One: How Education is Affected by the Macro-Processes of 
Globalisation, Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
 
This first section reviews the existing debates on macro processes that affect national 
education systems. It is useful because it builds conceptual blocks that guide the 
investigation as far as the first part of my research question is concerned (i.e., the kind of 
education models emerging in post-conflict settings within a globalized world). While 
how globalisation has affected education is extensively investigated in literature, little or 
nothing has been said on how externally assisted peacebuiding and statebuilding affect 
education. Beside looking at gaps in the literature, this part of the review aims to locate 
education within broader macro-processes.  
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A small but growing body of literature (that will be explored in depth in the 
second part of this chapter) has looked into the complex role of education in fragile states 
and the conditions under which it may contribute to peacebuilding: however, there exists 
a gap concerning the models (e.g., the type) of education systems whose building is often 
observed in those specific contexts that emerge from armed conflict and are made object 
of external interventions. Along with it, the question of how this might signal, on a 
broader historical trajectory, changes in the relation between education and the state, and 
how education has to do with peace and state(hood) is virtually absent in the literature. 
 
1.1 The globalisation of education policies  
 
In the past decade a growing number of scholars have focused on education and global 
governance, analyzing the increasingly global nature of education agenda-setting and 
policy-making/implementation. A range of similar education reforms, policies and 
programmes such as “[c]hild-centred pedagogies, school-based management, teachers’ 
accountability, public-private partnerships or conditional-cash transfer schemes” are 
being implemented world-wide in very different local contexts leading practitioners and 
scholars to define them as “global education policies” (GEP) (Verger et al. 2012: 3).  
The development of education policies and agendas at the international, global, 
supra-national level and their transplantion into the local level has been defined within the 
field of comparative education in many ways such as “[p]olicy diffusion, policy 
borrowing, policy transfer, policy travelling, isomorphism or convergence” (Verger et al. 
2012: 3). Yet the literature on education policy borrowing or transfer has not focused 
enough on ways, rationales and effects of globalisation into education policies and 
politics. The focus has been on the international rather than global dimension of given 
education policies, and the ways through which such policies transfer and transplant from 
one national context to the other one, without providing an account of the agents, interests 
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and power relationships at play.  
Another limitation of the policy transfer literature lies in the binary and 
dichotomous relationship between the international and local level (and unit) of analysis, 
representing them quite simplicitely as separate layers rather than mutually constitutive of 
(and in) the educational governance (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2011; Robertson 2012). 
Robertson (2012) suggests replacing the concept of level of analysis with the concept of 
scale. In this regard, using scale allows a conception of space that is fluid and a changing 
product of social relations and struggles, where both the local and the global are 
intertwined and mutually constituted and embedded.  
In most of the research on global education policies the re-territorialization of 
education policies and models is regarded as happening a-priori, without providing a rich 
empirical account of the interplay between global(isation) processes and the re-
contextualisation of education policies at the local level. Thus, very often, the failure of 
implementation of global education policies at the local level or the discrepancy between 
global education policies/agendas and their implementation or outcome at the local level 
is attributed to contextual differences or local backwardedness/incapacity to comply with 
global standards/trends, overlooking issues of agency and power.  
Only recently have a number of scholars departing from a range of different 
theoretical perspectives started to address the gaps inherent in the mainstream 
comparative education literature by seeking to critically analyse the reasons, factors and 
agents behind the globalisation of education policy, and the ways, structures and events 
through which a global education policy agenda is being constituted at the supra-national 
level while being contextualized at the local level: such scholars have paid attention to the 
effects of these developments (Verger et al. 2012; Sobe 2015, Robertson and Dale 2015). 
Here, particular emphasis is laid on the role of international organizations and other 
political (state or non-state actors) actors to shape and disseminate education policies 
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globally and the ways through which local contexts reply, comply, or resist such policies. 
Underpinning this recent critical research is the broader idea that “[p]rocesses of 
globalisation have drastically altered the education policy landscape across the world and, 
more particularly, in the context of developing countries” (Verger et al. 2012: 4).  
Developing countries and their policy landscapes are highly penetrated by global 
agendas as they are more dependent on aid, foreign expertise and information (Rose 
2007). In such countries the multiplicity of international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs), international organisations (IOs) and donor agencies have the material and 
ideational capacities to set agendas and priorities.  
 
1.1.1 The definition of globalisation and how it affects education policy 
 
Globalisation can be seen as “[a] constitutive process of increasing interdependence 
between people, territories and organisations in the economic, political and cultural 
domains. The dominant processes of globalisation can be characterized as hyper-
liberalism in the economic domain, governance without government in the political 
domain, and commodification and consumerism in the cultural domain” (Verger et al. 
2012: 5).  
In critically reflecting upon the impact and effects of globalisation on education, 
Bonal and Rambla argue that “[g]lobalisation has served as a catalyst for the introduction 
of new discourses, new practices and new agendas [...] [I]n the name of globalisation we 
have seen the replacement and emergence of paradigms in the field of development 
policies, changes which have also affected the sphere of educational investment priorities 
and strategies” (2009: 144). Globalisation has defined new problems that education 
policy has to address such as the transformation of the labour market and the emphasis 
put on knowledge-based economy/society. Within this competitive environment that 
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requires knowledge-intense products and labour, states need not just to expand education 
but also re-organise it around new skills, competences or concepts such as flexibility 
(Carnoy 1999 quoted in Verger et al. 2012). States, however, are increasingly 
complemented by the creation of a (trans)national private market of education provision 
that often is in competition with them. This private market of education provison not only 
alters state functions in education provision; it also alters conventional functions of 
education provision such as nation building (Robertson et al. 2002).  
Globalisation also affects state capacities to address education problems or non-
education problems through education policy. In this new context, the role of other 
international actors, below, above and beyond state level that are involved in education 
policy-making and implementation such as the World Bank, UNESCO, Organization for 
Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD), UNICEF, among others, 
becomes prominent; other actors that have been increasingly involved in education 
policy-making are non-governmental organisations such as transnational 
companies/firms, international consultants/experts, or transnational advocacy coalitions 
(Verger et al. 2012: 6, Robertson et al. 2012).  
This plethora of different international players has the capacity and power – 
through funding mechanisms and aid conditionality – to settle education agendas at the 
supra-national level and to define countries’ priorities, thus promoting certain education 
policies. Susan Robertson has defined this as the deterritorialisation of the education 
policy process with the national state loosing its historical centrality in education 
processes (Robertson 2012).  
The displacement and redefinition of the scale and space through which education 
policy is formulated, disseminated and implemented at the international/global level has 
also had a normative dimension concerning the transformation of the legal framework of 
states that are members within different international organisations. Bonal and Rambla 
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contend that “[g]lobalisation has consequences for the displacement of explanatory and 
normative frames of reference at a national or global level, but it also has consequences 
through legitimising, in the name of globalisation, particular types of political strategy 
and models of governance which are defined as necessary and appropriate” (Bonal and 
Rambla 2009: 155).  
Some of these education policy ideas and proposals represent “[t]he introduction 
of market mechanisms and logics (choice, competition, decentralisation), [and] the 
liberalisation and privatisation of the education sector” which are underpined by an 
hegemonic agenda of neoliberal ideology (Verger et al. 2012: 7). However, globalisation 
has also paved the way for and stimulated the development of transnational social justice 
movements and advocacy coalition campaigns for establishing education as a human right 
and a global public good. Moreover, some of these movements have contested the 
expansion of neoliberalism in education and the neoliberalisation of education (Novelli 
and Ferus-Comelo 2010). To conclude, as Verger, Novelli and Altinyelken have 
suggested, globalisation has to be seen as a new (conflicting) terrain, which redefines the 
education problems and priorities and the scale where they are addressed: 
 
It defines the problems to be addressed and, at the same time, alters the capacity 
of the states to respond to these problems by themselves; it empowers 
international actors and makes the transnational organisation of policy networks 
more pressing; and it is a strategically selective and conflicting terrain for 
educational policy-making, which is more conducive to certain educational 
policy ideas and political actors than others (Verger et al. 2012: 7).  
 
 
1.1.2 Theoretical perspectives on national education systems in a globalized world 
 
The relationship between global education models/trends/policies and national education 
systems and the effects of globalisation on education has generated a number of debates. 
Such debates, in turn, are animated by positions that are indebted to a number of 
theoretical perspectives within the broad field of comparative and international education 
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studies. These perspectives can be represented along a continuum: on one side, we have 
neo-institutionalist approaches, represented by the ‘World Society’ Theory (or World 
Culture Theory [WCT] or World Culture Polity [WCP]); on the other extreme we find 
international political economy approaches, represented by the ‘Globally Structured 
Agenda for Education’ and the ‘Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education’ 
analysis.  
In different degrees and ways, all of these perspectives seek to describe, analyze 
and/or explain how global education models and trends travel, transplant, diffuse or 
translate and how they are adopted/assimilated within national education systems. They 
differ, however, in a number of aspects, beginning with the different normative value they 
put on globalisation (its effects on education, the focus on different cultural, economic 
and political factors that contribute to the globalization of education) to the emphasis they 
lay on norms, agency and power.  
World society scholars – having a central position among comparative education 
studies investigating globalisation and education – argue that a global model of schooling 
exists, has spread around the world and it is part of the diffusion of a culturally embedded 
model of the modern (Western) nation-state (Anderson-Levitt 2003) or an international 
ideal type of rationalized and bureaucratic state (Drezner 2001).  
Put differently, this theory postulates the existence of “[a] ‘world culture’, or 
‘world polity’, [which] constitutes a universal transnational, cultural environment, and it 
is the existence of this common symbolic universe that explains the apparent worldwide 
convergence of conceptions of education. This symbolic universe is based on the values 
and propositions of Western modernity, which frame conceptions of both state and 
individual, especially through the ‘scripts’ that they provide for states in terms of 
education” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 157). 
Expanding schooling is part of conforming and converging to world models of the 
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organisation of sovereignty (Meyer et al. 1997 quoted in Verger et al. 2012: 11). 
Education, in the view of world society scholars, is a key sector for national governments 
to show to the international community that they are building a modern nation-state 
(external legitimacy), whose building and provision contributes to the consolidation of an 
internal type of legitimacy vis-à-vis their own constituencies. World society scholars are 
not focused on education policy change or specific forms of education models and 
reform. Their main point is not whether state policy (including education) is exogenously 
influenced, but that the state is an exogenously constructed entity (Verger et al. 2012: 12).  
In trying to understand what explains educational models and change worldwide, 
the world culture debate has emphasised specifically the existence of  convergence 
towards global models. In this regard, it can be seen as a valuable theory as far as 
accounting for the isomorphism that exists at the global level (i.e., similar education 
systems/models/conceptions despite the contextual differences) is concerned. One of the 
underlying assumptions is that convergence is enacted through the consensual diffusion 
of cultural norms or models. 
World culture theorists have focused on a number of education ‘models’ that have 
been identified by many scholars as central to the diffusion of the neoliberal ideology in 
education. Such models (or trends) are (1) decentralisation, devolution, privatisation and 
marketisation of education; (2) standardisation of curriculum with math and science 
emphasised; (3) a rise in national education assessment and international testing; (4) 
evidence-based education policy; (5) managerialism and rationalisation of universities 
(Silova and Brehm 2015: 17).  
Scholars such as Carney (2009) have used the concept of ‘policyscape’ to refer to 
a range of policy ideas and visions related to conceptions of the role of the state in 
education, the functions of education, etc., which are shared and used by a variety of 
international and local actors at various scales and which influence the ways these actors 
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think and implement education policy. According to him, a transnational policyscape 
underpinned by hyperliberalism is “[s]tandardising the flow of educational ideas 
internationally and changing fundamentally what education is and can be” (Carney 2009: 
68).  
While convincing in its explaining policy convergence, WCT has been criticised 
for what education anthropologists have defined as the disconnection of policy and 
practice, and global norms vis-à-vis local meanings (Anderson-Levitt 2003). Critics have 
pointed out that global policy scripts have not necessarily been adopted in local contexts 
as they seem, thus the impact of global scripts on policy outcomes needs reconsideration4 
(Steiner-Khamsi 2004; Silova 2006 quoted in Silova and Brehm 2015: 10). A further line 
of critique has argued that power dynamics have been ignored in world culture analysis. 
Stromquist (2015) argues that one of the limitations of WCT is that it contends a conflict-
free diffusion of values. It has denied agency (or at least has lacked a theory of agency) 
and reflective action within local and transnational contexts, and has overlooked the role 
of social struggles for change. Finally, WCT has at best overlooked, at worst denied the 
importance of the economic and political dimensions in and of the globalization of 
education (Stromquist 2015)..  
International Political Economy (IPE) approaches emphasise the role of economic 
drivers for educational change. For the Globally Structured Agenda for Education, the 
world capitalist economy is the driving force behind globalisation, and economic 
globalisation (and the related competitive pressure) is the main driving force behind the 
transformations occurring in education (Dale 2000). As mentioned above, globalisation 
has altered the problems faced by nation-states, and their capacity to respond to them 
(Dale 2000). It can be seen as a political force, that indirectly (rather than directly) affects 
                                                
4 By using Japan as a contrasting case in point, Jeremy Rappleye shows how the application of world 
culture to Japan or any other ‘insulated’ case lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of a given 
contexts and its people (2015). Consensual convergence/application of global models are not what 
explains educational reform and change in the case of Japan, as in other contexts.  
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education by altering the structural conditions within which education change and reform 
take place (Verger et al. 2012: 13).  
IPE approaches problematise the globalisation’s effects on education by critically 
investigating and highlighting the way through which neo-liberal and efficiency-driven 
types of reform in education are underscorring core principles in education such as equity 
(Carnoy 1999 quoted in Verger et al. 2012: 14). Moreover, such approaches bring to the 
fora the changing nature of state sovereignty by showing how fundamental education 
policies are being taken by international or transnational networks and organisations 
beyond the control of democratically elected institutions (Moutsios 2010 quoted in 
Verger et al. 2012). 
Neo-institutionalist and international political economy approaches place 
different emphasis on the role of international organisations in agenda setting, transfer 
and policy convergence. For World Society scholars, IOs are Western modernising agents 
(quite always at the service of their nation states) that spread the Western system of 
political organisation and state authority (Meyer et al. 1992a quoted in Verger et al. 2012: 
15). From an IPE angle, IOs spread particular views/ideas of education and educational 
reform, which are instrumental to the development of a neo-liberal and market-oriented 
economy, and are not to be seen as mere extension of nation states but have their own 
power and agenda. Indeed, World Society scholars overlook the many divergent and 
competing agendas and meanings of education agendas promoted by different 
international organisations. The way such organisations spread these views and the 
corresponding policies is through a range of policy mechanisms or global mechanisms of 
influence such as imposition, harmonisation, dissemination, standardisation, or the 
establishment of interdependence (Dale 1999). 
Beyond international organisations, there are a number of other international 
actors, which by using norms, ideational and material capacities, influence educational 
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policy setting and making. They are knowledge-intensive and their main source of power 
relies on knowledge and ideas. Among them, the most relevant are networks of 
international consultants and policy enterpreneurs (Ball 2007, Robertson and Verger 
2012), transnational civil society networks (Mundy et al. 2001) or international 
foundations. 
Perhaps not suriprisingly, but contrary to the absolute world convergence of 
education policy and practice that is highlighted by World Society scholars, empirical 
findings stemming from fieldwork show that globalisation does not have the same effects 
on education in all places (Robertson et al. 2006). In particular, Rappleye (2015) and 
Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe (2006) claim that policy ideas are transformed, indigenised or 
resisted while travelling and as they are implemented in different countries and contexts. 
This is first of all due to the fact that a policy - beyond its textual form - is and becomes 
part of a constantly mediated and disputed technical and political debate, which is always 
contigent and contextual (Verger et al. 2012: 23). Education policies are thus locally 
mediated by a plethora of international and local actors: they are re-contextualized 
through multiple processes across a range of different scales.  
Scholars point out to four types of factors – material, political, cultural and scalar 
– that explain why the implementation of global education policies can be problematic 
across different settings. According to Steiner-Khamsi, failures in education reforms 
often are not due to technicalities, limited funding or the incapacity of recipient countries 
to implement them; they are rather due to “[t]he fundamenal contradictions that arise 
when (policy) solutions are borrowed from educational systems where the problems are 
entirely different” (2010: 331).  
 
1.1.3 Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education 
 
The emphasis placed on the ‘world’ system made up of separate nation states 
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distinguishes WCT by the ‘structured education agenda’ approach (Dale 2000) which 
emphasises the importance and role of a number of transnational economic and political 
organizations, as well as global movements and practices. Most of these transnational 
organizations are representative of a global project of neo-liberalisation. The structured 
education agenda’s analysis is underpinned by a political-economy framework rather than 
a cultural one: “[t]he agenda for globalisation is seen as structured [...] by a dominant 
conception of a global knowledge economy, into which all nation states are incorporated, 
more or less directly, and which all states are more or less strongly bound and free to 
interpret” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 158). The critical cultural political economy of 
education (CCPEE) departs from this approach and tries to address some of its 
limitations, such as the fact that the approach tends to reduce the economy to one form of 
economic organization (capitalism), do not incorporate the cultural in its analysis and like 
the other above-mentioned approaches it lacks “[a] sufficiently developed account of 
agency or of the basis of social change” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 158).  
Both the structured education agenda and the CCPEE see globalization “[a]s a 
witting attempt by a range of national and transnational organisations to bring about a set 
of interventions around the globe aimed at extending the role of the market and reducing 
the role of national states” with effects on national education systems and models 
(Robertson and Dale 2015: 159). However, the expansion of capitalism or of the market 
cannot account alone for the globalisation of education processes worldwide. Other more 
cultural or political factors may in addition explain the globalisation of education, as well 
as education convergence and change. For example, the agenda of expansion of education 
around the world has been promoted by a cultural and political process which considers 
the increase of access at formal schooling a human right.  
Building upon critical cultural political economy analysis (Jessop and Yin 2004a, 
2004b; Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Jessop 2010) Susan Robertson and Roger Dale 
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(2015) have put forth an ambitious theoretical and methodological project – Critical, 
Cultural Political Economy of Education (CCPEE) – at the centre of which lies the study 
of education ensemble, the ways it is affected by and interacts with globalization, and its 
relationship with the political, the economic and the cultural, ultimately redefining each 
of these concepts in a non-hierarchical way. Here culture, politics and economics 
(relationships) in education are approached in critical and non-deterministic ways.  
Robertson and Dale (2015) claim that other theoretical perspectives that have 
analysed the globalisation of education have only focused on one of the three elements 
(i.e., the cultural, the political or the economic) without incorporating all of them in the 
analysis. Therefore, the reading that such accounts offer of the structures, institutions and 
actors underpinning the education ensemble is partial not grasping/offering a picture of 
the ensemble in the complexity of its forms, scope and outcomes and limited often to the 
level of that which is visible, overlooking structural, but invisible, processses (Silova and 
Rappleye 2015: 6). This recent alternative approach aims to enable critique, action and 
education change.   
For Novelli et al. (2013), CCPEE is first of all not a theory but a heuristic 
approach for engaging with the culture, politics and economics relationship in education; 
secondly, CCPEE constructively engages with culture-beyond-semiosis, and it links 
culture to materialist underpinnings albeit in open, non-deterministic ways; third, it 
constructively and critically engages with postmodernism/poststructuralism; lastly, 
CCPEE’s engagement with culture allows researchers to take the Globally Structured 
Education Agenda (Dale 2000) down to the micro-level and back up again (Burawoy 
2009 quoted in Novelli et al. 2013). 
Going beyond culture as semiosis or discourse may help avoid the risk of 
ignoring other cultural issues related to civilisational and identity aspects (Novelli et al. 
2013). Moreover, the study of economy as capitalist and non-capitalist opens it up to a 
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comparison of use and exchange value. Finally, the study of the political as more than the 
state opens it up to comparisons of the different ways in which power shapes education 
and how power is embedded in different state and non-state actors directly or indirectly 
involved in education.  
Common to this range of diverse comparative education perspectives (both 
mainstream and critical) is the emphasis put on globalisation and on the globalising 
effects on education policy, practice and pedagogy to the expense of other ongoing 
processes in the global South, such as violent processes of civil war, seccessionism, and 
international interventions of peacekeeping/building and statebuilding that shape 
education.  
The next two sections in this chapter will attempt to address such gaps by 
critically reviewing, the literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding one the one hand, 
and the literature on conflict and education (of which the scholarship on education, 
peacebuilding and social change is a recent add) on the other. This is done by putting at 
center stage how processes of war making, post-conflict reconstruction and 
statebuilding/peacebuilding impact on education and viceversa. Practitioner and scholarly 
contributions reviewing statebuilding and peacebuilding processes have only superficially 
touched upon the issue of education, relegating its role in the post-war peacebuilding 
architecture as one among several social services that needs to be re-established and 
provided, de facto disconnecting education from the broader and more complex 
relationship with processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding.  
 
1.2  The ommission of education in debates on statebuilding and peacebuilding 
interventions  
 
The observable ‘erosion’ and the hypothesized ultimate transformation of what 
historically used to be a strong link between education and the state has become more 
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prominent and empirically detectable in post-war, fragile and conflict-affected settings. 
On the one hand, in such settings the state often is not able anymore to protect education 
from a multiplicity of attacks. On the other, such states are often exposed to 
interventionary processes, practices and agendas promoted by different international 
actors, such as emergency and humanitarian response, development assistance, 
peacebuilding, statebuilding, all having an impact on education and – one has to assume - 
on its relationship with the nation state. 
Therefore, I argue that using a ‘globalisation/globalising’ lens is not enough for 
understanding the reform of education, its changing forms and functions, and the 
transformation of its liaisons with the nation state without incorporating broader 
processes in the analysis. For this reason, I will now specifically focus on the body of 
work that examines internationally mandated interventions to build peace in states that 
have been swept by war or that have been borne out of war. I argue that while this 
literature is useful for contextualizing education reform within a framework of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding practice(s), it is quite omissive when it comes to how 
education is affected by peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions and viceversa. 
Any discussion on the complex relationship between education, statebuilding and 
peacebuilding in a post-conflict country should start from a consideration of the link 
between peacebuilding and statebuilding and their interchangeable use in discourse and 
merging in practice. As both peacebuilding and statebuilding aim to achieve similar 
results, they are often used interchangeably masking differences and contradictions 
(Campbell and Peterson 2013: 336).  
According to Smith (2004: 28), international statebuilding and peacebuilding are 
pursued through similar set of activities. International interveners have often ignored 
fundamental differences between the two. While - theoretically speaking - statebuilding 
can potentially lead to peace, its focus on the building of formal institutions may be 
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expected to deflect attention from addressing structural causes of violence, which is a 
condition deemed necessary for the more empancipatory and sustainable peace that 
peacebuilding should theoretically contribute to build (Galtung 1996).  
Some of the aspects that may make statebuilding unsuitable for promoting 
sustainable peace are the fact that it is ahistorical claiming to be technocratic rather than 
political (while in fact it is as much political as it is technocratic); statebuilding is often 
bureaucratic, fragmented and ‘project-ized’; ultimately, it is criticized for harboring a 
reductivist, state-centric conceptualization of peace (Campbell and Peterson 2013: 339-
343). Indeed, critics mark a clear distinction between peacebuilding and statebuilding 
particularly on the last point; i.e., statebuilding reinforces “[t]he elitist notion that lodges 
legitimacy in authorities favoured by the ‘international community’, rather than in the 
customary social contracts and grounded legitimacy of socially meaningful institutions” 
(Pugh 2013: 17). From critical perspectives, the blurring of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding has become problematic: Richmond (2011: 46-50) notes that this is 
particularly the case in those contexts where the state does not hold the key to the social 
contract.  
The case of Kosovo is emblematic in this respect, since the very existence of 
‘which state’ has become one of the most problematic aspects of the post-conflict phase. 
As one of the most pervasive cases of peacebuilding enterprise, Kosovo could also be 
taken as an illustration of how the shift towards a statebuilding discourse (from 
independence onward) has been, to a large extent, a rhetorical attempt to hide and 
overcome failures of peacebuilding efforts during the previous decade (1999-2008). 
Although here one finds greater emphasis on building state institutions and strengthening 
the rule of law, power and decision-making remain in the hands of a plethora of 
international actors. In Kosovo, bolstering the state (which is expected to lead to greater 
stability in the country) and assisting political elites has also entailed the consolidation of 
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the grip on power on the part of predatory elites, coming to terms with them for the sake 
of stability defined as peace: Paris and Sisk refer to this situation as the peacebuilder’s 
contract dilemma (2009).  
This situation highlights one of the many dilemmas that statebuilding and 
peacebuilding efforts encounter in countries emerging from armed hostilities. The 
dilemma exposes also one of the main critiques that scholars working from a critical 
perspective: the excessive attention that liberal peaceduilding agendas devote to 
rebuilding and enforcing formal state institutions in post-conflict countries rather than 
focusing more on the community, societal and individual level (Richmond 2011). 
 
1.2.1 Liberal peacebuilding, peacebuilding from below and hybrid peace governance 
 
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the so-called new wars (Kaldor 1999; 
Duffield 2001) transformed the engagement of the international community in post-
conflict areas. The post-Cold Era marked also a change in the UN approach to tackle war 
and restore peace, with peacekeeping and peacemaking missions and operations 
becoming increasingly complex. These missions would not just aim to stop war and 
violence, but they would also seek to restore and build conditions that are conducive to 
sustainable peace, by tackling the causes that brought to war and the consequences that 
the latter left behind. The paradigmatic shift in conflict resolution, supported by a number 
of UN documents such as the Agenda for Peace (1992) or the Brahimi Report (2000), 
would become known as peacebuilding, which is consistent with the taking shape of a 
liberal peace agenda. Supportive of peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, peacebuilding 
seeks to address and to overcome structural contradictions that lie at the root of conflict 
(Galtung 1996).  
In Boutros-Ghali’s report An Agenda for Peace (1992) peacebuilding is defined 
as “[p]ost-conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen 
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and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. The process comprises an 
overwhelming agenda of intervention, and it focuses on (but it is not limited to) the 
building of legitimate and accountable democratic institutions through free elections, the 
establishment of rule of law, human rights, free media, market economy and civil society 
(Paris 1997, 2004).  
While initially conceived as a post-conflict practice, peacebuilding is increasingly 
considered as necessary during all phases of a conflict (Novelli and Smith 2011: 11). The 
UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee’s (re)definition of peacebuilding seems to 
reflect a broader, transformational understanding of it:  
 
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing 
or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for 
conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and 
development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the 
specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and 
should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively 
narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.5 
 
  
Richmond (2005) identifies 4 strands, or variations, of liberal peace that underpin 
peacebuilding interventions: 1) victor’s peace: close to a realist definition, whose 
foundation are underpinned by military strength; 2) constitutional peace: resting upon 
democracy, free market, free trade and cosmopolitanism; 3) institutional peace: the 
entities involved in conflict are bound within normative and legal frameworks of 
international institutions regulating their behavior; 4) civil peace: the focus is on citizens, 
participation and human rights. In the liberal paradigm that is dominant in peacebuilding 
operations, peace is achieved through political, economic and social liberalization. It aims 
at reproducing the neo-liberal (pseudo- and quasi-) sovereign state, as well as liberal, 
normative and institutional governance through forms of international surveillance (Lidén 
                                                
5 http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.c fm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=1765 (last 
accessed 28 November 2012) 
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et al 2009). 
To counter the verticality of top-down peacebuilding and its focus on formal free 
market, competitive and functioning elections and state institutions, the concept of 
‘peacebuilding from below’ has been elaborated over the past decade by Lederach (2005). 
Peacebuilding from below encourages the empowerment of local communities, stressing 
the significance and sovereignty of local actors; it should enhance a sustainable citizen-
based peace in a partnership between international interveners and local actors. Lederach 
calls for indigenous empowerment: peacebuilding from below becomes entrenched with 
the idea of liberating communities, peace represents in this view a process through which 
a space for the cultivation of the culture and of the structure of peace itself is created 
(2005).  
Activities aiming at building peace, which in the 1980s were associated with 
“[q]uasi-subversive, bottom-up challenges to the logic of bipolar confrontation” 
(Strazzari 2008a: 48), during the 1990s were gradually incorporated in the liberal-
institutionalist agenda for peace and in the new generation of multi-functional 
peacebuilding missions of the past two decades. Excesses in top-down peace engineering, 
inspired by shock therapies of assisted political and economic liberalization, have since 
been revised with renewed emphasis on local agency and local ownership. Scholarly 
work and ‘grey’ policy literature have been increasingly stressing the salience of local 
agency, considering it fundamental for the success of statebuilding and peacebuilding as a 
transformative yet collective effort for the achievement of a sustainable peace (Baranyi 
2008).  
Nonetheless, recent experiences and research have shown that peacebuilding from 
below is far from exempt from problems. Local communities and civil society 
organizations are site of power asymmetries, and carry on a number of problematic 
features such as ethno-national discriminations, clientalistic practices and relationships: 
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“[p]eacebuilding from below is not a panacea or magic wand, and can itself conceal 
vested interests and the influence of possibly corrupt and self-seeking actors” 
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 266). 
According to Belloni, liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict countries has by and 
large failed: “[r]ather than establishing a liberal and democratic peace, intervention has 
led to a hybrid condition wherein liberal and illiberal, democratic and undemocratic 
elements co-exist, while the absence of a full scale war resembles a truce more than a 
substantive version of peace” (2012: 21). A growing strand of literature deals with the 
concept of hybrid peace, whether as a de facto situation on the ground of peacebuilding 
initiatives (Mac Ginty 2011, Belloni 2012) or as the (envisaged) overcoming of the liberal 
peace itself (Richmond 2011). It is not yet clear whether hybridity is a deviation of (or 
from) liberalism, what are its implications in terms of establishing a more sustainable and 
locally-rooted form of peace, and if a particular type of hybridity may be more conducive 
to positive outcomes: be that as it may, the concept gives credit and centrality to the role 
of local agency in shaping peacebuilding processes and outcomes and it provides useful 
insights to peacebuilding dynamics on the ground (Mac Ginty 2011; Roberts 2011; 
Belloni 2012).  
Three forms of hybrid peace governance can be identified: first, an informal 
interaction between traditional and illiberal norms and practices and formal ones; second, 
formal inclusion of non-state actors into state structures; last, state structures dominated 
by violent non-state actors, which can be integrated into governmental structures for the 
sake of stability (Belloni 2012). In reality the three forms are not often pretty distinct, yet, 
the categories provide useful insights for capturing the dynamics. Although the issue of 
hybrid peace as a feasible alternative to liberal peacebuilding has been supported by a 
growing number of scholars (Mac Ginty 2011; Roberts 2011; Boege 2011), and 
Richmond has provided a set of empirical examples of nascent forms of hybrid peace, 
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how and which type of hybridity is conducive to (which) peace is still poorly understood 
(Belloni 2012).  
The recently emerged literature on hybrid orders and hybrid peace(building) is 
virtually silent on education. The marginalisation of the education sector within 
international (peacebuilding/statebuilding) interventions in post-conflict and conflict-
affected countries is more generally reflected in the work of scholars working within IR, 
peace and conflict studies (both mainstream and critical): sometimes evoked, the 
relationship between education reconstruction/reform and processes of 
peacebuilding/statebuilding is typically overlooked, glossed over, and by and large 
omitted.  
The political economy of conflict and peacebuilding literature has extensively 
investigated plausible causal mechanisms that may lead to further conflict and/or to 
successful post-conflict peacebulding. For example, the (policy-) influential conflict 
theory elaborated by Paul Collier framed along the greed vs. grievance dichotomy has 
identified economic sources as primary factors for war (Collier et al. 2004). Within this 
approach, that is fundamentally consistent with neo-liberal tenets - education practitioners 
and scholars have analysed education for its effects on both conflict and peace, more 
specifically its securitising potential often linked to broader counterinsurgency strategies 
(Novelli 2012). What is not recognized in this debate is that the struggle for education 
injustice might be central to explaining participation in armed conflicts and social and 
educational justice might be part of the solution (Novelli 2011a).  
 
1.2.2 What role for education in international statebuilding?  
 
Over time growing concern for instability linked to phenomena such as state fragility, 
state failure and state collapse shifted the focus of international attention from 
establishing free, competitive economies and democratic societies towards strengthening 
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the state and its institutions (or institutional capacities), through a new, somewhat more 
narrowly conceived dimension of peacebuilding. In extreme synthesis, such a shift, which 
can be regarded as a trend in peacebuilding thinking and practice, came to be known as 
statebuilding and it has been seen as a means towards the achievement of the longer-term 
goal of peace (Wennman 2010). Ronald Paris’ imperative ‘institutionalization before 
democratization’ can be seen as a case in point (Paris 2004).  
The two terms are often used in international politics as synonyms. The OECD-
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has defined statebuilding as “[a]n 
endogenous process of strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state, 
driven by state-society relations” (2010: 21). In Paris and Sisk’s own words, statebuilding 
means “[t]he strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions in 
countries that are emerging from conflicts” (2009: 14). Other scholars have pointed out 
that statebuilding is a response to the failure of peacebuilding strategies during the 1990s, 
which were characterized by an excessive focus on quick restoration of democratic 
institutions and open market economies, with the state playing a minimal role.  
Berit Bliesemann de Guevara has identified three analytical perspectives on how 
international statebuilding influences post-war, non-western states (2012: 2). The first 
perspective, epistemologically problem-solving, draws on the consensus of western, 
liberal-democratic policy circles and considers international statebuilding intervention as 
necessary for the security of post-war countries and that of the international system more 
broadly. The aim is to mould non-western states according to liberal-democratic 
standards set by the west (Chesterman et al. 2005; Paris 2004). Such an approach, known 
as the ‘liberal peace consensus’ has become hegemonic and despite obvious statebuilding 
failures in a number of contexts there are no signs that it will be chaop00nged soon 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 3).  
Critical perspectives, by contrast, have argued that international statebuilding 
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discourses and practices have depoliticized the non-Western state. The depoliticization-
by-statebuilding argument claims that the states that are being built are phantom and lack 
recognition by and legitimacy vis-à-vis their societies. While strong in unravelling how 
(international) power structures through statebuilding have hindered the legitimacy of 
externally-built state institutions, critical scholars have paid little attention to issues of 
local agency, social struggles, the effects of statebuilding on these externally-built states 
and societies and the global and historical structures within which such states are 
embedded (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 3). What both perspectives have in common is 
a tendency to romanticize the local and underestimate local agency.  
More recently, a third perspective that combines political sociology with 
anthropological approaches to statebuilding has tried to overcome the limits of the above-
mentioned approaches (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; Berger and Weber 2006; 
Heathershaw and Lambach 2008; Herring and Rangwala 2006; Lemay-Hébert 2009; 
Pouligny 2006). Such an approach claims that the internationalization or globalization of 
post-war, non-Western, peripheral states in the global South do not mean the end of local 
agency or social struggles. Authors within this ‘third perspective’ seem to make a step 
ahead versus the other two theoretical angles, when they look into the effects of 
statebuilding for local political contexts and power struggles/structures, the dynamics 
between local and international politics, and the ways in which effects and dynamics are 
shaped by global structures and ideas (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 4). The multiple 
aspects unravelled by and grasped through the adoption of this perspective can be 
analytically captured by distinguishing: 
  
between state-building, as a conscious effort at creating an apparatus of control, 
and state-formation, as an historical process whose outcome is a largely 
unconscious and contradictory process of conflicts, negotiations and 
compromises between diverse groups whose self-serving actions and trade-offs 
constitute the vulgarization of power (Berman and Lonsdale 1992: 5 quoted in 
Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 5). 
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Seen under this light, the effects of statebuilding are never clearly and fully intentional 
results that are determined by top-down practices: rather, such effects unfold in 
contingent, contradictory and often unintentional ways in the interaction between local 
and international actors (Ferguson 2006: 283 – 4). The concept of state-formation draws 
attention to the historicity and the global embeddedness of the state and its dynamics. 
Migdal and Schlichte have highlighted how in such external statebuilding contexts some 
or the most important state core functions are highly internationalized (2005). Moreover, 
internationalized forms of financing in interventionary contexts (Schlichte 2005: 182-
221) have led to the detachment of the state from its society, whose relationship is not 
based anymore on state’s capacities for domestic taxation and delivery/provision of core 
services/functions.  
Within the range of theoretical perspectives focusing on statebuilding, the only 
studies that have investigated the relationship between education and 
peacebuilding/statebuilding interventions, come from the policy and practitioner world 
(DFID 2011; McCandless 2011; Novelli and Smith 2011). Such a body of work, that one 
may identify as ‘grey literature’, has focused on the impact that the provision of education 
– as one of the main social services to be delivered in the aftermath of the war – has on 
addressing past grievances and on enhancing (output) legitimacy for national and 
international actors. Western interventions that aim at preventing state failure or relapse 
into conflict, have increasingly focused on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of citizens 
(Novelli 2010).  The reform and provision of education as service delivery is a key part of 
this strategy, linked to issues of legitimacy for the national government and the 
international peace/state building mission (McCandless 2011).  
McCandless argues that in those post-conflict societies emerging out of war, the 
lack of or the unequal distribution of social services can be a driver of conflict (2011: 1). 
The resumption of social services, in the aftermath of a conflict, in the form of education 
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access is more tangible to the community than the security sector or constitutional 
reforms (McCandless 2011: 29). The control and/or manipulation of social services can 
on the one hand create horizontal inequalities and undermine peacebuilding objectives; on 
the other one, the equal and just provision can foster trust between state and society.  
In the 2009 report Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict the UN 
Secretary-General (UN SG) has pointed out that the provision of social services has been 
one of the five recurring priorities. However, despite increasing recognition that 
education and other social services constitute a key pillar for state legitimacy and societal 
resilience, too little attention is given to them in statebuilding interventions that remain 
focused on the security sector and political process (McCandless 2011: 2).  
In conflict-affected areas, the distribution of aid to education remains mainly 
determined by security imperatives and it reflects the increasing trend in blurring the lines 
between the diplomatic, defence and developments rationales.6 With the rise of 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding and statebuilding missions during the 1990s, international 
actors have been supplementing or substituting the state in its capacities to deliver 
education in the aftermath of armed conflict. This has been particularly clear in cases 
such as East Timor and Kosovo, where internationally mandated administrations were 
created in 1999. In East Timor and Kosovo, for example, the UN and other international 
actors have since the beginning been involved in rebuilding school infrastructure, in 
recruiting teachers and in procuring instructional materials. As case analysis of East 
Timor and Kosovo will show in the following chapters, both countries 15 years after still 
deal with the strong legacy of external involvement, education sector included.  
According to Tawil and Harley (2004), post-conflict educational reconstruction 
should comprise a long-term strategy of policy and curriculum development and teacher 
                                                
6 For example, while Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan have received most of the share in official aid to 
education, other conflict settings such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad or Cote d’Ivoire have 
been poorly supported despite the equally large financing gap (UNESCO 2011: 174). 
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training that is driven and provisioned by local actors and processes rather than external 
actors (se also INEE 2011). Besides hampering bottom-up, locally-driven processes, 
externally-driven educational projects have been increasingly target of attacks, with the 
life of aid workers and of those teaching and learning seriously put under threat (Novelli 
2011a; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2012). 
In the second part of this chapter, I will analyse the scholarship (both problem-
solving and critical) that tackles education reform in emergency, humanitarian and 
broader peacebuilding/statebuilding interventions, with a view at those thereotical 
perspectives and approaches that have characterized the field of education, conflict and 
peacebuilding in the past two decades. As section one has shown, the field of education 
(and its reform in post-conflict international interventions) is seriously overlooked in both 
mainstream and critical scholarship on peacebuilding and statebuilding. This state of 
affairs reflects and reinforces the marginality of education sector reform within the 
current peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas.  
 
Part Two – How Education Affects Conflict, Peacebuilding and 
Social Change  
 
This section will analyse academic and policy debates on the relationship between 
education on the one side, and conflict, peacebuilding and social change on the other side. 
The main research works that have inspired the proliferation and reinvigoration of these 
debates in the late 1990s are the UNICEF report by Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli 
The two faces of education in ethnic conflicts (2000), and Lynn Davies’ Education and 
Conflict: Complexity and Chaos (2004): while the former draws a distinction between the 
negative and positive face of education, the latter elaborates an interdisciplinary 
framework for analysis that rests upon complexity theory.  
This research situates itself within a critical perspective that seeks to go beyond 
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the above-mentioned ‘two faces of education’ debate: the review that is presented here, 
therefore, aims to develop analytical categories that can guide my analysis and allow to 
grasp the multifaceted roles of education, while challenging dichotomizing and 
deterministic relationships between education and conflict/peace. The purpose is to 
question and ultimately destabilize the concept of peace and conflict that are commonly 
in use by looking at their contingent, contextual and conjectural manifestations: 
elaborations and articulations that I will extract from the literature review have a value in 
leading my analysis of the actual post-war settings where I will put education under 
scrutiny, specifically in Kosovo and East Timor. 
 I would like to contribute to a recent body of literature that, far from constituting 
a school, in recent years has nonetheless sought to account for the complex and multiple 
faces of education, conflict and peace. Important steps in this direction have been made, 
for example, by Mario Novelli and Alan Smith in their research work for UNICEF dated 
2011: other examples are Lopes Cardozo and Shah (2014; 2015), Gross and Davies 
(2015), and Pherali (2015). Much of these scholars’ work can be characterized as “[a] 
shift away from grand narratives towards more contingent, specific and contextually 
driven understandings of how educational processes, decisions and actions unfold in such 
settings” (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014: 3). 
These scholars’ work has not only critically analysed the multifaceted role of 
education in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings, but it has also made an attempt to 
move the debate on: from ‘education and conflict’ towards the investigation of the 
potentially multiple ways through which education could contribute to building a just and 
sustainable peace. Linked to the impact of education on the conflict/peace nexus, 
education can play a role in terms of addressing inequities and discriminatory schooling 
structures/contents that are reflected in and reinforced through education systems, and 
which mirrors the broader structural inequities of a given context. Such role is played and 
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enabled through at the level of structure, content and agency.  
Either by laying emphasis on the analysis of education and conflict or, by 
contrast, on peacebuilding and education, the issues that need to be examined are similar: 
the inequity of access and opportunities in education, as well as the relevance, quality and 
representation in the governance of education reform, are themes that will be reviewed 
more in specific in the third part of this chapter. This last section, beside presenting the 
debate, will elaborate a framework of analysis for investigating the relationship between 
education and peacebuilding from a social justice perspective by looking into questions 
such as access, curricula, pedagogy, the role of teachers, and broader governance of 
education reform. In doing so, it will consider authors that have examined the ways in 
which the reform and rebuilding of education can play a transformative role, as opposed 
to a conservative/restorative role.  
 
1.3 The nexus education-conflict: from ‘two faces’ to ‘many faces’ 
 
Only a few years ago, research on conflict and education could be described as a ‘field in 
its infancy’ (Tomlinson and Benefield 2005). Recent contributions to this field can be 
characterized by attempts to bridge problem-solving and critical theory through an 
interdisciplinary perspective. Novelli and Lopes Cardozo (2008) have called for the 
development of a critical research agenda on education and conflict, which draws upon 
Roger Dale’s work on mainstream educational research and globalization. Dale argues 
that the existing research on education tends to avoid the contribution of other disciplines, 
such as IR theory, conflict and security studies, and development studies. He puts forth a 
‘politics of education’ approach that seeks to overcome the pitfalls of ‘methodological 
nationalism’ by placing education practices and policies within a broader regional and 
international political economy (Dale 2005). 
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Part of the literature on education and conflict has examined the negative effects 
of war on education systems: here the focus has been on reconstructing educational 
infrastructure in the aftermath of the war. Another stream of literature has investigated the 
ways through which educational opportunities and access affect the probability of the 
restart of the conflict: here success has been measured in terms of enrolment rates, and 
the focus has been on the quantity of education (Dixon 2009; Ishiyama and Breuning 
2012).  
A further body of research has analyzed the complex and multifaceted role of 
education in (post-) conflict settings (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Smith and Vaux 2003; 
Davies 2004; Gallagher 2004; Tawil and Harley 2004; Buckland 2006; Lai and Thyne 
2007; Novelli and Lopez-Cardozo 2008; Paulson 2011b). This body of work has 
specifically focused on the structure and content of education systems, and on how they 
may reproduce and exacerbate conflict or contribute to peace (Gallagher 2011; Paulson 
2011a; Davies 2011; Mosselson 2011).  
In times of emergency and/or conflict and in its aftermath, education is often seen 
as one of the few protective measures that provides with a sense of normalcy, routine and 
psychosocial recovery (Smith and Vaux 2003, Smith 2005, Winthrop and Kirk 2008, 
UNESCO 2011, Novelli and Smith 2011, Save the Children 2013, Talbot 2013). As 
mentioned above, education provision plays a role as a peace dividend and in restoring 
state legitimacy (Dupuy 2008, Rose and Greeley 2006). Education more broadly plays a 
role in terms of reconciliation, nation-building and social cohesion through those 
messages, values and skills that through education are trasmitted and built (Fukayama 
2001, Tawil and Harley 2004, Sommers 2002: 18). 
In their seminal report The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a 
Peacebuilding Education for Children, Bush and Saltarelli (2000) investigated the ways 
in which education both affects and is affected by war, ranging from positive to negative 
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effects. Bush and Saltarelli note that education has the potential to contribute positively to 
building peace as part of a process of social repair, reform and social justice: however, a 
certain type of education under certain circumstances can do more harm than good. ‘Post-
conflict educational provision’ as a fixed package is not enough: issues of educational 
content, organization and governance can contribute to further conflict if due 
consideration is not placed over how such issues might have been among the causes or 
other factors that have fuelled escalation in the pre-war phase.  
A body of work is increasingly recognizing and emphasising the fact that certain 
educational aspects (i.e., equity, content, relevance, management) and specific conflict 
drivers (i.e., security, economic, social, cultural and political aspects) operate in 
contingent and at times conflicting ways (Shah and Cardozo 2014b). Not only is 
education seldom the solution to conflict, but the way in which it is reformed, rebuilt or 
located within the broader political economy of post-conflict reconstruction may turn it to 
be more a force of bad than a force of good.  
According to Shah and Lopes Cardozo “[e]ducation has multiple faces and 
dynamics in relation to conflict and reconstruction. [...] Education is deeply embedded in 
the context, history and cultural norms of societies, as well as current socio-political 
realities, making observed outcomes contingent, dynamic and inherently partial within 
the full realm of possibility” (2014: 4) 
Drawing on the work of Salmi (2000), Shah and Lopes Cardozo relate education 
to conflict and violence in two ways: (1) direct violence and conflict in which schools are 
physical battlegrounds for control in war and conflict-affected contexts, and where 
education communities and infrastructure are either attacked or serve a protective role 
against violence; (2) indirect violence, where social injustices and inequalities are 
reflected, reproduced and legitimised through discriminatory schooling practices and 
contents, that may lead to social exclusion and may represent causes of previous or 
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further conflict, or on the opposite injustice and inequalities are addressed through 
inclusive schooling practices and contents (2015: 191).  
Shah and Lopes Cardozo (2015: 191) complement their conceptualization of the 
link between education and conflict with a conceptual framework for defining social 
justice and linking it to education and conflict. They draw and adapt Nancy Fraser’s 
(1995, 2005) three-dimensional conceptualization of social justice in terms of 
redistribution, recognition, and representation, by looking at how certain educational 
domains might interact with social tensions in ways that could mitigate or exacerbate 
conflict, specifically in terms of (1) issues of safe and equitable educational access and 
opportunity; (2) educational relevance; (3) educational governance (Ibid.). 
 
1.4 Education and peacebuilding 
 
In 2011, thanks to research initiatives undertaken by UNICEF, the practitioners’ and 
scholars’ focus shifted from education and conflict to education and peacebuilding: in 
other terms, the ways in which education could contribute to the building of a positive, 
transformative peace. Among the questions that shaped the new agenda there was 
whether and how education was to be placed within peacebuilding in conflict and post-
conflict interventions. The discourse on the link between education and peacebuilding 
was based upon a reappropriation of Galtung’s concept of positive peace, which implied 
not merely the absence of war but the transformation of structural causes (of the different 
types) of violence.  
While formerly the focus was on the ways into which education could be a cause 
or solution to conflict, now the main concern became the identification of the multiple 
potential ways through which education could contribute to building a sustainable peace 
by addressing and/or transforming those structural conditions that led to violence and war 
in the first place. As the shift in education went from conflict to peacebuilding, the peace 
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that was envisioned to be built through education moved from negative to positive, as 
first elaborated by Johan Galtung in the 1970s.  
In the literature review for the UNICEF-funded Education in Emergencies and 
Post-Conflict Transitions (EEPCT) research project, Smith, McCandless, Paulson and 
Wheaton (2011) noted five limitations in the extant literature on education and conflict 
research. First, a lack of emphasis on the role that education played for longer term 
peacebuilding. Second, a scarce attention and analysis towards the context, political will 
and motivations of the various actors that were involved in the broader reconstruction in 
conflict and post-conflict settings, and in educational reform in particular. Third, while 
too much emphasis was put on analysing educational service delivery and the successes 
and failures linked to such provision, too little focus was placed over the location of 
education within broader agendas of social change and peacebuilding. Forth, too little 
research existed on the complex role of education vis-à-vis conflict and peace, as well as 
regarding the location of education within the broader political economy of conflict/post-
conflict at various scales (local, regional, national and global). Fifth and last, the absence 
of theory of the relationship between education and conflict drivers in dimensions such as 
social mobility, social inclusion, economic opportunity, social justice (Smith et al. 2011).  
One can hardly disagree with Smith et al. (2011): education initiatives in conflict-
affected environments all too often lack explicit links to peacebuilding theories and tend 
to focus on the immediate humanitarian needs with “[a] greater emphasis on protection 
and reconstruction” rather than “transformation” that “[r]equires a more explicit 
commitment to political, economic and social change” (Smith et al. 2011: 7). According 
to Pherali (2015), educational interventions in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings 
are underpinned by a liberal view of schooling, which assume that public education 
creates opportunities for individual development, social mobility and empowers those 
who have been traditionally denied access to economic and political power. 
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As part of the same UNICEF research project, Novelli and Smith argue that 
“[p]eacebuilding is essentially about supporting the transformative processes any post-
conflict society needs to go through, and these changes unfold over generations. 
Development through the education sector represents a very important part of this 
transformative process, with huge potential to impact positively or negatively” (2011: 7). 
According to them, the literature reviewed argues that “[e]ducation can contribute to 
peacebuilding more effectively if interventions and reforms are conducted at the sector 
level and by contributing to political, economic and social transformations in post-
conflict societies” (Novelli and Smith 2011: 12). 
They also question the sustainability of donor interventions during or after the 
conflict, if such interventions do not extend beyond short-term problem-solving 
approaches towards longer-term structural improvements of the education sector. The 
new critical research agenda, therefore, is one that explores how education can contribute 
to social transformation and longer-term peacebuilding and seeks to research how, why 
and under what conditions education and peacebuilding processes can mutually support 
each other.  
As mentioned earlier, research in the past has been treating the issue of education 
and conflict from a problem-solving perspective, focussing on how to get the education 
system back to working, overlooking whether, where and how is education located within 
the broader social transformation agenda (Smith et al. 2011). Such problem-solving 
approach explains the overemphasis on solving policy dilemmas that conflict and fragility 
cause on educational access and quality, overlooking the conditions under which 
educational problems are identified and defined (Novelli and Lopes-Cardozo 2008). 
Within this framework, the failure of educational interventions is explained as the result 
of poor policy design and implementation. 
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However, restoring educational provision and access is not enough, if due 
consideration is not paid to the ways in which education historically and at present is 
related to cultural, political and economic structures (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 
197). A ‘too educationalist’ mindset has characterized much of the research so far, while 
overlooking how education is located within broader social structures and institutions.  
Reflecting on this background, scholars are now recognizing that some of the 
challenges, dilemmas and problems of education systems in conflict settings are not 
intrinsic to education, but are the product of deep-seated historical legacies, social, 
economic and political structures and more often than not are linked to issues of power, 
injustice and inequality.  
While observing how domestic conflicts are increasingly managed and supervised 
by international interventions, Novelli argues that “[c]onflict and its resolution is shaped 
by a range of structures, institutions and agents that operate below, around, above, and 
beyond the nation-state” (2011: 7). The fields of education, conflict and peacebuilding are 
located in a “[c]omplex and highly unequal system of local, national, regional and global 
actors, institutions and practices.” (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008: 483). In overall 
terms, the literature on education and conflict has been suffering from an excess of state-
centrism: this has entailed the overlooking of processes and actors operating above, below 
and beyond the nation-state. 
Another under-researched topic in this field is the relationship between and the 
transition from short-term humanitarian responses (often conceived and implemented by 
international actors) to long-term developmental strategies [whose efforts are mainly led 
by local actors] (Novelli and Smith 2011). Research is lacking on the role of the state and 
the institutional changes and challenges that occur during and after the transition phase 
from donor-led humanitarian assistance to domestically-led developmental strategies 
(Lopes Cardozo and Shah 2013: 3). 
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In 2004, Lynn Davies investigated the relationship between education and 
conflict, showing how such relationship was complex and non linear. She argued that 
“[i]nput-output models do not work in social terms, as too many messy contextual factors 
and power interests intervene. The’attribution gap’ is too huge. Even if conflict were to 
decrease, it is almost impossible to trace this back to something in education” (2013: 3). 
Any attempt to link particular actions and interventions in the education sector to given 
outcomes in a conflict-affected or post-conflict settings is prone to failure, since 
“[p]ositivist, reductionist and deterministic understandings based on mapping clear cause-
effect relationships between education and conflict are insufficient” (Davies 2013). 
What is needed – Davies argues – is a careful analysis of the cultural, political and 
economic nature of conflict and its roots causes before envisioning the role functions and 
modalities of education reform in the aftermath of a conflict. Research drawing on critical 
cultural political economy helps to identify education’s positionality within the broader 
society, by looking at the ways in which: (1) education is both a reflection of and 
contributor to past, present, and future social relations, experiences and practices (the 
cultural); (2) the ways in which education fits into existing relations of production, 
distribution and exchange in society (the economic); (3) how and by whom education’s 
purpose, role and function in society has and is being determined and governed (the 
political): “[e]ducational policy production, reproduction, modification and adaptation 
become located within highly contested projects of state, nation and region building” 
(Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 198).  
The above-mentioned framework on social justice proposed by Nancy Fraser 
challenges mainstream representations of what peace or stability represents in the post-
conflict moment (Shah and Cardozo 2014a: 7) and how education could be related to and 
contributing to both. The evolution of the discourse and practice of education in 
emergency, conflict and post-conflict moments, reflect a shift in emphasis from ‘do no 
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harm’ approaches and activities to supporting and increasing ‘resilience’ in and through 
educational projects and reform (Smith 2011). Both approaches, underpinned by a 
problem-solving framework, imply that education contributes to bringing the system back 
to the pre-war phase and restoring the status quo, rather that promoting an education 
reform that would be transformative (Fraser 1995: 86). 
Social justice and social change frameworks can be used as conceptual lenses 
against which the relationship between education and peacebuilding can be investigated 
and analysed. They also provide with the possibility to normatively link peacebuilding to 
social justice goals. IR scholarship that is critical of neoliberal peacebuilding has been 
advocating an empancipatory and sustainable peace without further elaborating what such 
an ‘emancipatory‘ and ‘sustainable’ peace would look like (Richmond 2008). Moreover, 
it is not clear which forms and through which relationships, processes, actors and sectors 
would peacebuilding become empancipatory in post-conflict settings and if and how 
education can play a role in this regard. 
 
 
 
 
 64 
Part Three: Developing a framework of analysis 
 
1.5 Education and social justice between reproduction and transformation 
 
Robertson (2013) contends that education is a key site of cultural production and social 
reproduction. Bourdieu argues that education produces and reproduces class differences 
and inequalities, pointing out to the fact that children and students are passive recipients 
of educational practices and contents in which they learn to conform to the social 
structure (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). In Bourdieu’s own words, education “[i]s in fact 
one of the most effective means of perpetuating the existing social pattern, as it both 
provides an apparent justification for social inequalities and gives recognition to the 
cultural heritage, that is, to a social gift treated as a natural one” (1974: 32). 
In low and middle-income countries, as well as in conflict-affected settings, one 
often observes that social hierarchies and divisions are not only class-based but also 
ethnic-based (Pherali 2015). In post-conflict contexts, schools may well take center stage 
in reproducing those inequalities that might have been at the core of the conflict in the 
first place.  
Scholars that have identified in the education system a site and tool of 
reproduction of the broader class structure in the society have failed to acknowledge the 
space for confrontation and struggle between the structural and ideological functions of 
schooling such as reproduction and control and the role and power of agency – such as 
teachers and students – to oppose and resist. According to Pherali (2013), students and 
educators cannot be reduced to the role of passive recipients of hegemonic curricula 
imposed by the state. Acknowledging their agency, by contrast, means recognizing their 
ability to exploit and expand those autonomous spaces that can emerge within the 
classroom and its surrounding community, resisting the structural determinants of the 
education system. Educators can be seen as social and political agents that can channel 
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counter-hegemonic pedagogies (Pherali 2013: 54). In this perspective educational 
institutions are not only the space devoted to the formation of the workforce, but also the 
space where teachers and learners critically engage in debates regarding state policies that 
have an impact on their lives.  
Giroux (2003) suggests looking at schools as confrontational spaces that contain 
and convey the struggle over the type of knowledge and versions of the past, present and 
future that should be institutionalized, legitimated and trasmitted to students. In line with 
Apple, for Giroux (2003) schooling has to be seen as a space for confrontation, resistance 
and possibility.  
Intrinsic in education is thus the possibility for social change and social justice. 
Based upon the work of Nancy Fraser (1995, 2005), a number of scholars have elaborated 
analytical and conceptual frameworks that link education to social justice and change. 
According to Lopes Cardozo and Shah (2013: 8) “[a]ny educational framework that 
attempts to seriously work towards an objective of building peace would need to consider 
responsibility around [...] the cultural (recognition), political (representation) and 
economic (redistribution) injustices,” as defined by Nancy Fraser (1995, 2005).  
Keddie suggests that “[F]raser’s model should not be offered as an ideal of justice 
that is static and uncomplicated but rather as a productive lens for thinking about and 
addressing some of the key ways in which different dimensions of injustice are currently 
hindering schooling participation, engagement and outcomes of marginalised students” 
(2012: 15).  
Tikly and Barrett put forward a social justice framework that is informed by the 
work of both Nancy Fraser and Amartya Sen, as a way to “[p]rovide a fuller rationale for 
a policy focus on education quality than that provided by a human capital approach with 
its emphasis on economic growth or by the existing human rights approach with its 
emphasis on the role of the state in guaranteeing basic rights.” (2011: 3-4) 
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Lopes Cardozo and Shah argue that when education serves the principles of 
redistribution, recognition and representation, it can play a role in fostering a positive and 
sustainable peace and social justice, both necessary to address and transform the root 
causes of conflict (2013: 9). In this regard, education can play a different and stronger 
role than just either incorporating ‘conflict sensitivity’/‘do no harm’ as some scholars 
such as Davies (2010) have proposed or, as others such as McCandless (2011) and DFID 
(2011) have suggested, being reduced to a peace dividend bound to increase state 
legitimacy.  
The analysis that follows is essentially aligned with the proposal by Novelli and 
Smith, who aknowledge and advocate a role for education in building peace from the 
early phases of emergency and reconstruction to longer-term reforms and development 
strategies, suggesting that the analysis of the contribution of education to peacebuilding 
would require for “[t]he need for structural and institutional changes that involve changes 
to existing power relations within society” (2011: 14).  
Informed by Fraser’s theory and by other scholars who have reflected on 
education and social justice (Connell 2012, Robertson and Dale 2015, Young 2006), 
Lopes Cardozo and Shah (2014: 6) identify three ways in which the normative 
contribution of education to social justice and peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict 
can be conceptualized, discerned and mapped out: (1) redistributing access to safe and 
secure educational opportunities and resources; (2) recognizing culture diversity through 
a relevant (i.e., acceptable/adaptable) curriculum; (3) ensuring fair and transparent 
representation in educational governance. 
Unequal distribution of educational access can reflect social, economic and 
political exclusion within a society and can fuel motivations and serve as a conflict cause 
(Dupuy 2008). Equal and redistributive educational opportunities are in contrast expected 
to lessen social tensions. Better and safer schools and equal opportunities of educational 
 67 
access and into the job market decrease motivations and opportunities to engage in armed 
conflict. Some scholars argue that the opportunity cost of engaging in armed conflict will 
be higher than attending school (Ishiyama and Breuning 2012). However, to date little 
research has been conducted postulating and corroborating such an hypothesis. 	  
Education can be seen as irrelevant when it is seen as not promoting social 
mobility, does not increase economic opportunities, does not contribute to improving 
livelihoods, and there is a mistmatch between skills offered by the education system and 
the labour market needs and demands. To the concept of ‘educational effectiveness’ 
which is a reflection of a neoliberal market agenda for education that focuses on 
competitiveness and standardized testing, Shah and Lopes Cardozo (2014) oppose the 
concept of ‘just education system’ – that is, a system that responds to diversity and 
provide relevant education for all. Connell suggests drawing on “[i]ndigenous knowledge, 
working-class experience, women’s experience, immigrant cultures, multiple languages, 
and so on; aiming for richness rather than testability” (2012: 681-682). 
 
1.5.1 Access to education and the prevention or relapse to war 
 
Academic and policy studies have documented how communities in emergency and 
conflict situations consider education to be one of the few protective measures left in 
times of instability (Smith and Vaux 2003, Smith 2005, Winthrop and Kirk 2008, 
UNESCO 2011, Winthrop 2011). There has been a strong emphasis in assuring 
educational provision in such contexts since education can play a role in restoring or 
enhancing state legitimacy and as a peace dividend (Rose and Greeley 2006, Dupuy 
2008).  
While quantitative studies have been important in establishing a correlation on the 
role of educational provision and access for the prevention of armed violence or the 
relapse into war, there exists no consensus as to which level of education is more 
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important in the short and medium/long term and what type. Arguably, by laying 
emphasis on the type and quality of education, a body of qualitative research has been 
more successful in addressing the complex relationship between education and conflict 
(see next section). 
The literature dealing with the link between educational access and conflict have 
claimed that expanding and increasing education access can prevent the relapse into war. 
The rapid reconstruction of education systems can boost postwar economic recovery by 
building social capital and civil society (Putman 1993 quoted in Ishiyama and Breuning 
2012: 61).  
Dupuy (2008) shows how in several conflict contexts such as Rwanda, Liberia, 
Kosovo and Sierra Leone, the lack of equitable access to schooling among the civilian 
population and amidst different ethnic groups represented one of the causes that brought 
to or fuelled the conflict. In Rwanda during the colonial period, schooling opportunities 
disadvantaged the Hutu majority and favoured the Tutsi minority, who assumed political, 
administrative, cultural and economic control. After indipendence, the Hutu-majority put 
in place quotas to limit access of Tutsis to schooling. Not only schools did not promote 
national unity after independence (Weinstein et al. 2007: 55 quoted in Shah and Lopes 
Cardozo 2015: 192), but discriminatory and racial quotas in schools alienated the Tutsis 
minority, who fled the country during the 1980s, formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front and 
would later be involved in the 1990s civil war. In Kosovo, restrictions and discriminative 
policies in the education sphere for the Kosovo Albanian community led to the creation 
of a parallel system of education and to the spatial separation of schooling practices, a 
legacy that was perpetuated in the post-war phase and which still persists nowadays.  
The common assumption that increases in educational access are necessarily good 
for the consolidation of a durable peace has been challenged by several studies (Retamal 
and Aedo-Richmond 1998; Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Smith and Vaux 2003; Davies 
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2004; World Bank 2005). Some of these studies have found that pre-war education 
systems may carry the seeds of violent conflict. Thus, often it is not the education system 
as such (and its expansion), but the unequal access to the education system, or the lack of 
linkage between the education system and the economy that create frustration: education 
is strongly connected to several root causes of a conflict such as identity and culture, 
distribution of resources, and access to economic and political power (Degu 2005).  
The above-mentioned examples point to how unequal access and distribution of 
opportunities in and through education can fuell conflict, but it also suggests how in the 
aftermath of a conflict opportunity and access to education can be more equitably 
provisioned. Careful analysis of how and which groups have been historically 
disadvantaged in and through schooling should be complemented by a fair distribution of 
access and opportunities for all groups of learners in the post-conflict moment. Safe and 
secure acess means protecting students and teachers from attacks, ensure an education 
that is free of gender-based or other types of violence and discrimination and in the long-
term promoting critical pedagogies that encourage children’s expression (Shah and Lopes 
Cardozo 2015: 192).7  
An example where efforts of equal access and distribution have been successful is 
the case of Aceh, a province in northwestern Indonesia hit by a devastating tsunami in 
2004, and with a history of conflict that had lasted for thirty years. In order to address 
educational disadvantages suffered by the province and its population, the government 
“[e]liminated school fees, increased targeted support to conflict-affected 
regions/populations and made a legal commitment to directing the province’s resource 
revenues to education” (Shah and Lopes Cardozo – forthcoming quoted in Shah and 
Lopes Cardozo 2015: 192). Education as part of the peace settlement, occupied a critical 
                                                
7 However, as the empirical chapter will show, in Kosovo the promotion of bottom-up, critical 
pedagogies by external actors have been resisted or adapted by local teachers, especially in such a 
context whereby an historical legacy of top-down and hierarchical pedagogies still persists 
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role in terms of meeting public expectations of service delivery and redistribution of 
entitlements and opportunities. In the provincial government’s first educational strategy 
plan in 2008, education was mentioned to serve a transformative role by “[r]edressing 
past inequities caused by conflict, and working to (re) build a peaceful future for the 
province” (Bailey 2008 cited in Shah and Cardozo 2014: 2). 
The contribution of education to the perpetuation of structural violence or the 
intensification of a conflict has less to do with funds invested in education and more to do 
with the degree of equity in educational access. Moreover, if expanding access is not 
accompanied by expansion of economic opportunities, there is the risk of creating an 
educated but unemployed generation.  
Much of the focus in policy and academic milieux has been on primary and 
secondary education. In this context, the vast part of the literature on the relationship 
between educational access and conflict has focussed on the role that primary and 
secondary education play as a deterrent or catalyst for war. Few have addressed the role 
that access to higher education can play in reducing the likelihood of conflict 
reoccurrence in the short and medium term.  
In their quantitative study, Ishiyama and Breuning show that “[e]arly expansion of 
primary and secondary enrolments neither increases nor decreases the likelihood of 
conflict reinitiating”, however, early expansion of higher education opportunities in terms 
of enrolment rates during the first five years following the end of a war (in the form of 
increases in enrolment rates) reduces the hazard of civil conflict recurrence by 86 per cent 
(2012: 71-73). Generally speaking, there is no abundance of studies that address 
education systems as a whole: the vast majority focuses on portions of it.  
If one were to apply the definition of access given by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Education’s definition of access, Katarina Tomaševski (2003), i.e., 
education must be available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable to all, restoring 
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educational access might not be sufficient for conflict mitigation, transformation and 
peacebuilding, if education is not safely and equitably provisioned.  
 
1.5.2 Education through cultural recognition: the structure of education, curricula 
development, pedagogy and the role of teachers 
 
The literature dealing with the complex relationship between education and conflict has 
focused on the structure and content of education in fostering the relapse into war or 
preventing it (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Tawil and Harley 2004; Paulson 2011a). 
Particular school structures and contents have the potential to contribute to oppression or 
to fuel hostilities (Gallagher 2011; Paulson 2011a).  
 Historically, the key role of education has been to inculcate a sense of 
homogeneous community and to form future citizens; such a process has been 
intrinsically assimilationist. In post-conflict societies, in which ethnicity has been often a 
significant component of the conflict itself, the process of education restructuring and 
curricula development is unstable and conflictual (Jones 2011).  
In terms of structure, an education system that is fragmented and segregated 
contributes to perpetuating and reinforcing prejudices, stereotypes and intolerance among 
young people of different communities. Such systems keep young people apart and are a 
barrier to reconciliation (Clark 2010: 345). Furthermore, institutionalized forms of 
segregation legitimize discriminatory attitudes as socially acceptable behaviours (Kreso 
2008: 365). Conversely, forms of education that does not take into consideration the 
ethnic composition of societies might be used as a tool of assimilation that denies the 
rights of minority groups to expression.  
In terms of content, the focus in recent years has been on school curricula and in 
particular on history curricula (Tawil and Harley 2004). Exclusion can occur not only 
through the segregated structure of education systems, but also through learning content 
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that stereotypes ‘the other' (ethnic, linguistic, religious) in negative terms, further fuelling 
distrust and separation from the classroom level to the broader community and societal 
level, perpetuating a division within a country that might already exist (Shah and Lopez 
Cardozo 2014b: 193).  
Freedman et al. note that “[i]f public education can function to inflame hatreds, 
mobilize for war and reach acceptance of injustice, it can be used also as a powerful tool 
for the cultivation of peace, democratic change and respect for others” (2004a: 226 
quoted in Clark 2010: 352).  
Of particular importance in countries that have gone though an ethnic conflict is 
the history curriculum, particularly the development and implementation of curricula 
dealing with the recent conflict (Cole 2010; Paulson 2011a; Paulson 2011b). The history 
curriculum has, historically, reflected the need to transmit a unitary and common 
narrative linked to a national territory. Nowadays, the existence of competing truths 
implies that the teaching of history will be particularly contentious, and this represents a 
major educational challenge (Clark 2010: 355).  
Thus, a major challenge when reforming history curricula in ethnically divided 
societies is to create more complex and dynamic narratives. Such narratives allow for 
recognition of diversity, often striking a balance between the acknowledgment of 
diversity and lingering threat perceptions. Stated in another way, the key challenge is 
“[t]o find ways in which schooling can contribute to processes of social cohesion, while 
at the same time recognising and dealing with the reality of diversity” (Gallagher 2011: 
1).  
Spurred by the recognition of the important role that youth might play in 
preventing future violence, other types of training courses and curricula focussing on 
human rights and peace education have sought to tackle the issue of diverse and often 
competing (ethnic) identities (Oglesby 2007; Niens and Chastenay 2008). Such courses 
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aim at addressing and transcending ethnic identities, but in societies where the ethnic 
component have been constitutive of the conflict itself such a task is not easy and 
straightforward (Jones 2012).  
Indeed, a different type of problem has arisen in certain contexts whereby the 
attempt to neutralize or ‘de-ethnicize’ the content of the (history) curriculum, following 
an ethnic conflict, has resulted in a removal of (references to) differences. This risks 
estranging students and citizens towards the official narrative trasmitted through the 
curriculum because important issues of identities and struggle have been removed in the 
name of the national unity (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 194). It also removes the 
possibility for potential lessons that could be drawn from a critical reflection of the past. 
The current curricula reform in Rwanda reflects such challenges/dilemmas, in which 
history curriculum has been developed through a focus on a one-nation narrative, despite 
the fact that identity in the Rwandan context is deeply entrenched in ethnic 
belonging/differences (with the past conflict having an important ethnic component) 
(Paulson 2011a). 
Bush and Saltarelli note that peacebuilding education should involve “[a] bottom-
up rather than top down process driven by war-torn communities themselves, founded on 
their experiences and capacities. It would be firmly rooted in immediate realities, not in 
abstract ideas or theories” (2000: 23). In other words, in order for education to contribute 
to building peace, it shoud be characterized by action-oriented multidisciplinary learning 
process, that incorporates but is not limited to formal education or the knowledge-based 
classroom activity on peace (i.e., peace education programmes). Classroom-based 
interactions should be combined with community-based practical activities that relate to 
social, cultural and political issues (Pherali 2015).  
Some scholars have reflected upon and advocated for a critical, intercultural 
pedagogy, one in which minorities are framed, defined and seen as indigeneous rather 
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than as ‘invaders’ or ‘infiltrators,’ one that emphasises hybridity (Davies 2004; Davies 
2011), rather than essentialist and homogeneous ethnic compositions and identities, but 
also one that is not informed by uncritical and stereotyped forms of multiculturalism that 
do not consider issues of religion, race, gender and class (Davies 2011: 13,17, 34). 
Giel and Niens propose a dialogic humanising pedagogy that draws upon critical 
theory and Freire’s liberatory pedagogy of participation, emancipation and transformation 
(Gil and Niens 2014). According to them, for peace to be taught there is a need to engage 
critically on the causes of conflict. Building and strengthening the social foundations for a 
sustainable peace would require macro-level structural reforms that on the one side 
improve the life conditions of marginalized populations, promote inclusive democracy 
and social justice, and on the other side promote a “[h]umanising and transformative 
agenda” (Gil and Niens 2014: 25). Current education systems do not conduce to ‘dialogic 
pedagogy’ and would thus require a shift towards new teaching and learning practice 
(Pherali 2015). 
Pherali (2015) identifies in the teachers the social agents that could provide with 
the tools and spaces for a transformative and empancipatory pedagogy. He suggests 
teachers ought to be viewed as intellectuals in their capacities as educators who have 
important social functions. In using Aronowitz and Giroux’s four categories of teachers 
as intellectuals - hegemonic, accommodating, critical and transformative (993: 45-48 
cited in Pherali 2015), Pherali (2015) identifies in the ‘transformative intellectual’ the 
kind of teacher that would help students to resist hegemony and would empower students 
to take control of their education. 
The knowledge and ideologies that underpin and are transmitted through schools 
and other “’educating institutions’ in society are ‘partial representations of social reality’ 
which ‘simultaneously frame, fragment, and distort the perceptions and concerns of more 
subordinated groups’” (Livingston 1987: 55 cited in Pherali 2015). Such institutions are 
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often tools for legitimising the monopoly of the dominant class. According to Pherali 
(2015) ‘peacebuilding educators’ should challenge such monopoly and should provide 
learners with those intellectual tools in order to question those dominant structures that 
reproduce inequalities and normalise injustices. 
More broadly, there seems to be scholarly consensus on the fact that education is 
likely to have an impact if it is made part of a broader process of social change and in the 
presence of a longer-term political strategy (Weinstein et al. 2007; Tschirgi 2011). Lynne 
Davies’ seminal Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos demonstrates that failure 
to recognize the critical role of education in the path to war has ominous consequences 
for the building of a peace-prone post-conflict education system (2004). Davies proposes 
a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the way in which education can 
play a role for building peace, and she identifies relevant target areas of peacebuilding 
and statebuilding engagement.  
 
1.5.3 Education governance between participation and representation 
 
The way management functions and stakeholders’ participation within education 
governance and processes are designed and configurated can either promote constructive 
or destructive/distrustive interactions and relationships among different actors involved in 
the governance of educational reform (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 194). In this 
regard, there seems to be consensus in literature on the fact that political representation 
should be fostered in such a way that it ensures fair ethnic, gender, and linguistic 
representation and participation along the different levels of the educational governance 
(Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 195).  
Educational provision that is centrally controlled, managed and deployed can 
create a lack of accountability and transparency between citizens and the state, especially 
in those cases when resources are perceived to be deployed and managed in unequal 
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ways. In some cases such as Afghanistan or Aceh, school-based management and 
decentralization of authority, control and provision to local levels have been used as 
mechanisms for promoting inclusion and cooperation, potentially increasing levels of 
accountability, transparency and participation between educational service providers and 
communities (Dupuy 2008).  
Decentralization of management functions to community-based committees has 
been criticised by some scholars. They argue that often, communities are not trained, 
resourced or supported by the central government. Moreover, cases such as Nepal, post-
conflict Cambodia and Indonesia have showed that community-based committees are 
either prone to elite capture or unwilling to challenge educational actors (Bjork 2006, 
INEE 2009). As Poppema (2012) has pointed out, in particular contexts, decentralization 
of education at the local, community level does not complement but rather substitute the 
state.  
The agenda of decentralization has been globally promoted by a number of 
international actors, especially the World Bank, actively involved in the reform of 
education governance, in particular in post-war and conflict-affected countries. Its 
advancement has coincided with the rise of the good governance agenda and with the 
promotion of the privatization agenda. The latter has found its expression in the form of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) in educational projects and reforms. Dale contends that 
“[t]his initiative [PPPs in education] is intended to depress the role of the state in the 
provision of public services, as it opens up space for transnational firms, with a 
mechanism of articulation with national policies and agendas” (2009: 14).  
Recently, the global agenda of (neoliberal-infomed) education reforms have been 
increasingly characterized by a rise in discourses for ‘stakeholder participation’ or 
‘citizen voice’ in educational decision-making, and more generally of increasing 
decentralization of funding, control and provision of education service at local levels.  
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As mentioned above, mechanisms for stakeholder participation in schooling can 
promote citizenship and social inclusion. However, when participation is perceived to be 
restrictive, exclusive and biased it can lead to distrust between citizens within 
communities and towards the state (Dupuy 2008). In a number of cases, decentralization 
reforms in schooling have resulted in rising inequities and fragmentation within the 
national education system, which weakens the already fragile social contract between the 
state and its citizens in post-conflict and conflict-affected countries (Angus 1993, 
Gorostiaga and Paulston 2004, Lewis and Naidoo 2004). What emerges from a recent 
Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) research synthesis is that 
decentralization in educational governance has resulted in education reinforcing 
conditions of fragility or contributing to the status quo (2011).  
 
Concluding remarks: scales and contexts beyond methodological nationalism  
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on education, peacebuilding and statebuilding 
with a view to highlighting the existence of critical connections, seeking to account for 
the complexity and the evolution of debates and to spell out an understanding of 
globalization and social change; it has done so with attention to identifying existing gaps, 
so as to set the present research to address them. As a result of the proliferation of ‘new 
wars’, with a higher toll for civilians and school children and workers, and the rise of 
humanitarian international interventions, education has been affected and shaped by new 
concerns and dynamics that characterize a novel interplay between global, transnational, 
national and local actors.  
While there is now widespread recognition and empirical documentation of the 
impact of conflict on education (and viceversa), there remains a conspicuous lack of 
research on the impact of international interventions on modes, forms and functions of 
education in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings. Likewise, a research gap can be 
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detected on how education affects externally-driven peacebuilding and statebuilding 
operations; finally, a gap exists on those education models that are emerging in contexts 
of fragility and external intervention. My research question – i.e., when a new state 
emerges under the aegis of international statebuilding, in a situation in which society is 
divided by a recent history of armed conflict, what types of externally-assisted education 
systems are emerging, and how do they reflect and affect statebuilding and peacebuilding 
– seeks to address these gaps.   
In this regard, one has to point out that studying post-conflict and conflict-
affected settings cannot be oblivious of the fact that the education sector has often 
become part and parcel of counter-insurgency strategies (Novelli 2009). Several scholars 
argue that this is one of the reasons why education in these specific contexts has come 
under direct attack, and anyway it has been seen as an externally-driven initiative, thus 
estranging local communities (Novelli 2009; Novelli and Selenica 2014). In global terms 
the commitment to education responding to security and strategic imperatives or to 
education regarded as a social service to be delivered in the emergency phase has had an 
impact on the assistance and aid to education, which rather than focusing on longer-term 
efforts of development and sustainable peacebuilding has been limited to the early phases 
of emergency and reconstruction. 
Such volatility has often made educational reform unsustainable and not linked to 
objectives of peacebuilding, social change and transformation. Research is still relatively 
weak, for example, on how the transition from short-term humanitarian assistance to 
longer-term developmental strategies actually takes place in the field of education 
(reform), if at all. Another related under-researched topic is the role of the state and those 
institutional changes and challenges that occur during and after the transition phase from 
donor-led assistance to domestically led developmental strategies.  
While in the early 2000s attention on the role of education on conflict (and 
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viceversa) emphasized the negative face of education in armed conflict, in the 2010s the 
debate has shifted towards education and peacebuilding - i.e., an agenda on how and 
under what conditions education can contribute to building a sustainable, transformative 
and socially just peace has emerged. The new critical agenda that has been developed has 
sought to explicitly link education with peacebuilding, albeit in open, non-deterministic 
and contingent ways.  
What emerges from the research of a growing number of critical conflict and 
education scholars is that the relationship between education, conflict and peacebuilding 
is complex and non-linear, thus input-output models do not work as sometimes expected. 
Mapping clear cause-effect relationships and establishing input-output models for 
investigating the link between education, conflict and peacebuilding are insufficient and 
prone to failure as social reality is messy, complex and contingent, while our 
investigation will always be inherently partial.  
What is needed – one may conclude - is a thorough analysis of cultural, political 
and economic nature of conflict and its root causes as a base for envisioning the role, 
functions and modalities of education in the aftermath of a conflict. Social inquiry should 
also be complemented by a thorough analysis of the relationship between education and 
conflict drivers in the pre- and post-war phase or in conflict-affected settings. 
Against this background, one can say that the new critical agenda of research on 
education has taken a more explicit normative stance. Such a move is most welcome, 
because it links education to peacebuilding through social justice frameworks. The latter 
are not only useful in analytical and conceptual terms - as they serve as tools and lens 
against which the relationship between education and peacebuilding is investigated and 
examined on the ground. They also offer an alternative perspective on the type of 
education and peace to be built, and how it can be best tuned with the goal of 
transforming conflict root causes and build a just society.  
 80 
It can be said that those education, conflict and development scholars that have 
worked along this trajectory have been ‘daring more’ in defining a certain type of peace 
as a goal, than those IR scholars that have criticized the liberal and ‘undemocratic’ peace 
(built through statebuilding missions and administrations) often without a commitment to 
elaborating on how a different kind of emancipatory peace would look like, and what 
sectors and pillars are to be given priority.  
The debate on education and conflict emerged out of the recognition that wars 
and violent conflict are negatively impacting on education, but that certain types of 
education - far from being necessarily good - could further fuel conflict, if not lying at the 
core of its causes. This chapter has sought to show how, depending on the type of 
education and its embeddedness in the broader political economy of conflict, education 
can contribute to building positive peace. While less normative, my research is 
underpinned by a social justice analytical framework for unravelling and spelling out the 
type of peace and state that education has reflected and affected in the two cases of 
Kosovo and East Timor.  
In this regard, empirical analysis should always depart from the interaction 
between education and economic, cultural and political drivers of conflict. Furthermore, 
the investigation of the relationship between education, peacebuilding and statebuilding 
has to be multi-sectorial (looking at all levels of education) and able to examine the 
multiple issues involved in educational reform: access and opportunities (whether 
education it is safe and equitable), relevance (curricula, content, structure, pedagogy and 
teachers), representation and participation (the governance of educational reform and 
policy-makings and the role, positionality and power of the different actors involved).  
In conducting such an investigation, following Dale’s suggestion, one should 
avoid ‘methodological nationalism’, ‘state-centrism’ and ‘educationism’, thus making the 
research open to other processes and actors that are shaping educational reform beyond 
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the nation-state and beyond the sector of education itself (2009). Post-war and conflict-
affected settings may be characterized by various levels of direct and indirect conflict, 
violence and social engineering, whereby education is shaped in, out and beyond the 
nation-state on multiple scales and by a multiplicity of international and local actors. 
When addressing education reform in post-conflict contexts, it is necessary to 
problematise the complex intertwining of actors, interests and processes within the field.  
Dale and Robertson (2009) suggest that one should look beyond the state level in 
the study of the purposes, functions and roles of education: this means examining how 
they are formulated, interpreted and implemented by private agencies, foreign 
consultants/advisors, international agencies and local institutions. In order to avoid the 
pitfalls of methodological nationalism that frames much of the existing research, they 
recommend to explore the relationships between the various scales, spaces and levels of 
educational decision-making and policy production and acknowledge that conflict and 
solutions to it depend on a range of structures, institutions and agents that work in, out 
and beyond the nation-state (Dale and Robertson 2009; Robertson 2012). 
Processes such as globalisation, war and international intervention have 
challenged the basic unit of analysis - i.e., the nation-state. While traditionally, education 
policies have been developed within the boundaries of the Westphalian state, national 
policies are increasingly “[a] combination of political forces, social structures, cultural 
traditions and economic processes entangled in a matrix of intersecting multi-level, multi-
scalar (local, national, regional and global) sites and spaces” (Yeates 2001: 637). 
This is related to another limitation of much of the existing literature(s) - i.e., the 
simplification of the levels of analysis along the binary and dichotomous split 
national/international (local/global), which is a limitation that needs to be overcome (Dale 
2005). The conception of space and scale as used by Robertson (2012), in which the local 
and the global are intertwined and mutually constituted may contribute in such direction.  
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It has implications on how state is understood and conceptualized too, not merely 
as a monolithic, national, entity or unit of analysis but made out of different components, 
apparatus, bureaucrats and social relations and struggles that albeit operating within the 
state are simultaneously networked/constrained by their participation and membership 
with international organisations (i.e., the global level). Moreover, the state is embedded 
and constituted by social forces that work in, out and beyond the state level. In this 
regard, IOs or international actors are not something external to the state, or at least, they 
are more external for some states than for others, which also depends on the unequal 
distribution of power and bargaining capacities (Verger et al. 2012: 8).  
The Bourdieusian concept of field comes to help: it lends itself as a tool for 
overcoming the local-global binomial in education policy, since it allows to look at and 
framing the global education policy as a conflicting field or terrain in which different 
kinds of national and international actors struggle for its transformation and 
production/reproduction. In this regard, agenda-setting, policy-making and borrowing in 
education are not to be seen as the result of a conflict-free, one-way transfer along the 
axis global-local, but as the result of this struggle for problem definition, education de-
territorialization and re-contextualisation in which agency and unequal power (relations 
and distribution) play a key role.  
This brings to the fora the need to problematise the unitary nature of the state, and 
a certain methodological statism that is implied, i.e., looking at the state as “[a] rational 
and cohesive entity” (Verger et al. 2012: 9). The state needs to be understood as 
composed by a range of apparatuses that are the result of material condesations of social 
forces and struggles (Hartmann 2007 quoted in Verger et al. 2012: 9) and which often 
have contrasting agendas and interests (Cox 1995).  
Within the governance of education, state role and functions in relation to 
education policies and politics have been redefined, with the state being less autonomous 
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than in the past in terms of definition of policies/priorities as well as agenda setting in 
national issues/sectors.  Overcoming methodological nationalism and statism implies 
recognising and capturing the role and relevance of non-state actors in the governance 
and reform of education (Dale et al. 2007): “[f]unding, provision and ownership of 
education are carried out by a broad range of supra-national, national and sub-national 
agents, including IOs, the state, the market, the community and/or families. [...] the global 
governance of education means the redefinition of the relationship between education and 
the state” (Verger et al. 2012: 10).  
Most of the research produced in education and within the field of education and 
conflict has been problem-solving (Paulson and Rappleye 2007: 341). The pitfalls of this 
type of research are to be found in the fact that it tends to focus narrowly on problems 
inherent within a project or sector, while overlooking the relationships among problems 
generated within that project/sector, the conflict and the broader geo-political situations. 
It is thus much needed to go beyond an ‘educationist approach’ or a ‘disciplinary 
parrochialism’ approach that studies education projects as insulated from the surrounding 
context within which they are embedded (Dale 2005; Dale et al. 2007). In other words, 
policy trends and changes in education may be depending on extra-educational structures, 
events, processes and needs such as economic development, social cohesion or levels of 
welfare and poverty in a given country. Therefore, changes in education policies and 
priorities are better captured and understood as embedded within local and global 
political economy contexts (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008).  
What emerges from the different bodies of literature that I have reviewed is that in 
a globalized world, the model of education system in conflict-affected countries draws on 
the hybrid logic of (Western-led) development that favours free market, liberal 
democracy, individualism and competition with some recognition of human rights, civil 
liberties and gender equality (Rappleye 2011). In other words, educational reforms in 
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conflict-affected and post-war settings seem to be converging around the processes of 
liberal peacebuilding that have promoted a Western model of economy and governing 
system aiming to achieve the objective of “[a] self-sustaining peace within domestic, 
regional and international settings, in which both overt and structural violence are 
removed and social, economic and political models conform to international expectations 
in a globalized transnational settings” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 27). 
However, post-conflict settings whereby conventional political structures have 
been ruptured or destroyed provide with the kind of opportunities for envisioning and 
promoting progressive educational reforms beyond the ‘liberal peace’ framework. From 
such perspective, educational reforms should be implemented within broader political and 
social reforms that address structural inequalities. Indeed, there seems to be scholarly 
consensus on the fact that education is likely to have a positive impact only if it is made 
part of a broader strategy and process of social change in the presence of a longer-term 
political strategy, bearing in mind that “[t]he nature of the education system is at the heart 
of societal debates on social justice and well-being” (Novelli and Smith 2011: 27).  
As this chapter has shown, much of this recent line of research is based upon a 
shift from grand narratives towards more contigent and contextually driven 
understandings of educational processes, decisions and actions in post-conflict and 
conflict-affected settings. It is along this methodological and theoretical trajectory that 
my research intends to develop its empirical analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
we fill pre-existing forms  
and when we fill them  
we change them  
and are changed  
 
(F. Bidart, Borges and I) 
 
 
2.1 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1.1 Critical theory and critical realism 
 
My theoretical perspective rests upon the epistemological and ontological foundations of 
critical theory (Cox 1996) and critical realism (Bob Jessop 2003, 2006; Jones 2013; Neil 
Brenner et al 2003; Dean et al 2006; Kurki 2008). My research is indebted to the tradition 
of critical theory, which adopts critique as the basis for social change (Cox 1996). 
Concerned with the conditions for knowledge production and reproduction, critical theory 
assumes that knowing, experience and social realities are co-constituted by us (Jessop 
2009). In applying critique to my investigation of the relationship(s) within and between 
education, peacebuilding and statebuilding, one of my objectives is to reveal the existence 
of contradictions - and by doing so, to pave the way for further critique and social change. 
In a critical realist perspective, the social world is “[c]omprised of various layers 
of structures and generative mechanisms, [...] so that the social world is also comprised of 
a stratified ensemble of structures and relations” (Joseph 2000: 186). Critical realism 
makes a distiction between the ‘experential’, the ‘actual’, and the ‘real’ when 
approaching and investigating the social world, or social phenomena/objects. (Robertson 
and Dale 2015). The role of the researcher becomes investigating those visible and 
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invisible mechanisms, relationships (and non) between “[w]hat we experience, what 
actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world” 
(Danermark et al. 2002: 21 quoted in Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014: 4).  
 
8 
 
For the field of education, conflict and peacebuilding this implies looking at education’s 
multiple faces and dynamics in relation to conflict and post-conflict reconstruction and 
education’s embeddedness into broader (contextual), historical, cultural norms, structures 
and institutions within the society (Ibid.). This also implies that the outcomes observed 
are “[c]ontingent, dynamic, and inherently partial within the full realm of possibility” 
(Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014: 2).  
My methodology will be qualitative based upon a comparative analysis of two 
case studies, which are selected upon the international engagement to education reform in 
post-war statebuilding interventions. Empirical investigation makes use of semi-
structured interviews to relevant stakeholders on the ground. As methods for data 
collection and analysis I also make use of cultural political economy analysis and conflict 
analysis.  
                                                
8 Mingers and Willcocks 2004, critical realism diagram 
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The research is exploratory in its nature, and it does not aim to test hypotheses that are 
meant to broad generalizations. The goal is to make sense of the types of education 
reform and programming that are put in place in different contexts. This seems to be an 
urgent task: the literature review that I have conducted reveals the existence of a lack of 
empirical investigation on the ways in which the specificity of a conflict context has been 
addressed in education reform; on how country-specific education interventions have 
interacted with peacebuilding/statebuilding processes; on what have been the implications 
of peacebuilding/statebuilding interventions on education reform; on if and how 
education reform has been made by an implicit or explicit peacebuilding perspective. 
The research has been based on primary and secondary sources. First of all, it has 
involved an in-depth literature review, which has constituted a solid conceptual and 
analytical framework through which data has been collected, processed and analysed 
(Cohen et al. 2007). The review has tried to highlight knowledge and research gaps, 
identify relevant education initiatives, analyse evaluation/policy reports and other official 
documents.  
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A first strand has investigated the relationship between education and the state as 
a result of globalization, statebuilding and peacebuilding processes along non-Western 
trajectories (i.e., in unstable peripheries). Two main theoretical debates have framed the 
discussion around how global education models travel, transfer and transplant in/across 
national contexts, and how globalization has affected education systems around the 
world: World Culture Analysis (WCA) and Critical Cultural Political Economy of 
Education (CCPEE, that is an evolution of the Structured Education Agenda). 
I have drawn mainly from the last debate, focussing on the literature on critical 
cultural political economy to the study of education (Jessop 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010a, 
2010b; Robertson 2012; Robertson and Dale 2015). It helps to focus, among others, on 
educational embeddedness in wider social, economic, political structures and relations. In 
this regard, Roger Dale and Susan Robertson’s theoretical reflections on the globalization 
of education (beyond the boundaries of the national state) can be seen as a starting point 
for an empirical examination of the (changing) relationship between education and the 
state in those newly emerging states affected by post-war peacebuilding and statebuilding 
agendas of international interventions.  
Moreover, scholarly debates on peacebuilding/statebuilding in post-conflict 
settings have been critically examined with the aim of locating education reform and 
governance in the context of pervasive peacebuilding and statebuilding. Current debates 
among leading donors tend to narrowly conceive of the link between education and 
statebuilding as one to be identified at the level of service delivery. In this view, 
education is one among several service deliveries that might enhance or hamper state 
legitimization, thus contributing to the likelihood of successful statebuilding outcomes 
(DFID 2009, 2010, 2011). However, as argued above, in the complex post-conflict arena 
in which is it constantly reformed and reconstituted, education does and is more than 
merely service delivery.  
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A second part of my review has looked at the strand of literature that focuses on 
academic and practitioner debates on education, conflict, peace(building), and social 
change/transformation. Main works that have inspired the proliferation and reinvigoration 
of these debates are the UNICEF report by Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli The two 
faces of education (2000) which draws a distinction between negative and positive faces 
of education, and the book by Lynn Davies Education and Conflict: Complexity and 
Chaos (2004), which elaborates an interdisciplinary theoretical framework starting from 
Complexity theory, and which investigates the complex interaction between education 
and conflict.  
Debates that have investigated the relationship between education and social 
change/transformation have sought to examine the ways through which the reform and 
rebuilding of education can play a transformative role rather than a 
conservative/restorative role. In this regard, and linked to the impact of education in the 
conflict/peace nexus, education can play a role in terms of addressing inequities and 
discriminatory schooling structures/contents that are reflected in and reinforced through 
education systems, and which mirrors broader structural inequities in the society. Such 
role is played and enabled through at the level of structure, content, and agency within the 
education system.  
I draw on such review, as my research posits itself within those critical 
contributions that seek to go beyond the ‘two faces of education’ debate. The research 
aims to challenge deterministic and binary conceptions of the relationship between 
education, conflict and peace. It recognizes the existence of and seeks to account for the 
multifaceted and complex role of education in conflict and post-war situations. However, 
it also seeks to address an aspect that is not so explicit in literature: it seeks to destabilize 
and question mainstream conceptualizations of peace, education and conflict (along with 
stability and statebuilding) by looking into their contingent, contextual and conjectural 
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manifestations, elaborations and articulations in post-war settings.  
In the second phase of research, data collection combined desk review and in-
country data collection through semi-structured interviews for each of the two cases. Data 
collection methods involved individual semi-structured and in-situ collection of grey 
literature that would have been otherwise difficult to get access to (Gilbert 2001: 123-63). 
Questions were framed not only by deductively and consistently deriving them from 
primary research questions, but also by fine-tuning them according to the specificity of 
each case study, and each informant’s features. Questions were aimed at gaining an 
insight into programmes, expectations and policies that the informants had for education 
initiatives. I carried out interviews with the highest regards to the privacy and informed 
consent of the interviewees. 
Triangulation of sources and data has been used whenever possible as a 
mechanism for ensuring robustness, validity, and quality of the research. Research 
questions have been addressed by a number of angles ensuring inclusion of different 
perspectives. Triangulation took place in terms of contrasting responses of different 
actors and in terms of using different data sources and methods of collection. What I have 
sought to take into consideration throughout my research is that although each method 
can compensate for the limitations of another, mistakes in one method can cumulate when 
methods are applied sequentially and build upon one another. 
 
2.1.2 Qualitative and comparative research methodology 
 
The research is premised on a logic of comparison and contrast, initially focusing on the 
commitment of international actors to education reform. As I proceeded along my 
research I became aware of how simplistic the dualistic categories of international/local 
are when seeking to investigate education reform in conflict-affected contexts. While I 
maintain that these education systems are externally assisted and shaped, I have soon 
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come to recognize that the role of and the relationships among international and local 
actors is much more dynamic and fluid than I initially expected: most importantly, power 
is diffused among a plethora of different international and local actors and played out at 
various levels.  
The research intends to analyze how varying configurations of one specific sector 
such as education reflect and affect processes of building state and peace, and what has 
been the role of international actors therein. For this purpose and with a view to assuring 
rootedness through historical context of education systems and their development, I 
conducted ethnographic research in two cases: Kosovo and East Timor. 
In doing do, I have been guided by the intention of developing two theoretically 
informed but empirically rich case studies of education reform in newly emerging post-
war states. A key concern for me upon setting out with this research was that, in contrast 
to variable-oriented analysis, case-oriented research may yield more insights if one is 
interested in the context and in the complexity of outcomes and processes (Gerring 2007). 
In line with interpretive approaches to social sciences, here emphasis has been placed on 
‘thick description’ of few cases: generalizability is limited, while the specificity of 
contexts plays a significant role (Della Porta 2012): “[c]ase studies can trace not only 
which choices were considered and actions were taken, they can also show that some 
other actions were deliberately avoided in anticipation of the choices and actions of the 
other players” (Goemans 2007: 11 quoted in Ahmed and Sil 2012: 943). 
 Kosovo and East Timor are major recent examples of statebuilding initiatives 
encompassing activities in support of re-designing the education system in a context of 
emerging sovereignty out of a long secessionist process characterized by armed violence: 
the deployment of ambitious statebuilding plans represents the main criterion for case 
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selection.9 Comparison is ensured by a fixed set of core questions. Both cases develop in 
parallel along the same time frame, and for both the observation period is 1999-2014. A 
time frame of fifteen years allows the researcher go beyond the description of outputs, 
enabling the tracking of changes and the unraveling of outcomes that occur throughout 
middle/longer-term processes of education reform and international intervention. 
Investigation had to take into account the complexities and differences on the 
ground. The two countries differ substantially in a number of ways (i.e., geographically, 
historically, culturally, and politically), which call for some form of analytical control. 
Yet when internationally mandated interim administration missions were established, 
both cases were announced as examples of a possible new way to address similar 
conflicts. Similarities are not lacking: in both cases the conflict was for secession and it 
led to the creation of a new state, which is a crucial, additional criterion for selection here.  
My treatment of educational and statebuilding/peacebuilding interventions has 
been grounded on an explanatory and interpretive framework and detailed case studies of 
Kosovo and East Timor. The emphasis on social conflict shaping statebuilding 
interventions and inherent in educational reform may explain what actually emerges in 
practice, rather than merely lamenting the gap between plan and reality as most of the 
existing literature does (Hameiri 2010).  
Indeed, this research tries to go beyond merely describing the gap between the 
apparent intentions of interventions and their practical results and which results typically 
in either criticising the plans for being ideologically misguided or proposing technocratic 
or lessons learnt solutions (Jones 2011). Attention is paid to explaining differences in 
outcome, not just by referring to contextual differences. Full understanding of outcomes 
of interventions in education must involve analysis of the forces that come together in any 
specific instance, both intervening and intervened upon, in a historically and 
                                                
9 The UN staff that had designed the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) drafted the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in Timor–Leste (UNTAET) a few months later. 
 93 
sociologically informed fashion. 
The analysis has been grounded on the recognition that externally-driven 
interventions are not simply trying to ‘build’ states and reform education as we classically 
understand them, but also to ‘regulate statehood’ (Hameiri 2010) and education, thus 
fundamentally transforming the nature of target states and their education. 
 
2.2 METHODS  
 
2.2.1 Field research and semi-structured interviews 
 
Field visits and semi-structured interviews were conducted in East Timor and Kosovo, 
respectively in June-July 2013 and October-November 2013 targeting international and 
local stakeholders from international organizations that were involved in educational 
reforms (reps. from the World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO, other UN agencies, bi-lateral 
donors etc.), government officials (especially within Ministries of Education), 
representatives from civil society organizations, and university professors and school 
administrators. 
According to Wood (2008), field research is based on personal interaction with 
research subjects in their own setting. The risk of ill-conceived field research is that it 
may confirm preconceptions with which the researcher went to the field. Field research is 
an important tool of inquiry when it brings the researcher in contact with important 
categories of data that would be otherwise hardly accessible.  Such data concerns beliefs, 
preferences, rationales and interests of political actors involved in strategic interactions 
and entrenched in power relationships with other actors (Wood 2008):  
 
Site-intensive methods (SIM) are of particular value when what we’re studying 
is subtle (for example, relationships, networks, identities, styles, beliefs, or 
modes) and when what we’re studying is sensitive, hidden or otherwise kept 
behind barriers that require building trust or unlocking access (Read 2006: 12). 
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In addition to these data, researchers in the field often come across and generate other 
kinds of data that would not be available without personal interaction (Wood 2008). This 
dialectic and dynamic interaction between the researcher and the actor under study may 
generate new insights and questions on both sides.  
In the case of East Timor, I discovered how crucial the language issue and its link 
to (national) identity was only by being in the field. Unexpectedly, most of the interviews 
revealed the tensions that were inherent in language policy providing useful insights on 
the relationship between education reform, peacebuilding and nation building in ways and 
degrees that I had not previously been aware of. Moreover, interviews illustrated in a 
straightforwarded way the disconnection that I was expecting to find between education, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, and the paradox of education expecting to contribute to 
peace without a strategy on how to achieve so. Issues of power (especially the conflicting 
relationship with the former colonizer - Portugal - and its significant impact on language 
and curricula reform) were better revealed while in interviews and informal conversations 
in Dili. The role, influence, and power of international consultants and advisors, and the 
dependency effect that they instigate, has been another aspect that I could only grasp in its 
complexity and conflict potential only by being in the field.  
In the case of Kosovo, by doing fieldwork I could better grasp the significant 
impact that local actors would attach to the first period of international intervention in 
education following the end of hostilities (the so-called ‘Daxner period’, see chapter 
four). The significance and extent of the proliferation of private universities and their 
impact on the devaluation of the diplomas was another aspect I better captured during 
those five weeks of interviews in Pristina. The connivance between political elites and 
university positions (i.e., how university degrees and positions are used as legitimising or 
power distributional tools for political actors) was another element I could neatly grasp 
during interviews and informal conversations I had while being in Pristina.  
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In order to ensure representativeness of the different actors involved in education 
reform, peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo and East Timor, and consider a 
substantial degree of variation, my fieldwork sought to favour breadth (interviewing key 
representatives from each of the organizations) over depth (interviewing many 
representatives within few organizations). 
Interviews are key to qualitative field research (Wood 2008) when they explore 
subjects’ meanings and perspectives. In-depth, semi-structured interviews represented the 
core of my field research, and were organized around a set of fixed questions. However, 
they were tailored according to the subject’s profile (branching pattern) and each 
interview slightly adapted and refined building upon information collected from earlier 
interviews (building pattern). Interviews suggested recurrent discursive patterns, gaps or 
new avenues for inquiry. In conducting interviews I was aware of the dynamic nature of 
interviews (mainly semi-structured), through which the identities of the interviewer and 
interviewee10 are performed and the knowledge co-constructed. 
I used the snowball technique, which builds upon a potentially increasing, 
expanding and diversifying network of research subjects by using different informants 
and institutional gatekeepers (Gusterson 2008). An access strategy that included 
preliminary emails of presentation of my research position and my research project 
anticipated the field visit. I took detailed notes, which I transcribed in a daily field diary. I 
collected most of the data through semi-structured interviews; when this was not possible 
I conducted informal ones. I have conducted 35 semistructured interviews and 15 
informal interviews. 
I have not cited in the dissertation all of these interviews because several resulted 
as having similar contents, and the indications that I could distil from them were 
fundamentally converging. In addition, during fieldwork I had the opportunity to be part 
                                                
10 Interviewees draw on complex repertoires of discourses to perform themselves in response to 
particular questions 
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of several informal discussions that were not strictly related to the topic of my thesis, but 
have helped me to grasp the broader socio-political dynamics in Kosovo and East Timor. 
I partly recorded and daily transcribed most of the semi-structured interviews, and I wrote 
reports on the most salient informal interviews. Updating regularly my reports allowed 
me to approach proactively the amount of data that I was gathering, and to constantly re-
evaluate my research questions. In East Timor people felt more comfortable replying to 
my questions while I was taking notes in a field diary. In Kosovo most of the people I 
interviewed expected me to record them. In other cases, where recording or taking notes 
was not possible, I made a report at the end of the day.  
As I was a researcher bridging between different worlds (the locals and the 
internationals), I used my linguistic skills to try to deeply embed myself into the reality (-
ies) that I was researching. In Kosovo this implied the use of three different languages in 
interviews and other forms of conversations: Albanian (my mother tongue, although the 
Albanian spoken in Kosovo differs in many ways from the Albanian spoken in Southern 
Albania where I was born, a circumstance that prevented mimetic strategies) for 
approaching local interlocutors, English and Italian for the international milieux. By 
contrast, I used English for most of the interviews that I conducted in East Timor, while I 
made use of a local translator for two interviews with local NGOs’ representatives. I had 
constructive exchanges with the researcher/translator, who proved to be quite resourceful 
in suggesting additional contacts for further interviews. Perhaps not surprisingly, the little 
Portuguese I had studies in preparation for the fieldwork turned out to be quite useless.  
 
2.2.2 Political economy and conflict analysis 
 
Data analysis has involved a critical cultural political economy approach to the mapping 
of activities, actors and relationships in education reform and a conflict analysis to 
education programming and reform. The political economy approach entails recognizing 
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that “[e]ducational projects and interventions succeed or fail not only on the basis of their 
technical quality but also of a range of political and economic factors” (Novelli 2011b: 9). 
This type of analysis seeks to examine the interaction between structures, institutions and 
agents, and their impact on education programming and reform. 
Critical cultural political economy supports the examination and analysis of 
education processes, outcomes and discourses. It is a useful approach because it allows 
the researcher to understand the complex arrangements of agenda-setting, decision-
making and educational governance in place in post-war settings. Moreover, it helps to 
identify and map out the link(s) between education and political, social and economic 
relationships in the society, and allows detecting given strategic actions and responses by 
actors at various scales and moments and with outcomes that may simultaneously or 
consequentially reinforce or hamper aspects of state and peace formation.  
In critical political economy analysis context is crucial, although it is often fluid 
and therefore challenging: the notion of context includes the interactions between 
structure(s), agents and institutions (i.e., norms), and how such interactions affect and are 
affected by different policies. Robertson and Dale’s approach to political economy 
advocates taking culture seriously, and avoiding methodological nationalism/globalism, 
economism or ethnocentrism; furthermore, they suggest to consider and explore other 
issues such as nationalism, identity, values, and knowledge (production) (Robertson and 
Dale 2015). 
According to Novelli et al., critical political economy analysis is more effective at 
“[u]npacking the tensions, contradictions and inequalities in everyday life and in 
education systems – analysing what policy work or not and for whom, but appears less 
useful in offering easy policy solutions.” (2013: 20). Yet, CCPEE provides with a 
framework for disclosing “[t]he complex (and contradictory) ways in which education is 
being re/constituted in particular ways by discourses/ideas/imaginaries (such as 
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development, reconstruction, peacebuilding, social justice or cohesion), actors/institutions 
(such as the central and provincial government, international organizations, state and 
religious schools) and material capabilities/power (resources, aid, information)” (Shah 
and Lopes Cardozo 2014: 8; see also Robertson 2009 quoted in Jones 2010). Such a 
framework has been useful throughout the empirical analysis for both case studies, in that 
it channels and processes the research by looking for the themes that emerges out of each 
of them.  
A conflict analysis approach implies an understanding of the relationship between 
education and the pre- and post-conflict environment, specifically the root causes of 
conflict and the latent, structural violence. In this regard, it is first of all necessary to 
understand the drivers of the conflict (security, political, economic and social factors are 
often identified as key drivers of a conflict) and how education has interacted with them; 
second, it is useful to understand to what extent and how education has addressed these 
conflict roots and drivers (either challenging or reproducing them, mitigating or 
exacerbating). Moreover, attention has to be paid to how education interacts with current 
micro-sources and proximate triggers of conflict. Generally speaking, root causes are  
 
the general structural and deep-rooted background conditions. [They are] 
underlying events and conditions that have existed for many years and are 
mostly static or change slowly over time. They tend to be embedded in 
historical/cultural contexts, e.g., religious conflict, long-standing border disputes, 
difficulty in state building, poverty/economic exclusion or ecological 
degradation. Root causes are thus necessary but not sufficient conditions of 
armed conflict. They can be instrumentalized by political actors and are 
generally used to assess the risk potential of a country (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 
2002: 10). 
 
By contrast, proximate triggers are those dynamic causes, “[m]edium-term conditions and 
emerging socio-political economic trends. Together with root causes they can create 
sufficient conditions for armed conflict” (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 2002: 12). 
 
2.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
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Informed consent, transparency and anonymity were the ethical principles that guided my 
research. The focus of my research, the academic institutions behind it and any further 
explanation that was asked by the participants, was presented at the beginning of any 
interview. The interviewees were informed that they could have the right to withdraw 
themselves from the interviews at any time. The transcription of the interviews and the 
daily report of the observation have been accurately treated, stored in a removable 
memory stick, and protected. In both cases, several respondents asked me to preserve 
their anonymity. I have chosen to preserve the anonymity of all interviewees, and to refer 
only to their current or former position, next to date and location where the interview took 
place.  
With regard to challenges that I encountered in the field, one major constraint 
were the specific moments in which I conducted my fieldwork in Kosovo and East Timor. 
In the case of East Timor I was in the field during June-July 2013: once in the country I 
found out that this was a period where some international advisors I was targeting for 
interviews were in fact leaving for holiday. I had difficulties in accessing different 
international officials: in particular, despite many efforts, I could not interview any 
current or past, local or international official working with UNICEF, which was one of 
the main actors in curriculum reform.  
I encountered similar access problems in the case of Kosovo, for which 
November 2013 was a period of high political tensions due to administrative elections. 
Some of the potential contacts I approached for interviews were abroad for conferences or 
field visits. Here too, despite several attempts that I made, no UNICEF representative was 
available for interviews. Moreover, while I had an informal conversation with an 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) official who gave me 
insights on the role that her organization had played on the reform of higher education 
and multicultural and minority education, I could not formally interview any OSCE 
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official. The OSCE department on higher education was expected to cease its activities a 
few months later (it closed its office in January 2014). I tried to reach the director of that 
department (in charge until the very day I arrived in Pristina), but he declined my 
invitation on the basis of the fact that he would leave Kosovo soon. This meant that I 
could not gain access to the archives related to the OSCE programmes on higher 
education and minority issues. 
I was born in Albania, a circumstance that had some effect on the way in which I 
could gain access to the Kosovo context, if nothing else because of the benefit of 
speaking the main local language. Moreover, I wrote my master thesis on the EU 
development strategy in post-war Kosovo: I already had had fieldwork experience in the 
country. Compared with East Timor, I began my field research with a better 
understanding of the Kosovo context, also thanks to a number of pre-existing local 
contacts. Being an Albanian, and locally identified as a kin, made me feel that I could 
penetrate and decode with relative ease local meanings and social practices; on the other 
hand, the fact that I am not from Kosovo, and that I have been studying for some years 
within the European Union (EU) – Italy and the Netherlands – made me feel in several 
ways distant from the context that I was observing. Perhaps suprisingly, I experienced 
more frustration with organizing and conducting interviews in Kosovo than in East 
Timor, where my fieldwork was certainly more rewarding.  
In the case of East Timor, I felt that I was identified by all people I interviewed as 
an external scholar with no previous links with the context or subject I was researching. 
In more than one occasion, I was identified and defined as an ‘East-European woman’, a 
circumstance that induced me to think  that my status/position as a scholar was being 
overlooked. On another occasion I was identified “as beautiful as all other East-European 
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women.”11 In this latter case, while I tried to frame the conversation according to my 
research questions and subject, the interviewee was inviting me to his village during the 
weekend, asking me to be potentially his guide when he was visiting Albania sometime in 
the future. In both countries, most of the people I interviewed were men sitting in 
different power positions, somehow embedded in paternalistic and sexist contexts. I 
sometimes found myself to be observed as an exotic object, asked who I was and where I 
came from rather than raising interest in the subject of my research.  
 
2.4 CONCEPTS 
 
According to Boyer, “[t]he definitions are less important in themselves than for the way 
in which they assist research” (1990a: 60 quoted in Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum 2006: 
306). Therefore, in preparing a research design I believe one has to be aware that 
“[c]oncepts are never introduced once and for all at a single level of abstraction but are 
continually redefined in the movement from abstract to concrete – acquiring new forms 
and transcending the limits of their previous formulations (Aglietta 1979: 15-16). In this 
regard, I present below an attempt to define education and peace, while the definition and 
evolution of peacebuilding and statebuilding were reviewed and presented in chapter one. 
I have tried to engage with such concepts in a critical and ‘problematizing’ way all along 
the process of dissertation writing. 
Bodies of literature reviewed on education and conflict in peacebuilding and 
statebuilding interventions reveal that none of such concepts is indeed problematized as it 
should be. More specifically, in debates over education, war, and 
peacebuilding/statebuilding, conflict is seen as negative and in need for prevention, rather 
than as intrinsic of/in any society, so the question becomes how to prevent conflict rather 
                                                
11 Interview with an highly-ranked official within the Ministry of Education, 1 July 2013, Dili, East 
Timor 
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than what conflict (or its absence) would reflect about underlying (power) relations and 
(legitimate) political orders. 
By contrast, peace is regarded as a neutrally positive outcome, process or utopia, 
or criticised due to its externally-imposed and liberal nature. Debates abound on the 
definitions, evaluative benchmarks and indicators, ways to consolidate/achieve it, or 
reasons for its failure. The fragility of a state of peacefulness and the difficulty to measure 
or evaluate it suggests seeing peace as an historical process and the result of particular 
social relations. Attempts to conceptualize it against a number of agreed-upon 
benchmarks at which interventions are then assessed presume an a-contextual process, 
and ignore the fundamentally historical and contingent nature of peace.  
When dealing with education, there is growing concern and increase in interest on 
the part of involved international actors on how to quickly rebuild it along the emergency, 
medium- and long-term imperatives. Moreover, there is by now a growing literature that 
criticises the neo-liberal policies and strategies that are transplanted and implemented 
from one context to the next one on a global scale. However, there is little research on 
how such neo-liberal agendas are interacting with social forces on the ground, what are 
the effects and outcomes of such interaction, and what is the rationale behind prevailing 
education agendas and choices. Thus, there is a need for more empirical insights on the 
role of local actors in receiving, implementing or contesting such global educational 
agendas.  
Lastly, the nature of the state that emerges through, in and from 
peacebuilding/statebuilding interventions is rarely questioned. Most of the approaches 
that study the issue of state failure in international statebuilding interventions, depart from 
neo-institutionalist or neo-weberian perspectives that take for granted the unitary nature 
of the state. Some scholars (Jones 2013; Hameiri 2010) are proposing a Gramscian 
perspective to studying the state that emerges in post-war statebuilding interventions, 
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emphasising its relational nature (i.e., state as social relation as extensively elaborated by 
Bob Jessop).  
 
2.4.1 Education  
 
In my research, I adopt a description of broad state-specific educational trends. I therefore 
try to avoid a rigid compartmentalization of education through a sector-by-sector analysis 
of the education system, which I read as dimensions along which models may differ. By 
models of education systems I intend recurrent patterns in organizing an education system 
which may vary in terms of more or less emphasis on public vis-à-vis private education; 
technical and vocational training education vis-à-vis higher education; emphasis on 
majorities vis-à-vis minorities (in education structure or curricula); emergency response 
in the form of service provision vis-à-vis longer term curricula development; degree of 
intrusiveness of donors vis-à-vis degree and power of local agency. The research will 
seek to unravel the rationale for and the agency behind such patterns. In looking at 
education as a complex (more than a) system, the category of ‘education ensemble’ as 
used by Robertson and Dale (2015) is particularly useful.  They urge to see the ‘education 
ensemble’  
 
As a complex collective, construction of the social world, that is not reducible to 
schools, or universities, learners and teachers. [...] Education involves an array of 
actors and other institutions, [...] whose logics, interests and forms of authority 
generate tensions and contradictions within the ensemble. [...] Education is the 
outcome of sets of ideas and activities accredited over generations, which, whilst 
individually irreducible to each other, can be seen to be in an internal 
relationship with each other in the production of the ensemble. [...] there can be 
no understanding of the individual elements of the ensemble, without an overall 
understanding of it (Robertson and Dale 2015: 155-156).  
 
The broader concept of ‘ensemble’ is useful in that it places education in multiple 
relationships with(in) societies and it allows detecting the range of relatioships within 
education and between education and the broader society. Education is a “[c]omplex and 
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variegated agency of social reproduction” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 150), which cannot 
be reduced either to “‘[a] system’, or ‘an agent’ of socialisation and social selection, or 
indeed a provider of vocational qualifications” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 150).  
Robertson suggests to view education “[n]ot as pre-given container or universal 
and unchanging category of social relations and life-worlds, but as a complex terrain and 
outcome of discursive, material and institutionalized struggles over the role of education 
in the social contract” (Robertson 2014: 2). In investigating the education ensemble one 
has to take into account four elements that are related to it and which contribute to its 
definition and construction: the wider, cultural scripts through which education is 
constructed or by which it is influenced (e.g., Western Modernity, Western education, 
Islam, Catholicism, etc.); its relationship with the society(ies) at the local, national, 
regional and global level; its relationship with the economy (modes of economic 
organization/production such as capitalism); forms of organizations that features it as a 
system (Robertson and Dale 2015: 156).  
Methodologically, investigating the education ensemble would involve a number 
of ‘education questions’ as largely debated by Dale and Robertson (Dale 2000, 2005; 
Robertson and Dale 2013, 2015). These questions move along four “analytical 
moments”12 or levels of analysis that constitute “[d]ifferent frammings and realisations of 
the ‘education ensemble’” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 156).  
 
• moment of educational practice, which deals with issues of distribution of 
educational experiences and revolve arounds questions such as ‘who is taught 
what, by whom, how, where?’; 
• moment of educational politics, which deals with the relationship between policy 
and practice focusing on questions such as ‘how and by whom are those things 
                                                
12 These moments remain distinct at the analytical level: while moving at the ground level one finds 
them overlapping, in a dynamic relationship.  
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decided?’, always recognizing that events occurring at these two ‘moments’ are 
placed in a dynamic and co-constitutive relationship; 
• moment of the politics of education, which is “[c]oncerned with both political-
economic structures, and deeply embedded cultural/civilizational/national 
structures and discourses, [...] ‘paradigmatic setting’ that both promote and set 
limits to what is considered possible and desirable from education” (Robertson 
and Dale 2015: 156); 
• moment of outcomes of educational processes, include immediate consequences 
of the three previous moments for those directly involved, but also the wider 
consequences and effects at the individual, collective, societal levels arising from 
the production and operation of the education ensemble (Robertson and Dale 
2015: 157).  
 
A critical cultural political economy is better suited to capture the complex array of 
structures, institutions and practices of the education ensemble, and of its scope, forms, 
and outcomes, since it focuses on the cultural, political and economic elements of the 
ensemble. Importantly for the study of education around the world, the idea of culture, 
economy and politics are pluralized, so that whilst it is recognized that capitalism and 
modernity are major determinants of the shape of education in many parts of the world, 
this is not to say that all cultural projects can be characterized as modernity, and nor are 
all economic relations in education capitalist. 
The approach suggested and adopted by Robertson and Dale goes beyond a 
traditional understanding of the economy (i.e., recognizing one form of organising the 
relations of production, distribution and exchange), by looking at the education sector 
itself as an economy in its own right, partly “heavily commodified” and partly depending 
on a “gift economy” (Robertson 2012: 3). Also, the ‘political’ within such framework and 
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in education does not limit its scope to the formal institutions of government or to the 
state and state actors as such, but extends to the multiplicity of non-state actors that 
operate in, out and through education, ultimately sugggesting that power and politics in 
education is and works in a myriad of ways. Finally, the ‘cultural’ in their framework 
does not only refer to ‘semiosis’ or ‘discourses’, but also to wider “[c]ivilisational 
projects – such as modernity, Confucianism, Islam” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 154).  
 
2.4.2 Peace  
 
Peace has always been a contested concept. Nearly four decades after the foundation of 
peace research and following three decades of peacekeeping/peacemaking/peacebuilding 
missions, peace remains an “essentially contested concept” (Strazzari 2008a: 46). The 
stance that this research takes is one that considers peace as an inter-subjective and 
context-specific process, constructed in the interplay among different subjects, which 
struggle to define it. Such subjects underwrite explicit or tacit ontological, 
epistemological and methodological assumptions, further various interests, and are 
entrenched within power relations (Richmond 2008: 16)  
Peace, as a concept and as a practice, is subjected to the varying historical and 
material conditions. Approaching the definition of peace genealogically and contextually 
is useful in that peace cannot be a fixed and universalizing concept and that “[p]eace 
always has a time and space...and exists in multiple forms in overlapping spaces of 
influence” (Richmond 2005: 16). Examining the conceptualization of peace one cannot 
exempt from questions such as what is peace (for), why, who creates and implements it, 
how and for whom? (Pugh et al. 2008) 
According to Richmond, the focus in the disciplines of peace research and 
conflict studies has been on preventing conflict rather than on “[a] sustained attempt to 
develop a self-sustaining peace” (Richmond 2008: 9). The preponderance of war 
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discourses over peace discourses has to do with the idea that peace has been seen as non-
war, a generic non-event that is difficult to measure (Strazzari 2008a). The establishment 
of peace research in the 1960s critically challenged and questioned the definition of peace 
as merely the absence of war.13 
One of the most prominent exponents of that generation of peace recearcher has 
been Johan Galtung. Central in his work is the search for positive peace, encompassing 
the addressing and overcoming of structural and cultural violence, the search for human 
empathy and solidarity, and the inclusion of social justice as a pivotal dimension of a 
broader conceptualization of peace. In this view peace comprises the implementation of 
social justice, a condition where human rights are respected (Johnston and Slyomovics 
2008). Such a broader understanding and definition of peace lays the foundation for 
multidimensional approaches to peace (ranging from the management and prevention of 
war, to the removal of injustices and inequalities, to the overcoming of the latter through 
non-violent means). This is also found in the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee’s 
(re)definition of peacebuilding that seems to reflect a broader, transformational 
understanding (and application) of it encompassing elements of Galtung’s positive peace. 
Part of my research question is looking at the kind of peace(s) that education 
systems reflect and affect in Kosovo and East Timor. On another level, the review and 
contextual analysis of the empirical case studies aims to grasp the meanings and 
theoretical foundations underpinning the peacebuilding agendas and practices of 
international actors in both cases. In this section, rather than using and choosing a 
definition of peace against which I test the results on the ground and the measurable 
                                                
13 The multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature of peace research aims at shedding light at the conditions of a 
sustainable and durable peace. A number of institutions mark the origins and evolution of the discipline: in 1959, 
the creation of the Norwegian-based International Peace Research Institute that becomes an independent institution 
in 1966 and is guided by the founding scholar in peace research Johan Galtung; in 1959, the setting up of the 
Center for Research on Conflict Resolution based at the University of Michigan, led by Kenneth Boulding; in 
1961, the founding of the Canadian Peace Research Institute; in 1966, the founding of the Swedish-based 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).  
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contribution of education respectively, I aimed to briefly present the ambiguity and 
complexity of the debates surrounding any definition of peace and peacefulness as well as 
their elusivity.  
In doing so, I nevertheless argue that any attempt to define, build and practice 
peace and its (mutually constitutive) relationship with education has to incorporate a 
concept of social justice. In this regard, Nancy Fraser’s conceptualization of social justice 
in terms of redistribution, recognition and representation is useful as a conceptual 
framework that links education reform to (contributing and building) a just and positive 
peace, in terms of (1) redistribution, i.e., issues of safe and equitable educational access 
and opportunity; (2) recognition, i.e., educational relevance; (3) representation, i.e., 
educational governance. Linking (social) justice to peace challenges mainstream 
representations of what peace and stability may mean or represent in the post-conflict 
moment and how could education be related to and contributing to it.  
In other terms, frameworks of social justice and change provide with the 
possibility to normatively link peacebuilding and education to social justice goals. IR 
scholarship that is critical of neoliberal peacebuilding has been advocating an 
empancipatory and sustainable peace without further elaborating what such an 
‘emancipatory‘ and ‘sustainable’ peace would look like (Richmond 2008). Moreover, it is 
not clear which forms and through which relationships, processes, actors and sectors 
would peacebuilding (as a process) lead to a just and empancipatory peace in post-
conflict settings and if and how education can play a role in this regard. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
MULTICULTURAL PEACEBUILDING IN AN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED KOSOVO 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The province of Kosovo, which had historically been the poorest in the former 
Yugoslavia, underwent a war in 1998-99. NATO launched an air bombing campaign 
between April-June 1999 that forced the Belgrade’s security forces to withdraw, along 
with ethnic Serbian civilians, and facilitated the return of Kosovo refugees (most of 
whom were of Albanian origin14). In the aftermath of the war, Kosovo was administered 
according to Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). This implied that, although 
Kosovo remained de jure part of Serbia, de facto the province (for most of its territory) 
was not responding to Belgrade’s authorities.  
New governance structures came to Kosovo in the form of the UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK), operating as a transitional, interim administration with unlimited 
legislative and executive powers. UNMIK functioned in coordination with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR): over time it gradually 
transferred its competences to democratically elected provisional local authorities. During 
1999-2008, the international community  
 
provided over three billion Euro in foreign aid, and undertook larg projects in 
peace- and institution-building. [...] many criticize the international 
administration for being inneffective in satisfying the real needs of the Kosovar 
population, constructing social trust across ethnic communities and in realizing 
economic recovery and psycho-social reconstruction. The international 
                                                
14 Ethnic Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo will be referred to as Kosovars, following the local use of the 
term. By contrast, I will sometimes refer to Kosovans (a term that has no local language 
correspondence) to design the entire population that lives in Kosovo, including other ethno-national 
groups. I use, otherwise, the terms ‘Kosovo Albanians’ and ‘Kosovo Serbs’ to refer to particular ethnic 
groups of the Kosovo population.  
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administration is also criticised for deepening ethnic fragmentation, [...] 
inhibiting local ownership and making bottom-up approaches to transition and 
normalization impossible (Beha and Visoka 2010: 84).  
  
In spite of these efforts, that were made under a UN quasi-protectorate, it is hard to define 
Kosovo a success story of peacebuilding and statebuilding post-conflict reconstruction: 
major failures and systematic fragility persist. One of the main failures was the political 
solution that came with the unilateral declaration of independence adopted by the Kosovo 
parliament on February 17, 2008, following the breakdown of diplomatic efforts that 
sought to bring the parties (i.e., Pristina and Belgrade) to an agreed upon outcome over 
the status of the province.15 
The declaration of independence of 2008 was not the first one adopted by 
Albanian parties, but unlike the previous ones it was met with recognition on the part of 
most Western states: locally it was welcomed with widespread euphory by the vast 
majority of Kosovans, most of whom are ethnic Albanians. For nine years following the 
end of hostilities, the (intractability of the) ‘status issue’ had been used by both the 
international community and the local authorities as an alibi for posponing other pressing 
issues and problems of post-war Kosovo, such as widespread levels of poverty and 
unemployment, in an highly demographically young country. Indipendence was thus 
given a talismanic meaning, and expected to contribute to solving some of these issues.  
Following independence, international governance mechanisms were 
reconfigured, in a process characterized by tensions and ambiguities: given the fact that a 
number of countries that were participating in the post-war multilateral rebuilding effort 
refused to recognize the new state, complexity on the ground  reached unprecedented 
levels: different actors, in primis the EU and the UN were struggling to redefine and 
reassert power and competences. When I visited Kosovo in March 2008, in the immediate 
                                                
15 Kosovo’s political status has been at the core of a long conflict between Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs. After the war, the negotiation process between Belgrade authorities and Pristina’s provisional 
government resulted in a deadlock, with Kosovo Albanians becoming increasingly frustrated vs. the 
international UN mission. 
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aftermath of the unilateral declaration of independence, the disillusionment and 
desolation I could grasp by talking to local inhabitants was amplified by the growing 
complexity of the international presence which made me look at the country as embroiled 
within a frozen conflict that has never ended. Despite the prospect of EU integration and 
unprecedented levels of international assistance, the picture I could grasp in two distinct 
fieldworks (in 2008 and in 2013) is that of a country where poverty and 
underdevelopment assumes different but persistent forms. 
 
The international community put twenty-five times as much money and fifty 
times as many troops into Kosovo, on a per capita basis, as into Afghanistan. 
And yet despite this enormous commitment of resources and effort, by the 
mission’s own standard it still largely failed (King and Mason 2006: 240). 
 
As mentioned above, underdevelopment has been a key question related to Kosovo 
during Yugoslavia: development indicators which worsened throughout the decade that 
preceded the war, as the Yugoslav economic and budget crisis reached unprecedented 
peaks. Failure to reach planned development standards can be regarded as one of the 
underlying causes of conflict; an aspect that has, nevertheless, been largely ignored and 
neglected by the international community in post-war Kosovo (Montanaro 2009).  
It is sometimes thought that the disintegration of Yugoslavia started in Kosovo 
during the student riots in 1981. The protesters were asking for a rise in salaries, measures 
for addressing high unemployment rates, and an overall improvement of the economic 
situation. Moreover, the status of ‘Republic’ for the ‘Autonomous Province of Kosovo’ 
also featured among the requests that were aired in Pristina. Commenting on the student 
riots at University of Pristina, the journalist Zdenko Astic emphasized the role of the dire 
socio-economic situation of Kosovo,16 underlining how a (relatively) huge amount of 
funding that had been poured by the Federation into ‘the development of Kosovo’ were 
not translated into growth: the region had remained the poorest in Yugoslavia. 
                                                
16 For a documented analysis of underdevelopment in densely Albanian inhabited areas see Roux 1992: 103-127 
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One could already identify here the close relationship between conflict dynamics, 
(higher) education and underdevelopment as being part of underlying conflict causes. The 
socio-economic and political situation in Kosovo further worsened during the 1990s, as 
an effect of the discriminatory policies that were the fruit of the politics game played by 
Slobodan Milosevic against Kosovo Albanians.17 
The 1999 war was the result of a number of dynamics and factors: the worsening 
of the socio-economic conditions in which the large majority of the population lived can 
be considered one of them. Although one should refrain from mechanistic explanations, 
the deterioration of living standards affected both the Serbian and the Albanian 
communities. The major violent riots swept post-war Kosovo in March 2004 (causing 21 
deaths) was both addressed against the Serbian community and the international 
community. Beside the frustration related to the question of the political status, once 
again, high unemployment rates, a decline in purchasing power and the deepening of 
socio-economic inequalities made Kosovo’s social landscape particularly unstable and 
vulnerable. According to King and Mason: 
 
If economic privation was a spur to the lethal violence of March of that year, it 
was no coincidence that the riots occurred when they did. 2004 was the year 
people woke up to their manifest poverty. Prosperity, like independence, seemed 
to have been postponed much longer than initially hoped; by 2004, many had 
concluded it would never arrive [...] Poverty no more presents an excuse for the 
ethnic violence of March 2004 than a deprived upbringing should count as an 
excuse for other violent crime; but if there was a casual link, it is that the ‘feel-
good factor’, fleetingly delivered by the reconstruction effort in the early days, 
had gone into reverse (King and Mason 2006: 224). 
 
As the EU took the lead in 2008, seeking to mentor the course of post indipendence 
Kosovo, many socio-economic problems remained unaddressed and unresolved: among 
them, the existence of large sectors of informality, extremely high (youth) unemployment 
                                                
17 This period was characterized by a large job displacement of Kosovo Albanians, which were substituted with 
Serbian workers. Milosevic was trying to create demographic imbalances between the different ethnic groups. He 
was forcing the repopulation of the Kosovo region with Serbian refugees from other parts of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
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and poverty rate, a young and unbalanced demographic structure, and decreasing levels of 
migrants’ remittances and international aid. Six years after indipendence, such a situation is 
hardly improved: on the contrary, it is further exacerbated by the political and geographical 
isolation in which Kosovo lies, being the only Balkan country excluded from visa 
liberalization vis-à-vis the EU-Schengen area.  
 
3.1 The intractable conflict: a background analysis  
 
 
[a]ll parties can agree that the issue of Kosovo 
is, quite simply, the most intractable of all the 
political conflicts in the Balkans (Malcolm 
1998: xxvii) 
 
 
For most of its modern history, Kosovo has been a poor and contested frontier area, in 
which the control of central authorities was nominal, insecurity characterized social and 
economic life, social capital was quite low, and the basis for stability was to be found 
within the family or kin group (and related networks). Michel Roux defined it as a 
“[v]èritable périphérie de la périphérie” (1992: 238). Kosovo was the poorest province of 
Yugoslavia. The issue of development interacting with the ethno-national question was of 
critical importance for the way the conflict unfolded.  
A genealogy of the Kosovo issue which aims to contextualize the root causes of 
such a long conflict is not a straightforward task. There has always been a manipulation 
of historical facts and sources, and controversy over different ‘national historical truths’ 
(Dogo 1999). However, a background to the recent history of Kosovo that includes 
phases and causes of a long conflict between the two main ethnic groups of Albanians 
and Serbs is useful because it provides with the context within which education has been 
developed and reconstructed.  
The current administrative structure of Kosovo is still legally grounded on UN 
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Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1999), which brought Kosovo back to the 
autonomous status it gained following the adoption of a new constitution in Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1974 (Klasnja 2007: 15). This constitution gave to 
Pristina the same functions and representation within the Yugoslav Federal state as those 
of the other six Yugoslav republics.18 Yet, Kosovo formally remained an autonomous 
province within Serbia. By not being a republic in the Yugolav federal system, Kosovo 
did not have the right to secede. In the aftermath of Tito’s death, Yugoslavia showed the 
first signs of economic and institutional crisis, which preceded the rise of dangerous 
nationalist movements in the respective republics.  
As mentioned above, in 1981 Kosovo Albanians started hunger striking and 
rallied in protests asking for the status of ‘republic’ for ‘two million’ Kosovo Albanians: 
one of the underlying reasons for such a claim was that neighbouring Montenegro, home 
to 600,000 inhabitants had the right to secession. Albanians accused the Yugoslav 
authorities of discrimination vis-à-vis the main non-slavic nation within the Federation. 
By the end of the 1980s, Milosevic began a process of re-centralization of Yugoslavia, 
which started by removing Kosovo’s autonomy, and reducing Kosovo to a Serbian 
district called Kosmet (i.e., Kosovo i Metohia). Re-establishing Serbian direct rule over 
Kosovo was followed by replacing Kosovo Albanians with Kosovo Serbs in the public 
administration (Del Castillo 2008: 137). The systematic discrimination perpetuated by the 
Milosevic regime worsened Kosovo’s socio-economic underdevelopment, with 
unemployment rising and inter-ethnic inequalities deepening (Del Castillo 2008: 138).  
Following the attack on the autonomy of the province, Kosovo Albanians 
organized a referendum, in which the majority voted for the indipendence of the 
‘Republic of Kosova’. As a result, government structures and a parliament were created. 
                                                
18 In other words, Pristina could decide on matters of infrastructure, agriculture, light/heavy industry 
and it was an equale member for the rotating Yugoslav presidency, government and the leadership of 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.  
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On September 7, 1990, two thirds of the political representatives of the ‘elected 
parliament’ gathered clandestinely in Kačanik, and after a few days a declaration that 
came to be known as the ‘Constitution of the Republic of Kosova’ was adopted. Two 
years later (1992), general elections were held in a situaiton in which Belgrade – that was 
present with its own administration and security apparatus – formally ignored 
developments among Kosovars: they were won by the main political organization Lidhja 
Democratike e Kosoves (LDK – the Democratic League of Kosovo) led by Ibrahim 
Rugova, who became the president of the self-proclaimed republic.  
The Serbian authorities did not recognize the new structures, and the latter 
operated in a condition of clandestinity, as shadow institutions performing the same 
functions of a state, particularly as far as the delivery of basic social services is 
concerned. This led to the creation of a parallel state system with a self-taxation 
mechanism (within Kosovo and outside in the Kosovo Diaspora), education system, 
medical and media structures, but it lacked a policing and judicial system (O’Neill 2002). 
Throughout those years, while the Balkan wars were disintegrating Yugoslavia, Rugova 
opted for nonviolent resistance as the way to achieve indipendence. 
This changed after the Dayton agreements which seemed to award those countries 
that reached indipendence through war and violence. According to Morozzo della Rocca 
(1999), Kosovo was left out of the agenda in Dayton: this meant the postponment sine die 
of the Kosovo problem on the international agenda. Parts of Kosovo’s society and of the 
diaspora community at this point joined ranks, feeling that the gradualist, non-violent 
project had entered a dead-end alley: an growing number of subjects started to question 
Rugova’s authority and his peaceful approach. They proposed an active resistance 
strategy that could clearly escalate into armed confrontation.  
Soon after, a guerrilla-like ‘army’ known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
was formed, in part thanks to diaspora remittances. The KLA confronted systematically 
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both the LDK and the Serbian authorities during the period between 1997-98 (Klasnja 
2007: 16; Morozzo della Rocca 1999; O’Neill 2002; Scotto and Arielli 1999). Serbian 
police and paramilitary factions responded with increasing repression against the civilian 
population, and as clashes between Serbian forces and KLA combatants escalated 
throughout 1998, non-Serbs (mainly Albanian) were forced into a mass exodus into the 
neighbouring countries of Albania and Republic of Macedonia.  
The ‘Racak massacre’ of Albanian fighters (January 1999) was a turning point 
that pushed the international community to organize negotiated talks between Kosovo 
Albanian leaders and the Belgrade authorities in Rambouillet, near Paris. Although the 
agreement were eventually accepted by the Kosovo delegation, they failed as a result of 
Milosevic’s refusal to sign the conditions that were aiming to reinstate Kosovo’s 
autonomous status of 1974, asking for the withdrawal and replacement of Serbian troops 
with an international peacekeeping force, and the establishment of an international 
mission that after three years open the door to a referendum on the political status of the 
province (Morozzo della Rocca 1999: 111-119). The refusal by the Serbian delegation 
meant the braking down of the negotiation and the start of a war campaign by NATO: 78 
days of bombing and the creation of an interim international administration under UN 
guidance.  
 
3.2 How many Kosovos and which one counts more? The complexity of the 
context  
 
Mapping out the international commitment to peacebuilding and statebuilding in post-war 
Kosovo and its interaction with conflict roots and dynamics requires sketching out a 
number of ‘images’ of Kosovo or issue-driven representations. The place of Kosovo in 
Western cognitive maps is part of the deep-rooted tradition of representation of the 
Balkan region as an intractable problem awaiting remedial and therapeutical strategies. In 
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scholarly and policy literature, Kosovo is characterized, for example, as a case of post-
socialist transition, as an ethno-national conflict, as a post-conflict country, as a 
peripheral territory facing serious development challenges, as a failed, fragile, neo-
patrimonial, criminal, or quasi-state preparing for EU accession (Pugh 2006; Strazzari 
2008b; Woodward 2007; Montanaro 2009), or a post-liberal order and neo-colonial 
protectorate (Chandler 2010). However, these dimensions have not been equally 
considered and emphasised in post-war Kosovo. 
While the perspective of Kosovo as a potential candidate country for EU 
accession has been increasingly emphasised by EU officials since indipendence (which 
was mirrored by a more complex EU role and presence), its prospects on the ground have 
blurred to say the least: Kosovo’s growing isolation reflects this state of affairs. Yet, 
Kosovo remains part of the EU integration process and the corresponding EU 
Enlargement strategies and policies. A second dimension concerns the status of Kosovo 
as a developing country, and the extent to which such a dimension has been linked to 
broader sectors and processes such as post-conflict education. While a range of data point 
to the existence of an unambigous ‘development problematique’, the latter has been 
largely ignored by the international community: this was particulatly apparent in how the 
European Union came to terms with the region, when it volunteered for assuming primary 
responsibility under UNMIK for economic development and reconstruction.  
A third representational line and characterizing dimension concerns the definition 
of Kosovo as a post-socialist, transition country. This dimension and its legacies have 
been often eclipsed or overlooked by the international community by putting more 
emphasis on another significant dimension of the Kosovo conflict, i.e., its ethno-national 
matrix. Another important line has depicted and framed Kosovo as a post-conflict 
country. What has to be taken into consideration when analysing conflict and 
international intervention in Kosovo is that there exists the possibility that development, 
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reconstruction and education assistance are conceived and concretized in ways that they 
become ethnically uneven and polarized, thus reinforcing instability or conflict cleavages.  
 
3.3 International governance in post-conflict Kosovo 
 
Following the NATO air campaign (April 1999-June 1999), the Serbian forces withdrew 
and Kosovo fell under UN rule, administered according to the lines formally established 
by UNSCR 1244 (June 10, 1999). The latter paved the way to an unprecedented 
“[c]omplex multi-pronged transition to peace” (Del Castillo 2008: 140). UNMIK was 
exerting functions that were close to those of a state, but which did not put (de jure) into 
question the territorial integrity of Serbia, recognizing Kosovo as formally part of Serbia.  
The UNSCR 1244 gave to the UN unprecedented civil administrative functions 
and broad government responsibilities. Executive and legislative powers were exercised 
by UNMIK and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) until the 
resolution of the final political status of the province: “[t]je UN led, for the first time, ‘an 
integrated operation’ as advocated by Boutros-Ghali in the early nineties, in which the 
UN set priorities, coordinated humanitarian, civil administration, democratization, and 
economic reconstruction activities” (Del Castillo 2008: 140). UNMIK powers were not 
intended as merely regulative, but also as transformative, “[c]oncerned with provision of 
public goods and good governance, maintenance of peace, and facilitation of formation of 
local democratic and accountable political actors to whom UNMIK powers could 
gradually transfer” (Mulaj 2011: 246).  
Within the framework of UNSCR 1244, any solution to the political status was 
stated to be done by respecting the territorial integrity of the then former Yugoslavia. For 
Woodward (1999) while the two missions of Kosovo and East Timor were almost 
identical, they differed in one aspect, the political status in each of the settings. In East 
Timor the political path to nation- and statehood was clear from the beginning, while in 
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Kosovo it remained unsolved with consequences still felt today. King and Mason (2006) 
argue that not addressing the political status in the aftermath of the war was one of the 
failures of the UN mission in Kosovo, and this might explain several mistakes that the 
mission recorded in Kosovo, such as in the fields of development, rule of law, security 
etc.  
The governance system that emerged in post-war Kosovo, led some authors to 
define it as a modern form of protectorate, whose supervision and functioning were 
managed by a range of international actors, within and outside the UN mission (King and 
Mason 2006; Montanaro 2009). UNMIK rested upon a pillar-based structure that 
separated functional areas of responsibility, respectively entrusted to key international 
actors (the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the World Bank) (Héthy 2002). 
The first Secretary-General report on UNMIK outlined the mission’s main tasks, 
responsibilities and powers (UN SG 1999a). The report stated that “[i]n order to ensure 
that the institutional capacities of the agencies cooperating with the UN are pooled for 
optimal effectiveness on the ground, each component will be assigned to an agency 
which would take the lead role in a particular area” (UN SG 1999a: par. 5, emphasis in 
the original). The four pillars were:  
 
(a) Interim civil administration, entrusted to the United Nations;19 
(b) Humanitarian affairs, entrusted to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNCHR); 
(c) Institution-building, entrusted to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE); 
(d) Economic reconstruction and development, entrusted to the European Union. 
 
                                                
19 Education was part of the first pillar, the interim civil administration 
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Tensions soon arised in the UNMIK governance systems, as each of the 
respective pillar-leading actors took a different approach. There were tensions between 
OSCE –  tasked with institution building – and the UN agendies, that were given  
implementation responsibilities. The UN was building the capacities of institutions, 
municipalities and other sector of the administrative machinery, while OSCE was 
building the capacities of ‘soft-power institutions’ (and sectors) such as the media, the 
organization of elections and the promotion of human rights. Other tensions were more 
related to structural UNMIK deficiencies.  
From its very outset, UNMIK deployment was slow: several important goals were 
never achieved also due to intra-agency rivalries. In the early months the void was filled 
by Kosovo Albanians, who had been running education, health and other civil and social 
services during the 1990s. Illustrative of international, intra-agency rivalries was the lack 
of a ‘conflict resolution’ unit, most likely because international institutions were reluctant 
to see it under the control of any of them. King and Mason contend that there were too 
many leading masters within UNMIK, which was reflected in a lack of coherence and 
coordination in pursuing strategies and goals (King and Mason 2006: 251). 
Some specific functions were performed by different institutions and agencies, a 
fact that caused major overlaps and duplications. In the beginning, for example, decisions 
regarding economic development were taken by three different actors without 
coordination among them, i.e., the UN, the EU and the United States Agency for 
International Development [USAID] (King and Mason 2006: 126). A similar situation 
occurred in the media sector, for which both the OSCE and the UN were performing 
similar tasks. In terms of accountability, it was not clear who the UNMIK was 
responsible to, beside the Security Council.  
UNMIK embarked upon implementing its mandate with a strong emphasis on 
pursuing the overall goal of building democratic institutions and making Kosovo reach 
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democratic standards. This was seen as as precondition for resolving the ‘final status’ 
issue. By February 2000, UNMIK had established the Joint Interim Administration 
Structure (JIAS), for sharing administrative functions with Kosovars, although the latter 
did not exercise decision-making authority.  
The 2001 UNMIK-sponsored Constitutional Framework paved the way to an 
elected legislature and autonomous government with limited powers. Similar to the 
process of ‘Timorisation’, the process of ‘Kosovisation’ aimed to partially hand over 
power from the international community to elected local authorities. Elections for the 
Kosovo assembly were held on November 21, 2001, but a local government was formed 
only months later due to political tensions between the different political parties (Del 
Castillo 2008: 141). The Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) started 
operating as of April 2002 and the three ethnic Albanian parties were represented.20 The 
local authorities would work parallel to UNMIK, in a situation in which the UN mission 
maintaned ‘exclusive’ power and competences over a number of areas and issues, while 
the provisional authorities gained ownership in the ‘transitional areas’ (Hèthy 2002).  
The relationship between the local and international authorities were marked by 
rivalries and confrontation concerning the devolution and power sharing, with tensions 
arising in the period before and after the 2008 independence. Local authorities were 
frustrated because UNMIK had the power and control over the most important sectors 
and the  local government often complained of controlling social issues such as health, 
education, environment, which were small budget sectors.  
With the final political status in a limbo, SRSG Michael Steiner launched the 
‘standards before status’ policy in April 2002, which listed a number of benchmarks that 
                                                
20 The three parties were the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK, ex KLA), the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK, another ex-KLA branch).  
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local authorities had to reach before a negotiation for the final status could start.21 Critics 
to the ‘standards before status’ strategy have pointed out to the fact that the success and 
feasibility of the envisaged standards in a context of institutions-building was problematic 
in a context of “[s]uspended sovereignty” (Mulaj 2011: 251). Five years later, in March 
2007, as negotiation between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians had reached a deadlock, the 
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General proposed a UN plan that would grant Kosovo 
‘supervised independence’ under EU tutelage and NATO protection. Kosovo Albanians 
accepted the plan, which was nevertheless rejected by Serbia.  
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared unilateral independence from Serbia. 
Kosovo authorities accepted EU supervision according to the Ahtisaari Plan that 
envisaged the transfer of power from UNMIK to EU. In practice, this happened only 
partially and post-unilateral independence has seen an even more complex governance, in 
which the UN mission has been complemented by an EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX), and an International Civilian Office (ICO)22 led by a special representative 
appointed by the Council of the European Union. UNMIK scope and mandate had to be 
redefined, with the EU expected to lead and supervise the post-indipendence phase.  
The whole international governance system upon which Kosovo is legally based 
remained in place – UNMIK formally included - as the Resolution 1244 could not be 
overcome due to Russian’s veto in the Security Council. Serbia and the Serbian-inhabited 
areas of Kosovo have since been objecting to the deployment of the EULEX mission, 
which – they claimed - would imply acknowledging the de facto independence. EULEX, 
for its part, had the problem of some EU member states not recognizing the independence 
of Kosovo, and therefore declared itself status-neutral. On the ground, the deployment of 
international missions in Kosovo has been carried out along ethno-territorial lines.  
                                                
21 The standards included developing sound and functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom of 
movement, refugee return and reintegration, economic reforms, enforcement of property rights, dialogue with 
Belgrade, and the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) (Del Castillo 2008: 340).  
22 The ICO was the authority in Kosovo responsible for interpreting the Ahtisaari Plan and supervising Kosovo’s 
indipendence and it ceased its activities in September 2012. 
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3.4 Externally-driven statebuilding and peacebuilding  
 
The international community treated Kosovo as a ‘tabula rasa’ or an ‘empty shell’ where 
everything had to be rewritten from scratch (Lemay-Hébert 2011). International 
interventions administering the territory and building the state during the 1990s had re-
proposed some of the most problematic aspects of former UN trusteeship colonial 
administration during the 1920s, “[c]onsidering post-conflict territories – such as East 
Timor or Kosovo – as ‘blank slates’ needing complete (re)construction of governments, 
economic and social systems.” (Montanaro 2009: 5; Blair 2002). Yet, Kosovo was not a 
“blank slate” and in the aftermath of the war it had inherited a number of social, cultural, 
political and economic legacies and fragilities from the pre-war phase.  
Fragility in Kosovo can be seen first and foremost as an effect of the basic lack of 
state capacity to exercise its authority over the territory. Yet, Kosovo contains other 
dimensions of fragility, in that it is a weak and poor performer in providing basic services 
to the population. Moreover, in Kosovo power is channelled through a deep-rooted 
patronage system that was reconfigurated due to the emergence of new actors in the war 
season: political leaders have derived their legitimacy for their contribution as peaceful 
dissidents during the 1990s or their liberation (and military) roles during the 1998-99 war, 
their overall contribution to the independence of Kosovo and more broadly their regional 
and clan-based embeddedness (Montanaro 2009: 6). This has led some scholars to define 
Kosovo as a neo-patrimonial or quasi-state whereby different political authorities 
compete for legitimacy in a situation of deep economic stagnation and weak bond 
between the state and society (Montanaro 2009: 6).  
As in other post-war and post-interventionary systems of governance, stability 
came at the cost of building or accepting the emergence of states that have been 
innefective showing scarce interest in generating public goods or economic development: 
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“[i]nstead of creating and investing in domestic conditions, which would provide durable 
peace and human security in Kosovo, the policy of the international community in 
Kosovo was shaped by a preoccupation with stability” (Beha and Visoka 2010: 89). For 
Zaum “[s]uch a policy [...] makes the international presence a condition of stability, rather 
than an instrument to attain self-sustained peace” (2009: 1).  
What is most critical, is that external-led statebuilding intervention in Kosovo has 
failed to address the underlying causes of conflict and it may have contributed to building 
a state that is weak and fragile in a number of ways. Despite the OECD ten principles for 
engagement in fragile states (2007), that point to the context as a starting point, and speak 
of an inclusive bottom-up rather than elite-based approach, the absence of a proper 
understanding of the context and conflict drivers on the part of the international 
community stands out in post-war Kosovo. I argue that rather than the absence of conflict 
analysis, the problem is that analysis upon which intervention and assistance plans were 
premised laid excessive emphasis on the ethnic component and overlooked the socio-
economic aspects of the conflict.  
Although Kosovo was nominally the biggest recipient of international and EU 
aid, the international community has failed to foster economic growth and promote social 
inclusion by fighting unemployment: there has been no focus on medium- and long-term 
development, while most of the donors’ assistance has been ad hoc and short term. The 
role that economic and social development had played as conflict drivers and the role that 
they can play for the consolidation of a sustainable peace has been overlooked. Indeed, 
international actors have prioritized short-term security and stability rather than 
development and long-term peace. Instead, the international agencies working on 
governance focused extensively on the ethnic causes of the conflict, whose potential risk 
was managed through decentralisation rather than reconciliation, and it has thus done 
little to weaken social and ethnic divisions in contemporary Kosovo.  
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Moreover, the structure of the international governance, with its overlapping and 
confusing mandates and the way in which the status issue has been managed have 
reinforced existing patterns of parallel political authorities. In this regard, Kosovo-Serbs 
have developed their parallel governance systems as a sign of resistance towards the 
Kosovo state, and control over schools, university (and curricula), hospitals, courts, social 
pensions etc., is exercised by Belgrade: “[T]he language barriers, different school 
curricula and different ways of teaching history, identity and nationhood risk contribute to 
a worsening of the inter-ethnic divide.” (Montanaro 2009: 12).  
The inter-ethnic divide has been tackled through the promotion of a form of 
multiculturalism and protection of minority rights which has been translated in practice in 
territorial decentralisation along ethnic lines (Randazzo and Bargués 2012: 27). The 
international community has adopted a narrow understanding of multiculturalism which 
rests upon a homogenized and essentialized understanding of identity and which has been 
translated and expressed in ethnically-defined and divided municipalities. According to 
Randazzo and Bargués, the international community, has been committed to  
 
the promotion of a multicultural approach at State level, supporting the existence 
of diverse groups, but which has ultimately                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
imposed homogeneity within communities and polarized identities, as it has 
taken for granted already defined groups, omitting possible hybrid or ambiguous 
identities (2012: 27).  
 
Difference in Kosovo is institutionalized and protected through decentralisation: the 
condition for sovereignty and statehood is the accommodation of claims by distinctive 
identity groups, which – however – seek payoffs and rewards by avoiding connections, 
exchange and integration.  
 
3.4.1 Development, a removed dimension  
 
Several International Monetary Fund (IMF) Aide Memoires and World Bank documents 
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have pointed out the existence of a number of urgent problems related to the socio-
economic situation in Kosovo such as high levels of poverty and “[e]xtremely high levels 
of unemployment,” low annual growth (less than 1.5 percent per year), decrease of 
remittances, “[d]epleted stock of human capital, dilapidated main public utilities and 
infrastructure” (Moalla-Fetini et al. 2005: 2; IMF 2005a; IMF 2006; IMF 2008; World 
Bank 2007).  
The economic and human consequences of the 1998-1999 war were enormous 
(Del Castillo 2008: 139). Both the war and the NATO bombing campaign had turned 
large portions of Kosovo into a terra nullius where nothing was functioning. In a 
historically very poor area, infrastructures had been extensively destroyed and the 
population displaced en masse (King and Mason 2006: 86). Around 75 percent of houses 
were either destroyed or burned by Yugoslav forces or NATO’s air strikes and 
approximately more than half of ethnic Albanians (900,000) were forced to leave or left 
Kosovo to neighbouring countries such as Albania, Bosnia, Republic of Macedonia (Del 
Castillo 2008: 139). 
Beside the widespread destruction of infrastructure, other post-war vulnerabilities 
that hampered reconstruction were an high structural unemployment rate and low human 
development (Del Castillo 2008: 158). In the emergency phase, difficulties arose also due 
to “[s]taffing problems, an unclear division of responsibilities, duplication in functions, 
and a lack of trasparency and cooperation among the UN pillars” (Del Castillo 2008: 
160).  
Notwithstanding such a devastating post-war scenario, the first years after the war 
were characterized by extraordinary rates of ‘nominal’ economic growth, a growth that 
was mainly due to (and distorted by) the presence of the international community, the big 
amount of assistance that Kosovo received in the first years, and diaspora remittances 
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(Wittkowsky et al. 2006). However, growth was bringing Kosovo’s economy to the pre-
war level of development - i.e., to being the poorest economy in the region.  
Aid delivery in the aftermath of the war was difficult and both international and 
local actors lacked sufficient capacities in managing and implementing the large amount 
of available assistance (IKS 2007). As in other post-conflict settings, assistance in the 
beginning was focused on emergency and rehabilitation programmes. Assessment 
analysis of needs and damages were carried out by a number of states, organizations and 
donors, mostly foreigners, and prioritization was based on these assessments (IKS 2007: 
17).  
Aid flows and priorities changed around 2003, whereby growing attention was 
put on capacity building and technical assistance in the areas of democratic governance 
and civil society (Vasolli quoted in IKS 2007: 17). For the Kosovar Stability Initiative 
(2007), some sectors have been over-funded and others overlooked. Agriculture and 
education has been amongst the most ignored sectors in the post-war phase (IKS 2007: 
18; King and Mason 2006: 85). Few attempts at assisting these two sectors have 
prioritized reconstruction and infrastructural rehabilitation objectives and missed an 
overall long-term vision/strategy. The typical focus of donors’ assistance has been on 
good governance, market liberalization, privatization and civil society, neglecting areas 
such as social and rural development, and public health. After the 2004 riots, donors’ 
projects acquired a multi-ethnic focus and became more concerned with minority 
protection.  
According to former co-head of the UNMIK Reconstruction Unit, Roy Dickinson, 
“[d]emocratization is of course vital. But to have had so much money poured into civil 
society initiatives, whilst the keystones of a democratic society – education, police, 
justice, public service training – seem to have been under-funded seems – well strange” 
(2000).  
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While the post-conflict economic outlook were already envisaged in the first two 
Secretary-General reports issued in 1999 (UN SG 1999a; UN SG 1999b) - i.e., a market-
based economy with the perspective of integration in the broader regional economy of 
South East Europe, the international community in Kosovo lacked a development 
strategy. The same can be said for the local governing elite. To date, Kosovo is missing a 
development strategy.  
UNMIK first stressed the need for a comprehensive national development plan in 
2003, which has, nonetheless, remained a draft known as the Kosovo Development Plan 
(KDP). In 2004, two Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group (ESPIG) papers 
assessed the state of the economy and proposed principles and activities for the strategic 
framework of a development plan (ESPIG 2004a, ESPIG 2004b). The overall aim, as 
envisaged by both documents, was the transformation of Kosovo from a low to a high-
productivity economy, yet it has remained a draft and most sectors have their own 
strategic framework (EPO 2006: 20). Therefore, what is also missing from a policy 
perspective is an explicitation of the ways in which education is linked to national 
development.  
Among the population, frustration related to the economic situation grew in the 
post-conflict phase. When the country was unilaterally declared indipendent, the World 
Bank was defining poverty in Kosovo as shallow, in which 45 percent of the population 
lived below the poverty line, 18 percent was vulnerable to poverty, and approximately 15 
percent of Kosovans were defined as extremely poor (World Bank 2007, 2009). On the 
eve of independence – i.e., nine years after ‘international engineering’ – Kosovo was 
defined by the World Bank as the poorest region in the Balkans and among the poorest in 
Europe (World Bank 2008). One of the main causes of poverty  remained unemployment 
– with the highest rates in the Balkans at around 40-50 percent – in a country where half 
of the population is younger than 25 [the youngest population in Europe] (UNDP 2006a; 
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European Commission 2014). 
Kosovo’s weak economy was identified as a source of social and political 
instability already in 2007, by Martin Ahtisaari. Poverty is widespread among the most 
disadvantaged portions such as older people, single mother households, people with 
disabilities, unemployed and non-ethnic Serb minorities such as Roma and Gorani, with a 
potential destabilising effect on inter-communal conflict (Montanaro 2009: 13).  
According to the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) Internal Security 
Sector Review Report in Kosovo (ISSRR) “[t]hreat of internal division in Kosovo 
remains present and may increase if economic and unemployment issues are not 
comprehensively addressed” (2006b: XIV). Far from the inter-ethnic violence issue to 
which the international community had dedicated much of its focus until then, the ISRR 
reported that  
 
for the people of Kosovo high unemployment, a lack of economic development 
and widespread poverty have created an atmosphere of insecurity. [...] economic 
instability has exacerbated problems such as ethnic violence, corruption, 
increased crime rates and contributed to a growth in mistrust of Kosovo’s key 
institutions of government, both international and indigenous (UNDP 2006b: 
XIII).23 
 
Quite tellingly, among Kosovo Serbs escalation of ‘ethnic violence’ was regarded as the 
main threat to stability, while unemployment and poverty score first among Kosovo 
Albanians (UNDP 2007). 
 
3.4.2 The ethnic dilemma: the institutionalisation of parallel structures through 
territorial decentralisation 
 
Under UN legislation, Kosovo’s eight communities (i.e., communities whose members 
belong to the same ethnic, religious and linguistic group) are Albanians (92 percent), 
                                                
23 See also UNDP 2013 
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Serbs (4 percent) and then, in lose order, Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Egyptians, 
Ashkali (Mulaj 2011: 244; Krasniqi 2013: 402). The majority of the Serbian community 
in Kosovo challenge the legitimacy of Kosovo’s statehood, although Kosovo has a 
constitution that provides with wide autonomy, protection and quota for proportional 
political representation for smaller communities (Mulaj 2011: 244).  
Ethnic decentralisation has been introduced by UNMIK as the way to address the 
conflict and tackle what was deemed to be its cause, the ethnic divide. This was 
particularly clear in the Ahtisaari Plan (the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status 
Settlement), which served as the basis for the solution of the status issue and as the 
framework for managing the supervised indipendence. Its main goal was to solve the 
status issue by providing it with a decentralised solution to what was considered the main 
cause of conflict, the divide between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs.  
The plan envisaged an asymmetrical system of power-sharing: it provided wide 
autonomy for the minorities through the creation of six new municipalities of Serbian 
majority that would have exclusive powers in matters such as higher education, secondary 
health care, cultural and religious affairs, local police and the entitlement and collection 
of local taxes (CPKSS 2007: Annex III, Art. 4 and 8.2).  
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo was declared “[t]o be a democratic, secular and 
multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and protection under 
the law” (Kosovo Declaration of Independence). According to Krasniqi, “[K]osovo is not 
defined as a national state of its titular nation, but a multi-ethnic state of all citizens, 
guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law of all 
communities” (2013: 403). 
This definition of the state has implications for the relationship with its citizens 
and it has implied an array of rights and protection for its minorities as eshrined in the 
Ahtisaari Plan (Annex II) and the Constitution of Kosovo (Chapter II and III). Among 
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others, it includes reserved seats in the parliament (ten for Serbs and ten for the rest of the 
communities), two ministerial portfolios in the government, proportional quotas on other 
governance’s levels, and double-majority for issues of vital interest to non-majority 
communities (Krasniqi 2013: 403). Despite this legislation and efforts from the Kosovo 
government and the international community, return and reintegration of refugees and 
Serbs in the Kosovo institutions remains practically non-existent (Ibid.).  
Since 1999, approximately 200,000 refugees and internally displaced people 
(mostly Serbs) have left Kosovo (UNHCR 1999; ICG 2003: 8). Other Serbs have moved 
to other parts of Kosovo: this movement has created Kosovo-inhabited areas known as 
enclaves. As a matter of fact, post-1999 Kosovo suffers high levels of ethnic polarisation, 
with the Serbs living in Northern Kosovo or in segregated enclaves. The 1999 war and 
the 2004 riots have widened the gap between the Serbian and Albanian community, 
furthering the lack of interaction between people from different communities, a legacy 
inherited by the 1990s. Lack of contacts is particularly eivdent among younger 
generations, that have no Yugoslav background and virtually no language bridge.  
In terms of political participation, local Serb population living in the enclaves 
slowly became part to some degrees of UNMIK-led Kosovo institutions. At least until the 
2004 crisis, Kosovo Serbs increasingly co-operated with UNMIK and the new PISG 
institutions. Interethnic relations deteriorated after violence escalated in March 2004. 
Two episodes – the killing of a Serbian youth in Pristina, on March 15 and the alleged 
death of three Albanian children in the Ibar river in unclear circumstances – sparked acts 
of violence and agression from Albanians against UNMIK and Serbs: 19 people were 
killed (8 Serbs and the 11 Albanians), 1,000 more injured, approximately 550 homes and 
27 monasteries destroyed and burned and 4,000 people displaced (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 20). 
The 2004 violent riots alienated Kosovo Serbs with many of them boycotting 
Kosovo institutions and turning increasingly towards the consolidation of parallel 
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institutions supported by Belgrade. In post-independence Kosovo, even those Serbs that 
had returned to Kosovo institutions, urged by Belgrade withdrew from Kosovo 
administration. After 2008, Serbia intensified its efforts to reinforce parallel political 
structures in northern Kosovo and other Serbian-inhabited areas (OSCE 2008). Although 
two thirds of Kosovo Serbs live in the enclaves, the majority of funds from Belgrade 
would go to the Kosovo Serbs living in northern Kosovo (Krasniqi 2013: 407).  
However, politico-administrative decentralization and the creation of new Serbian 
municipalities led to tensions and divisions between the Serbs living in northern Kosovo 
(increasingly looking towards Belgrade) and the Serbs living in the enclaves, territorially 
less contiguous, and unable to interact with Belgrade. Indeed, Serbs living south to Ibar 
river to some degrees integrated in some of Kosovo institutions while those living north 
of Mitrovica strengthened their collaboration with Belgrade in an attempt to sever the 
links with Kosovar society and what they perceived as an hostile political system 
(Krasniqi 2013: 405). According to Krasniqi, “[N]orth Kosovo has in many ways become 
a hub of Serbs in Kosovo, an intellectual centre. It holds a university [officially called 
‘Pristina University’] which is part of Serbia’s system of education” (2013: 405).  
Although the EU has facilitated the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, and a 
number of agreements have been reached on matters of custom stamps, border crossing, 
civil registers, the situation in northern Kosovo remain embroiled in a frozen conflict. 
Despite the efforts put in place by the international community to turn Kosovo into a 
multiethnic society, Kosovo has remained “[a]n ethnically divided society after nine years 
of direct international rule and control” (Krasniqi 2010: 532-534) and after 16 years of 
shared power by the international community with Kosovo local authorities.  
There is a total lack of bridging social capital between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo 
Albanians (atrophied during the war) and between Kosovo-Albanians and other 
communities such as Gorani. Clan and regional divides are exacerbated by generational 
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divides, of which the high youth unemployment is an underlying aspect. The difficulties 
in building a cross-ethnic social contract may be partly explained by the fact that Kosovo 
has historically been characterized by “[t]he existence of inward-looking social capital, 
[...] rooted in clan and regional ties and interests” (Montanaro 2009: 8).  
Moreover, country’s embroilment in parallel ethnic structures has resulted in  
non-efficient, discriminatory provision of public services along ethnic lines (Montanaro 
2009: 11). According to the European Centre for Minority Issues (2009), there is “[a]n 
extensive network of parallel, Serbian language schools run by the Serbian government in 
Kosovo, which further hinders integration of Serbian pupils into Kosovo educational 
structures.” 
According to Randazzo and Bargués, territorial autonomy has resulted in 
segregation: “[A]s ethnic territorial decentralisation relies upon a static notion of 
contending ethnic groups, the borders include one group and exclude another. 
Reconciliation or cooperation becomes problematic, as patterns of conflict are reproduced 
instead of appeased when peacebuilding is about mapping the territory according to 
ethnicity” (2012: 36).  They propose a focus shift upon those cross-factional issues that 
affect all ethnicities. UNDP surveys point out to a number of issues of common concern 
for most of the ethnic groups in Kosovo such as unemployment, economic problems, 
education etc. (UNDP Kosovo 2010).  
Some authors have proposed an integrative approach, which implies the building 
of a common citizenship identity overcoming ethnic cleavages. According to Kallaba, 
“[I]nstead of decentralising Kosovo and leaving it mired with complex regional political 
problems, a better approach for Kosovo’s future would be to help build a strong and 
authoritative central government capable of providing good governance and effective 
territorial control” (2010: 7). The dilemma (pitfalls) of building a political community 
 134 
based on citizenship rather than ethnicity might be that it overlooks or do not sufficiently 
protect differences and minorities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Kosovo has always been and still remains a poor and underdeveloped country. Dire 
socio-economic conditions have played a key role in the conflict between Kosovo 
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. However, the international community failed to tackle the 
development dimension. Development and growth were expected to be a by-default 
product of externally-led, post-war market liberalization and privatization. This 
expectation hinged upon a misled form of conflict analysis by the international 
community whereby excessive emphasis was laid on the ethnic dimension, which 
eclipsed the peculiar configuation of the socio-economic dimension of the Kosovo 
conflict, and its intersection – through relative gains, perceptions and manipulated fears – 
with the ethnic question itself. 
Despite suggestions by major donors such as the World Bank and DFID (2005) 
that statebuilding have to emerge from processes of peacebuilding and reconciliation, as 
in other post-war contexts there has been a fragmented and overall emphasis on 
strengthening formal and stable state institutions, in a condition of suspended, post-poned 
and supervised sovereignty and statehood. Longer-term peace and reconciliation have not 
been achieved, focussing instead on shorter-term stability, meant as the absence of ethnic 
frictions, and managed through an accurately process of territorial decentralization along 
ethnic lines. As Monteux has suggested, decentralisation “[s]eems to have become a ‘one 
size fits all’ device for the international community to ‘freeze’ ethnic conflict and escape 
its responsibility for dealing with the reasons behind these conflicts” (Monteux 2006: 
163).  
The excessive focus, by the international community, on formal state institutions 
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has overlooked the need to enhance the relationship between state and society, which 
DFID (2009) has suggested to be one of the main factors for an effective statebuilding 
process. In Kosovo, the social contract and bond between the state and its citizens has 
been already weak by a long history of distrust of public authorities, of which communal 
self-sufficiency has been a result, and by current overlapping and contrasting forms and 
levels of political authority (external and internal), in a nation whose very existence is 
contested or understood in exclusionary and ethnic terms.  
If peacebuilding is about setting in motion a set of transformational interventions 
and processes that would lead to the building of a sustainable and lasting peace and that 
would prevent the return to the pre-war situation, the reversal ethnic segregation in post-
war Kosovo, perpetuated and institutionalized by decentralisation processes – among 
others – does not speak on behalf of a just peace but on that of a frozen conflict. Put 
another way, the narrow application of a shallow form of multiculturalism has resulted in 
a negative peace characterized by the absence of open conflict and violence, but where 
diversity and ethnicity are frozen and contained within non-dialectical, isolated islands. 
Liberal peacebuilding in Kosovo has resulted in the protection of minorities by ethnically 
separating them, thus undermining the conditions for ethnic interaction, social cohesion 
and trust.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION SYSTEMS, SEGREGATED PEACE? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Kosovo’s education system is an interesting case not only because of the country’s 
exposure to massive, unprecedented levels of per-capita post-conflict reconstruction aid 
that were channelled through a formal internationally-controlled statebuilding 
architecture, but also because in few (if any) other cases the functioning of the education 
system is so patently and directly intertwined with conflict drivers as in Kosovo. Not only 
has education played an important role in the rise and the shaping of Albanian 
nationalism, as with all other national identities in the Balkans: in Kosovo the struggle 
over education emerged as the primary site of contention between Serbs and Albanians in 
recent history, and to date it remains very much a minefield. In other words, restrictions 
to the use of the Albanian language in schools for several decades (Ottoman period-First 
Yugoslavia) and, following the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade, the 
abrogation to the high degree of autonomy of the education sector that from 1974 onward 
was guaranteed under the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia, fuelled the awareness than 
studying in Albanian was conditional upon the creation of the Albanian national state. 
This chapter provides first of all an overview of the role that education has played 
in the unfolding of the Kosovo conflict. It then examines post-war education reforms: 
more specifically, it investigates the role played by a plethora of international and local 
actors, trying to unravel their agendas and modus operandi. Finally, it zooms in on those 
areas that were deemed to be strategic and that have received more attention on the part 
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of international and local actors: curriculum and textbook reforms, multicultural 
community education, and higher education.24  
As education is historically intertwined with conflict, post-war education has been 
a problematic foundation for peace. The present chapter shows that – perhaps 
counterintuitively - education has been marginal to the externally-driven peacebuilding 
and statebuilding agendas in Kosovo and to the process of nation building more in 
general.  
Although no evidence can be found documenting that education was on the 
peacebuilding agenda for Kosovo, the peacebuilding model that prevailed in Kosovo 
indirectly informed choices and priorities made by international actors in the field of 
educational reform. Tension arose between education as a sphere that may contribute to 
social cohesion through building national identity and education as an area of reforms that 
should introduce modern standards of efficiency and effectiveness while not threatening 
stability, in a context in which state and nation are contested and problematic notions.  
The perspective that has shaped the (re)construction of an education system as 
part of an externally-assisted effort to build peace is one that sees Kosovo as ‘a post-
communist country with an ethnic problem’ but which overlooks the existence of a 
domestic development question. Rather than emerging as an arena where root causes of 
the conflict could be identified and addressed, education has been regarded as a sphere 
that simply reflected and reinforced the ethnic division between the different 
communities. For quite some time considerations about underdevelopment, 
unemployment and youth demographics were kept at safe distance from thinking about 
the education system.  
As shown in Chapter three, the international community promoted in Kosovo a 
‘divisive version’ of multiculturalism, based upon a narrow understanding of the notion 
                                                
24 Another area that has received substantial attention is the training of teachers. It is left out from this 
analysis for reasons of space and because it has not been linked to any peacebuilding objective. 
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of identity, mainly in ethnic terms. This has led to the creation of a multiethnic society 
which is kept fictionally homogenised within ethnic groups but that is practically 
polarized among diverse groups. In the sphere of education this situation can be grasped 
when observing the actual working of the decentralisation of education governance and 
curricula.  
The promotion of a multiethnic and pluralist society through education has led to 
a multiplication of curricula in different languages. Albeit not entirely available due to 
lack of funds and political willingness, where some education integration exists the 
outcome is not integration among different communities. An excessive emphasis on equal 
collective rights and extensive decentralised autonomy for the different communities, 
along with a strong focus on stability and security, has made education segregation the de 
facto strategy of choice, and the one reality one can observe on the ground.  
 
4.1 Education and the Albanian national question in Kosovo, 1970-1989   
 
The pivotal moments of the conflict that have characterized much of Kosovo’s modern 
history have been accompanied by educational events that turned out to be proximate 
causes/triggers for, and instances of the articulation of this long-simmering conflict. A 
look at the history of the Balkans, during the 19th and 20th centuries, suggests “[t]he 
existence of a link between education policies, dynamics of national identity-formation 
and those state-making practices that lie at the very heart of violent conflict in this 
region” (Strazzari 2000: 12). 
In analysing the history of the education/war relationship in the region, education 
practices seem to have been both constitutive and reproducive of violent, bellicist, and 
exclusivist discourses. They have been used by national elites as part of their strategic 
repertoires and political calculus. In this context, education can be seen both as a root and 
a proximate cause through which a violent ethnonational conflict can be fostered by 
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making it appear socially acceptable and politically necessary. As a root cause, education 
is a long-term process with clear links to wider processes of identity formation, national 
articulation, and state-making; as a proximate cause, by contrast, it can be seen as an 
extremely sensitive issue-area, one that is endowed with a strong potential for triggering 
the flaring up of violent crises, and spilling over into other arenas (Strazzari 2000).  
In Kosovo ‘national question’ and education system have always coincided: 
education has been the stage in which the national question has been performed by both 
the Albanian and Serbian sides, involving claims about autonomy, statehood, and 
sovereignty. The establishment of the University of Pristina in Albanian language on 
November 19, 1969, represented the first instance of autonomy for Albanians in Kosovo 
after many years of repression: it came to symbolize the Albanian national identity and 
paved the way to inter-Albanian exchanges in the Balkans.25  
The Yugoslav constitutional reforms of 1974 gave to the autonomous province of 
Kosovo theoretically nearly full control over education governance and content matters. 
Kosovar Albanians were at that point empowered to promote their own culture and 
history through education in their own language (World Bank 2001a: 107). This was 
very much in line with the former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) education system that – 
unlike the other socialist countries in East and Central Europe – put in place a strong 
system of decentralized management and financing of the education system. The 
‘Secretariat of Education, Science and Culture of Kosova’ – that is, the de facto ministry 
of education of the province of Kosovo - administered independent curricula, decided 
about the maintenance of schools, and controlled the whole education system.  
During the 1980s, authorities in Belgrade progressively re-centralized control 
over the content of education. It all started with the riots that flared up around the 
University of Pristina in 1981, soon after the death of Yugoslavia’a leader Jozip Broz 
                                                
25 The University of Pristina functioned as a biligual institution, with both Albanian and Serbian 
languages in use. 
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Tito. Although the origin and the extent of the protests have never been fully clarified, the 
nexus between education and socio-economic conditions was certainly central. According 
to Woodward, “[t]he student rebellion in Kosovo in 1981 began not as a secessionist 
movement, but as a demonstration against the lack of jobs for university graduates” 
(1999: 279-81). The transferring of authority over education to Belgrade was part of a 
process of repressive reassertion of central prerogatives that began with introducing 
segreation in different school buildings, and culminated with the expulsions of teachers 
and the closing of secondary schools when Kosovo’s autonomy was abrogated in 1990, 
triggering the proclamation of the shadow ‘Republic of Kosova’.  
 
4.2 Between resistance and statehood: education under the ‘parallel system’, 
1990-1998 
 
The conflict over Kosovo’s education system during the 1990s was fuelled by the 
nationalist campaign inaugurated by Milosevic as early as 1987.The removal of 
autonomy was part of constitutional changes that restricted political, economic and 
cultural rights of the Kosovar Albanian community, derailing their aspiration to the status 
of federative ‘republic’ (as opposed to ‘autonomous province’). Discriminatory measures 
were adopted in classes that had been long taught bilingually and this led to the mass 
dismissal of the Kosovar Albanian teaching staff that refused to teach in Serbian.  
Kosovar Albanians established an organized parallel system of governance, 
opting for a non-violent form of resistance. In the sphere of education, this meant that 
most Kosovar pupils boycotted state classes and attended instead parallel schools, which 
were typically organized in private houses, garages and cellars. The education system 
became ethnically segregated, with a formal façade that was boycotted by the vast 
majority of the population, and a tolerated parallel system that went underground, and 
was separated in structure and content. Looking at how the Albanian identity in Kosovo 
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during the 1990s was presented in Albanian history and geography textbooks that were 
used in the parallel schools, Kostovicova highlights the pre-eminence of the spatial 
dimension in the construction of the nation (2005: 11). 
Throughout the 1990s, ‘parallel education’ was the only fully functioning system 
in the shadow Kosovo Albanian state. Education was supported through a number of 
arrangements for financing from within (via a system of informal municipality-level tax 
collection between 3-5 percent that provided for 70 percent of education expenditure) and 
from external remittances that would cover the rest of the costs. There were no reliable 
statistics, but it is estimated that around 20,000 teachers and non-teaching staff supported 
around 300,000 pupils in 400 primary schools, 50,000 students in 65 secondary schools 
and approximately 10,000 university students in 20 faculties (World Bank 2001a). The 
parallel education played an important political role by representing the Albanian non-
violent strategy as a legitimate form of national struggle against Serbian repression: “[it] 
was both a symbolic and a political expression of Kosovo Albanian nationhood” 
(Kostovicova 2005: 2). 
In 1996, through the mediation of the Sant’Egidio Community, which deemed 
education as crucial for positively channeling the Kosovo conflict, two distinct 
agreements were brokered between Belgrade and Pristina’s Albanian representatives in 
the fields of schools and university: the basic idea behind the mediation was that it was 
possible to de-segregate education, bringing communities back to the same buildings. It 
was the one and only success of diplomacy in the increasingly violent Kosovo landscape 
(Strazzari 2000). Soon after, a prominent negotiator was killed in an obscure car accident, 
and the rector of the Pristina university survived an attempt on his life, while the conflict 
escalated into open violence. It is worth noting that the end of the fragile equilibrium 
between the Belgrade authorities and the ‘Republic of Kosova’ parallel institutions 
coincided with the return to the streets of students from the University of Pristina. 
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Following Dayton’s agreement that left Kosovo issue unresolved, the students started 
questioning the passivity of the nonviolent and ‘quietist’ strategy promoted by Ibrahim 
Rugova – himself a respected intellectual -  and his LDK party.  
One final annotation is in order. Given the fact that education was the only fully 
functioning public good produced by the Kosovo Albanian parallel state, controlling 
education became an expression of political power. Power competition among the 
Kosovar elite over the control of education turned education into an arena of struggle and 
conflict, almost leading to its own destruction, along with that of the parallel state 
(Kostovicova 2005: 210-11). This intra-ethnic conflict also exposed the political 
faultlines within the Albanian leadership.  
When the international community landed in Kosovo in the aftermath of the war, 
it fed this struggle and favoured certain groups (i.e., former Kosovo Liberation Army’s 
combatants, now PDK party members) over others (i.e., the LDK party) by allocating 
certain representatives in the UN structures in Kosovo.26 In other words, the international 
community intervened in a context of power relations, and its choices were far from 
politically neutral: they promoted certain political elites, and certain visions of education 
over others.27  
  
4.3 ‘Kosovo international’: the war and post-conflict hybrid governance, 1999-
2014 
 
In the aftermath of the 1999 war, the structure of Kosovo’s education system was a result 
of the legacies of Yugoslavian Socialism and post-autonomy education. Kosovo’s parallel 
system of education during the 1990s was itself an evolution of the Yugoslav system, and 
it maintained its main features of being simultaneously administratively decentralized, 
politically centralized, and hierarchically structured. Pedagogically, it was teacher-centred 
                                                
26 Interview with executive director, Kosova Education Center, 21 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
27 Ibid. 
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and its curriculum relied upon uniformized textbooks. The close connection between 
education and the world of production/industry, an important feature of Yugoslav 
education, was no longer existent during the 1990s (Bacevic 2014).  
After NATO’s bombing campaign, infrastructural reconstruction and teacher 
training were among the most urgent needs. A UNESCO assessment conducted with a 
number of NGOs on the ground assessing the physical conditions of 784 schools revealed 
that 37 percent were “either completely detroyed or in extremely bad physical conditons. 
[...] a total of 1,034 (out of 1,211) schools were assessed, out of which 800 had suffered 
damage and needed to be repaired” (Daxner 2000: 206).  
During the parallel education era, the system was almost totally isolated thus few 
teachers or administrators benefited from any professional skills upgrading. The system 
was found isolated from trends in pedagody, methodology and education management 
and administration (World Bank 2001a: 109). The issue of minorities’ rights and their 
access to education was another problematic aspect in education. The bifurcation of 
education during the 1990s – between a formal Serbian system and an underground one 
in Albanian language – and its extreme fragmentation had an impact on educational 
access for minority groups.  
In the initial post-conflict phase there seemed to be at least two education systems 
and a multiplicity of textbooks and curricula, mainly in Serbian and Albanian. In Serbian 
and Turkish, the curriculum was the one specified by Belgrade. In Albanian the existing 
curriculum of the parallel period was used for the 1999-2000 and the 2000-2001 school 
years. The Albanian curriculum was fragmented and on an ad-hoc basis: it comprised the 
curriculum from the pre-1989 system and books newly developed or borrowed from 
neighbouring countries, mostly Albania. 
 
4.3.1 How the UN started an education experiment  
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It is often assumed that post-war settings provide compelling opportunities for 
international organizations and educationists to rebuild education from scratch, not 
merely reconstructing but also reforming the system. For the international community in 
Kosovo, the past seemed wiped away from the war, while the present was treated as a 
tabula rasa or an empty shell (Lemay-Hébert 2011). 
Unlike in other post-conflict situations, the UN and other international 
organizations in Kosovo were confronted with no formal local government when they 
engaged in post-conflict educational reform. Moreover, the extent and scope of the UN 
mandate in assuming full responsibility for the administration of this territory was unique 
and unprecedented (Søbjerg 2006). Albeit in the form of an interim administration, the 
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) established through UN Security Resolution 1244, was 
described as the most all-encompassing and comprehensive mission in a post-conflict 
country. Compared to previous post-conflict missions, the UN assumed full power and 
control for the reconstruction of the education system. 
The UN in Kosovo engaged in a grand scale experiment of simultaneously 
managing educational reconstruction and reform (Søbjerg 2006). In this context, the 
parallel system of education–the centrepiece of Albanian resistance to the repressive rule 
of Milosevic–was sidelined and his legacy disregarded by the newly established 
UNMIK’s Department of Education and Science (DoES),28 operating under UNMIK 
Pillar II (Civil Administration) (Sommers and Buckland 2004: 35). 
DoES replaced the previous Joint Civil Committee of Education (JCCE). It worked 
with an international and a local co-head whose tasks were needs assessment, aid and 
donor coordination, identification and initiation of domestic reforms. Veteran Serbian and 
especially Albanian education leaders were left on the back, often supportive of 
educational changes but marginalized from the process.  
                                                
28 The Department of Education and Science (DoES) was established under UNMIK Regulation No. 
2000/11 
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The previous JCCE had been the first attempt to bring the two main communities 
to work together on educational reconstruction, and it was composed by international 
consultants, as well as Albanian and Serbian representatives. The attempt was doomed 
from its very inception since the Committee was boycotted by the Serbian 
representatives, and the JCCE was an apathetic and slow mechanism for educational 
reconstruction: it was unable to coordinate the different actors working on the ground. 
When UNMIK was established, priorities in education were divided between 
immediate reconstruction needs and long terms curriculum reform ones. UNMIK’s three-
phase education strategy aimed at creating a unified and working educational system and 
a transfer of power and competencies from the international to the local counterparts.  
Reconstruction in education went through three institutional phases: the first phase 
from June 1999 to March 2000 was directed at emergency and infrastructure projects, 
including the repairing and reconstruction of school infrastructure, provision of essential 
supplies, and getting children back to school; in the second phase from March 2000 to 
2001, the aim was starting curriculum reform and more broadly the designing of an 
education system that could suit Kosovo needs; the third phase between 2001 and 2002 
aimed to transfer power and responsibilities to a provisional government and to an 
assigned local Ministry of Education.  
Infrastructural reconstruction was a priority also for the government in power 
(2008-2010 and 2010-2015)29 at the time of my fieldwork. According to the Deputy 
Minister of Education, while education was never a priority for the previous local 
governments (2000-2008), it had become central to the current government,30 proof of 
which was the construction of 100 new school buildings between 2008-2009, and the 
                                                
29 Kosovo underwent snap elections in November 2010, which were won by the same political party in 
power (PDK) 
30 Interview with Deputy Minister of Education, Science and Technology, 6 November 2013, Pristina, 
Kosovo 
 146 
expected completion of 24 more by the end of 2014.31 However, investments in education 
contradict such a claim. The latest data from the World Bank show that public spending 
in education is lower than regional and GDP per capita comparators, suggesting that 
education is currently not among government’s top priorities: in 2012, Kosovo was 
spending 4.1 percent of its GDP in education, lower than the average in Europe or Central 
Asia (World Bank 2015: 8).  
The reform phase was launched by DoES through the articulation of a strategic 
initiative called Developing an Education System for Kosovo (DESK). It was composed 
by various multi-stakeholder working groups that addressed development issues in 
primary, secondary and higher education, and more broadly systemic and strategic issues. 
It was an advisory body with 22 international and 25 locals with tasks in planning. It had 
three working groups specifically working on preschool/primary, secondary and higher 
education/research, with a particular focus on teacher training and curricula development 
(Nelles 2006: 104). 
The slow pace of reform during the first months after the war changed in 2001 
when Michael Daxner became the Principal International Officer (PIO) of the DoES and 
the Principal Administrator of the University of Pristina. According to several 
international and local consultants, under his leadership educational reform was enacted 
in ways that continue to affect Kosovo’s education system. During Daxner’s two-year 
term, the UN’s effort to rebuild education was defined as “[n]othing less than 
reinvention” (Sommers and Buckland 2004: 20).  
Kosovo’s Yugoslav-time educational legacy was considered problematic and 
obsolete by the international community, thus in need of substantial and drastic change, 
not of gradual reform: “[d]ramatic reform, even renewal, became the order of the day” 
(Sommers and Buckland 2004: 20). Daxner managed to develop his vision of the 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
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education system by obtaining from the UN charte blanche so as to attract considerable 
levels of funding for education, recruit a considerable number of international 
consultants, and inaugurate the new ‘lead-agencies approach’ whereby renowed 
international agencies were assigned core tasks within the education system: UNICEF 
together with UNESCO were in charge of curriculum reform; the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) was in charge of teacher training; the European 
Commission was in charge of infrastructural reconstruction; the World Bank focused on 
quality assurance, and management information system support; the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on technical and vocational 
training (TVET) and the Dutch NGO Spark and later OSCE on higher education. 
A local education expert that I interviewed distinguished between two different 
approaches by the international community: the first was exemplified by Peter Buckland, 
who was sensitive to the local context and to the past legacy, while the second which 
prevailed and initiated most of the substantial reform was the one enacted by Michael 
Daxner.32 According to this expert, in Daxner’s vision there was the pupil, the book and 
the international: there was no consideration for teachers.33 With the promotion of the 
‘lead agencies’ approach, Daxner ignored and sidelined local capacities.34 
The World Bank called for political authorities in Kosovo and the donor 
community to grasp the unique opportunity of building “[a] modern and responsive 
educational system that is compatible with a new economic environment and with 
European legislation, policies, governance and institutions, as well as content and 
performance standards” (World Bank 2001a: 112). Key objectives and priorities had to 
focus on improving education governance and financing in general and those of higher 
education in particular; curriculum and assessment; textbooks; teacher training and 
                                                
32 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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learning; secondary technical/vocational education and adult training; personnel costs 
efficiency; capital budget, including the decentralization of capital expenditure and 
granting. Public education and investor promotion programmes were foreseen as 
immediate and important tools for promoting the launch of the Kosovo Privatization 
Strategy (KTA 2004). 
According to Daxner, UNMIK’s two main goals were “[e]nsuring rapid 
resumption and continued learning during the period of transition to an elected 
democratically accountable government” and “[s]upporting the longer term 
reconstruction and transformation of the education system to reflect the needs of a 
modern European society on the brink of the twenty-first century” (2000: 216). For 
OECD (2001) “[t]he international community remains committed to ensuring a 
peaceful multi-ethnic society, with an education system that serves the needs of 
Kosovo’s young society and reflects modern European standard ” (OECD 2001: 10). 
One of the main priorities set in the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan 2011-2016, 
is “[t]o establish, preserve and improve standards and relevance of all levels of education 
in Kosovo to European standards” (MEST 2011b: 26) and in particular “[i]mproving the 
quality of higher education by ensuring quality control, the application of European 
standards and a review of academic structures organization” (MEST 2011b: 12). It is 
indeed in the area of higher education that “[E]uropean and international trends”35 play an 
important role, according to the Strategic Plan (Ibid.: 38).  
The main aim of the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan has been linking life-long 
learning (another European policy trend)36 to inclusive education as the basis of the whole 
education system, with the overall objective to reach out to all learners, whom are 
                                                
35 See for example European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education – ENQA (2009)  
36 “[L]ife-long learning implies an inclusive education and learning model that includes all – children, 
youth, women, minorities and adults as learners. It also encompasses learning throughout the life-cycle, 
from pre-primary to retirement taking in formal, non-formal and informal education methods” (MEST 
2011b: 11).	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provided with equal opportunities for relevant and quality education (MEST 2011b: 11). 
According to the plan, there is the need for the education system to respond to “[t]he 
labour market demands, aligned with key government priorities and pressing 
development goals.” (MEST 2011b: 11). According to the Plan 	  
	  
The vision for education is to create an inclusive education system and to 
provide all citizens in Republic of Kosovo with equal access to quality education 
at all levels; a system which provides the people of Kosovo with life-long skills 
for an advanced knowledge integrated into European society and to contribute to 
the long term sustainable development of the country through job creation and 
enhanced social cohesion (MEST 2011b: 26). 
	  
	  
The pursuit of and convergence towards ‘European standards’ and trends such as 
‘life-long learning’ inclusive education, has been an overarching policy theme that 
has informed international and local interventions in education reform throughout the 
past decade, and it has been applied as the ultimate goal in teacher training and in 
broader institutional and curriculum development.  
An analysis of policy documents and interviews conducted in Pristina reveal 
that consensus and understanding regarding what is meant by European and Western 
standards are very thin, especially given the fact that those ‘standards’ vary 
considerably across European context, not to speak about variation ‘within the West’. 
In the OECD’s view, some of the changes that might reflect given standards include 
“ [a] shift from the ‘lecturing’ model to ‘interactive learning’: introducing ‘science’ 
as a single subject to replace the separate subjects chemistry, biology and physics; or 
introducing new subjects such as civics. In other cases, ‘European standards’ referred 
to the quality of buildings, equipment, furniture, computers, and even on occasion to 
teacher salaries ” (2001: 19). 
 
4.3.2  Other  international initiatives  
 
In the post-reconstruction phase, Kosovo was overwhelmed by a myriad of 
international governmental and non-governmental agencies that became active in 
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post-war education. A number of NGOs were engaged both as donors and as 
implementing partners in the repair of schools. There were different types of donors, 
and often it was difficult to identify their roles and functions, since they were wearing 
different hats on several occasions (Daxner 2000: 214). During the early emergency 
phase, a number of training courses on human rights were organized by the 
international community.37  
A number of education initiatives such as policy debates, conferences, aid 
projects and reforms were initiated and organized by international actors. UNMIK’s 
priorities “[c]oncentrated on making the schools attendable” and getting pupils back 
to school (Daxner 2000: 7). Most of UNMIK’s civilian budget in the phase from 
1999 to 2000 was committeed to education reconstruction and implied rebuilding 
infrastructure and re-establishing the teaching staff.  
The World Bank got involved in early infrastructural reconstruction and later 
in education system management and school decentralization. UNDP ran the Schools 
Rehabilitation in Kosovo project (with a US$ 2,6 milion grant by the Japanese 
government) for rebuilding school infrastructure (UNDP 2002a). UNDP together 
with the Department of Education, UNICEF and the Mine Action Centre organized 
training on environmental health and landmines awareness. The European 
Commission’s Task Force and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR - the 
operative arm of the European Union in Kosovo) prioritized vocational training 
relating it to labour market needs (2000). 
The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has remained heavily 
dependent on the financial and technical assistance of the international community: 
the World Bank continues to provide support for management system capacities and 
implementing decentralization programmes,38  while the EU has been providing 
                                                
37 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
38 In 2011, the Ministry of Education, supported by the World Bank, started the implementation of a 
pilot project on increasing financial decentralization in the education system, which aimed among 
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support for curriculum development, teacher development and quality assurance 
measures (USAID 2014: 38-39). USAID has also been an active donor in pre-
university education through its Basic Education Programme, which has linked the 
development of basic education to enhanced human capital, with the latter identified 
as a cornerstone of economic development and growth (USAID 2014: 38).  
Despite the attempts made by the international community to create a 
pluralist and multiethnic society, post-intervention education reforms reinforced 
ethnical segregation in a reversed way (Nelles 2006: 98). By 2000, most of the 
Albanian students and teachers had moved from the parallel system into government 
schools, while Serbs across Kosovo had now moved from the government buildings 
into making their own parallel system of education.  
A decade of (ethnic) segregation during the 1990s followed by an ‘ethnic war’ 
from 1998 to 1999 made post-conflict segregation also a foreign choice 
(Kostovicova 2005). At the end of hostilities, there were a few schools that 
attempted some steps towards integration, including one in Kosovo Polje and another 
in Kamenica (Pupovci and Hyseni 2001: 9). The integration of the Serbian 
community into a unique education system became a highly politicised issue and it has 
not been resolved yet. Although reliable data are lacking, the Kosovo Ministry of 
Education citing sources from its counterpart in Belgrade, reports that by 2011 there 
were approximately 80 Serbian education facilities in Kosovo with around 1,054 
classrooms. As Serbs in Kosovo may be around 7 percent, the Ministry of Education 
Science and Technology (MEST) estimates that around 30,000 students are enrolled 
in the pre-university system and approximately 10,000 students are enrolled in the 
University of Mitrovica (MEST 2011b: 43). 
The parallel system of education in Serbian has been seen by the 
representatives of the Serbian Education Ministry in Mitrovica as a pillar of Serbian 
                                                                                                                                      
others, increasing accountability at the school level and enhancing community participation. (Interview 
with Deputy Minister of Education, 6 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo). 
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survival in Kosovo. In the aftermath of the war, bringing children to school meant a 
return to normality and to some form of future prospect. By being anchored to 
Serbian education, the parallel system has sought to establish a form of continuity of 
Serbian rule between pre- and post-war Kosovo, thus acquiring a national and political 
importance. However, the Serbian education system has constituted a barrier to the 
Serbian integration into an Albanian state, and indeed a form of denial of the 
existence of this state. The relationship with UNMIK has always remained confined 
to infrastructural reconstruction projects (Nelles 2006).  
 
4.3.3 Current challenges 
 
According to a 2014 report by USAID, “[t]he education system in Kosovo fails to 
address the pedagogical and skills training needs of Europe’s youngest population, 
resulting in vast numbers of unemployed youth without the skills or training required 
of a growing economy. ” (USAID 2014: i). As mentioned in Chapter three, Kosovo 
struggles with the highest levels of poverty in the whole Balkan region – with an 
estimated 34 percent of the population living below the poverty line (World Bank 
2012) – worrying unemployment rates (approximately 45 percent), over-dependence 
on imports, an extremely small export base, and a steady 3.5 percent of growth rate in 
the decade 2001-2011 (USAID 2014: 4; World Bank 2015). While data differs, youth 
unemployment rates are thought to reach 70 percent, in a country where 50 percent 
of the population is under the age of 25, and where one fourth of the population is 
enrolled in primary and secondary education (USAID 2014: 4; World Bank 2015: 7). 
 According to USAID, with such estimated poverty and youth unemployment rates, 
Kosovo’s stability and development are strictly linked to job generation and to a 
better education system (2014: 6).  
Achievements have been reached in physical infrastructure, curriculum 
development and in “[i]nstitutionalizing a decentralized, modern basic education 
system with assessment-based and student-focused learning. ” (USAID 2014: 4) 
Improvements have been achieved in access to pre-primary and secondary education, 
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respectively 72 percent and 92 percent by 2012; by strengthening the financing of 
education system although regional disparities across the country remain; by 
promoting teacher management and professionalisation; and by adopting the reform 
of curricula – which included the introduction of learner-centered and outcomes-
based teaching methodologies. The overall improvement of learning and school 
infrastructure was reached by either restructuring or building new schools and by 
reducing to 70 percent the number of schools operating in two shifts (World Bank 
2015: 7).  
This being premised, several challenges are still unanswered: among them, 
over-crowding in urban areas (due to rapid rural to urban migration); inequitable 
access to quality education (especially between and within urban areas, between rural 
and urban schools and for minorities); poor completion rates among minorities; 
inadequate curricula; overall shortage of learning materials; scarce teacher 
professional development; gender gaps in education management; and high female 
dropout rates, especially at grades 9 and 10 (USAID 2014: 8, 38). With reliable data 
regarding student achievements being poor, the low passing rate and overall 
achievement levels at grade 12 suggests the need for further improvement: there 
remain large regional disparities and differences between girls and boys as well as 
between rural and urban students (World Bank 2015: 8).  
The situation does not look any better if one moves onto considering the 
higher education level. The main public higher institution, the University of Pristina, 
has serious management, curriculum relevance and pedagogy problems. The quality 
of the graduates is poor and it is not matched to workforce requirements. The 
liberalization of the public higher education space – promoted by different 
governments – has resulted in the creation of 7 new public universities between 2010 
and 2014:39  interestingly, the process was based on no comprehensive strategy for 
tackling the low market absorption rates in a country with extremely slow growth of 
the private sector. 
                                                
39 In 2010 the university of Prizren was inaugurated, followed by two universities in Peje/Peć (2011), 
and three more in Gjilan/Gnjilane, Gjakove/Đakovica and Mitrovica (2013) and the latest in 
Ferizaj/Uroševac (2014). 
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 International and local initiatives in the education sector in the period 2013- 
14 have sought to consolidate the quality of pre-university education (in particular by 
further implementing curriculum reform and teacher professional development) and 
to increase access to higher education [as mentioned above, through the establishment 
of new higher education institutions and the improvement of existing ones] (ETF 
2015: 3). Moreover, since 2008, there has been an increasing focus on vocational 
education and training. By 2013, the Law on Vocational Education and Training was 
passed and a strategy for developing vocational practice was approved including the 
finalisation of the syllabus for 21 new profiles based on demands of the labour 
market for targeted centres of competence; the Agency of Vocational Education 
Training and Adult Education was established in March 2014 and it governs four 
centres of competences in Skenderaj, Malisheve, Prizren and Ferizaj and two technical 
schools in Prizren and Pristina (ETF 2015: 3-4). The project is supported by the 
German GIZ, which provides capacity building and management for the Agency’s 
staff. However, a local education expert highlighted how the centres of competences 
in Malisheve and Ferizaj were still not operating by the end of 2013.40 
Overall, the need to match education reforms with labour market needs is 
highlighted in government strategies, at least rhetorically. In particular, one finds  
stronger emphasis on enhancing the link between education and the economy in the 
sectors of vocational education and training and higher education (ETF 2015: 4). Yet, 
“ [a] systematic approach to meeting education and employment challenges through 
skills development ” is missing (ETF 2015: 4). Supported by the European Training 
Foundation, Kosovo has drafted a capacity development roadmap for the country’ 
skills system up to 2020 that identifies the following main priorities: the promotion of 
competence-based learning and improvement of the responsiveness of the education 
and training system to labour market needs (aiming to tackle unemployment and 
social exclusion); fostering entrepreneurship and innovation; reforming employment 
services; developing capacities for coordinated sector policy development, especially 
by improving inter-ministerial cooperation (ETF 2015: 5).  
                                                
40 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
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4.4 Key trends in Kosovo’s post-conflict education reform 
 
This section examines three areas that international agencies have prioritized in Kosovo 
with the apparent aim of institutionalizing multiculturalism and addressing the multi-
ethnic nature of the new state: curriculum reform, community education, and higher 
education.  
 
4.4.1  Curriculum reform and textbooks 
 
In leading curriculum reform, UNICEF initiated a dialogue and process for primary 
curriculum – which was funded by a Japanese grant (US$ 16,160,000) through the United 
Nations Human Security Trust Fund – that could promote a pluralist and multicultural 
society (UNICEF and DoES-UNMIK 2001). UNESCO joined UNICEF in curriculum 
reform and together with its International Bureau of Education organized curriculum 
development workshops in Geneva. The first reform initiative was the new Kosovo 
Curriculum Framework, which was based upon the current and past trends of educational 
development in the West, particuarly by introducing the focus on learner-centred 
approaches (Tahirsylaj 2013).  
An evaluation of the curriculum framework made by the London Institute of 
Education in 2005 stated that “[t]he Curriculum Framework for the National Curriculum 
produced by MEST with the support of UNICEF and the technical expertise of 
UNESCO/Institute of Education is an excellent, modern, high quality document and an 
excellent model for education in Kosovo” (London Institute of Education 2005: 3). 
In 2002, with the creation of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology 
(MEST), local authorities took over education reform and policy development, including 
curriculum development. MEST took a number of steps to make Kosovo’s education 
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system compatible with European standards. An early step was the adoption in 2002 of 
5+4+3 education structure instead of the previous 4+4+4 (OECD 2001). However, some 
local experts in education said that it was done in a hasty way not allowing time for the 
system to adapt to the change and initially without a curriculum for grade nine.41 The 
adoption of new textbooks followed that of the curriculum framework, the last updated 
version of which was adopted by MEST in 2011 (MEST 2011a). 
The revised Kosovo Curriculum Framework focuses on “[l]earner-centeredness, 
competencies, integrated teaching and learning, flexibility, mobility and transparency,” 
which reflects “[t]he fundamental values and principles of human rights, living together, 
social justice and inclusiveness” (MEST 2011b: 24). The competency based curriculum 
encourages “’[l]earning to learn, problem solving, critical understanding and anticipatory 
learning’” identifying them as some of the skills that are needed in order to practically 
achieve life-long learning. (Ibid.: 25). Many Kosovo educators considered the curriculum 
framework not to be as successful as planned because it did not consider Kosovo’s past 
educational experiences and contexts (Tahirsylaj 2013: 7).  
By 2006, MEST drafted the Pre-university Education Strategy 2007-2017, aim of 
which was to turn Kosovo into a “[k]nowledge society integrated into the mainstream of 
European processes, offering equal opportunities for personal development to all 
individuals, who will in turn contribute to sustainable economic and social development” 
(MEST 2006: 20).  
One of the most potentially conflictual and underdevelopment aspects in curricula 
reform has been history curriculum reform, especially with regard to the period between 
the end of World War II [WWII] (when Kosovo became part of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia) and the 1999 war. A Purdue University project mobilized a network of 
                                                
41 Interview with executive director, Kosova Education Centre, 7 Novermber 2013, Pristina, Kosovo; 
Interview with executive director, Kosova Education Centre, 21 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo; 
Interview with local education consultant, 27 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
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scholars in joint research and conferences “[t]o resolve the Yugoslav controversies, 
including theme groups interpreting Kosovo’s problematic history” (Nelles 2006: 99).  
The battle over Kosovo’s history has resulted in competing and exclusivist school 
curricula (Sommers and Buckland 2004: 39). Much of the conflict over politics and 
education in Kosovo has been around different and competing interpretations of Kosovo 
history by Serbs and Albanians (Dogo 1999). As Sommers and Buckland (2005) 
highlight, the issue of history was a constant theme in the interviews that were conducted 
with Kosovar Albanians and Serbs in 2004.  
However, such controversies did not emerge from the interviews that I conducted 
with MEST representatives almost a decade later, in November 2013. MEST has recently 
launched an initiative at multiperspective approach to history.42 It is still in the piloting 
phase and the project has not reached contemporary history, leaving out the most 
contentious part of Kosovo history from the end of WWII until recent history. 
MEST has been on the way of having a single curriculum for all Kosovan 
communities, with translation in the different languages. However, the curriculum in 
Serbian has been drafted but not issued, and there is no record or statistics on the number 
of Serb pupils and schools of the parallel system, nor is there a strategy of integration of 
the Serbian parallel system into the Albanian one (OSCE 2003, 2006, 2009b). 
The three MEST strategies for pre-university education have shown a changing 
and progressive de facto acknowledgement of the Serbian parallel system. In the first 
MEST strategy issued in 2003, the goal was the “[u]nification of the Education system” 
(MEST 2003: 8); in the second strategy issued in 2006 the Serbian parallel system was 
identified as “[a] challenge to be dealt with” (MEST 2006: 18);  while the last strategy 
drafted in 2011 – three years after the unilateral declaration of independence from 
Kosovo authorities – accepted the use of curriculum and textbooks from the Republic of 
                                                
42 Interview with head of curriculum section, MEST, 12 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
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Serbia as stated by the Law on Education in the Municipalities of the Republic of Kosovo 
(MEST 2011b: 70). It is not clear to what extent this change in strategy depends on 
Kosovo’s authorities accepting the de facto existence of the parallel system or whether 
the acceptance is due to international pressure. The fact that Kosovo’s curriculum and 
textbooks to date have not yet been translated into Serbian illustrates the existence of lack 
of will on the part of Kosovo institutions to create the conditions for the integration of 
Serb students into the education system of the new state – providing an easy alibi to those 
Serbs who call it the ‘Albanian system’.  
In 2009, a process of revision of the Curriculum Framework was relaunched 
following the 2007 strategy for pre-University Education. Concomitantly, an Independent 
Commission – composed of three MPs from the Serbian community, three MEST 
representatives, and one representative from the International Civilian Office (ICO) – was 
established to review the Serbian curriculum and textbooks. It released a report with 
measures and actions for ensuring conformity with the Kosovo constitution and the 
Ahtisaari plan (Bozzato 2013). It was most likely influenced by the OSCE report that 
stated that Kosovan authorities did not seem committed neither in including the Serbian 
community in education system nor in integrating the Serbian parallel system into the 
Albanian formal one (OSCE 2009b).  
The report issued by the Commission stated that the use of Serbian curriculum 
and textbooks was necessary, given the lack of curriculum and textbooks in Serbian 
language by MEST (MEST 2010: 2). The report identified a number of contentious 
contents in the Serbian curriculum and textbooks, followed by recommendations of 
“[m]easures and actions to be taken by the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology in order to ensure reasonable conformity of the Serbian language curriculum 
and textbooks with the Constitution of  Kosovo and relevant legislation” (MEST 2010: 
4). 
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Two of the contentious issues regarded curriculum – the different structures of 
education systems (5+4+3 in Kosovo and 4+4+4 in Serbia) – and religious education. 
Religious education is compulsory in Serbia while is not part of the curriculum in 
Kosovo. The third regarded the contents in Serbian textbooks that are considered 
incompatible with the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo. The most problematic is the 
history curriculum, since it does not present a history of Kosovo but of the Serbian nation 
as a whole, and it does not touch upon the core events after 1998, which is when Kosovo 
stopped being practically part of Serbia (MEST 2010: 6).  
According to Bozzato, the process was politically-driven as most of the members 
of the commission on both sides were not technicians but politically appointed 
personalities (2013: 18). Although considered as an interim solution until MEST issues a 
Serbian-language version of the curriculum, the fact that changes and harmonization to 
the Kosovo constitutional framework were proposed on those sensitive, national subjects–
history, geography and religion–that represent the main controversy with Serbia suggests 
that the process is destined to fail (Ibid.). 
While curricula in Kosovo satisfy the educational needs of specific communities, 
they fail to promote “[m]utual respect, understanding and tolerance”: OSCE suggested 
the need for initiatives promoting “[i]ntegration within diversity and intercultural 
education” (OSCE 2009b: 24). OSCE concluded in its report that the generation of youth 
from different communities in Kosovo that are being formed in the current education 
systems will find it difficult to communicate with each other for lack of a commonly 
understood language and for lack of a non-divisive and shared history (Ibid.). 
The politics of curriculum reform in Kosovo and the related debates in Kosovo 
and Serbia show that there is little concern about the improvement of the curricula, 
textbooks and didactics more generally (Bozzato 2013: 24). Hence, it is rather unlikely 
that objectives of fostering inclusion, integration, and consolidating cohesion and peace 
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have been or are currently informing curriculum reform in Kosovo. Indeed the process is 
tied to the broader political dispute between Kosovo and Serbia over the status issue.  
 
4.4.2 The question of minorities  
 
Under UNMIK and within the DESK process the aim was to develop an education system 
that would include interactive methodologies and new curricular topics in ways that 
would promote equity in access and mutual understanding among different ethnic groups. 
At the beginning, UNMIK tried to achieve its goal of multiethnic cooperation and 
schooling by organizing shift schemes or shared facilities, focusing especially on the 
Serbian and Albanian community. However, it did not work either because of the lack of 
will on the part of the two communities to attend same schools or for lack of physical 
security. Broader development and security issues had an impact on Kosovo’s education 
in the post-war period (Nelles 2006: 102). In 2002, UNMIK officials negotiated an 
agreement with the Serbian Ministry of Education, but it seems that the attempt failed in 
the last moment because the Serbian delegation could not hold together (Sommers and 
Buckland 2004: 127). 
Following the 2004 riots, the OSCE was engaged in “[a]n interesting initiative” 
promoting the democratization of society through education, as part of the longer term 
objective of peacebuilding.43 It was quite an unusual approach from OSCE working 
jointly with MEST, to use education to promote democratization and built social 
cohesion. As argued by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the main 
objectives were the promotion of human rights and multiculturalism. Moreover, OSCE 
launched a special unit on higher education, whose main function was to facilitate the 
integration of national minorities within higher education.44  
                                                
43 Skype interview with former employee with the Dutch NGO Spark, 21 November 2013 
44 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
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Community areas have been off limit zones for the Kosovo institutions, where the 
international community alone had the mandate to work. The role of the international 
community in higher education increasingly became limited to the communities, 
sometimes with outcomes that rather than solving were exacerbating certain issues. This 
was particularly the case of the Gorani community. USAID has tried to get the two main 
conflicting communities together through a couple of projects that aim at the 
development of inter-ethnic communication and interaction between Kosovo Albanians 
and Kosovo Serbian communities, focusing on languages, capacity building, education 
and economic development (USAID 2013). 
There seems to be partial integration of the Bosnian, Turkish, and Roma, Ashkali 
and Egyptian (RAE) communities within the Kosovo system of education, while Gorani 
and Serb communities are not integrated at all (OSCE 2009a). The OSCE report showed 
that communities seem to be moving gradually on their own separate ways: this is seen as 
evidence of the fact that community integration within the education system is not 
sufficient for the integration of minority communities within the broader society (OSCE 
2009a). This is particularly visible in a few areas: between the Albanian and Serbian 
communities in Kosovo, whose absence of relations is influenced by political obstacles 
mainly due to the active engagement of the Serbian government to the maintenance of 
Kosovo Serb schools and school staff operating within the so-called parallel system; in 
the blossoming of prejudice and stereotyping due to the lack of communication and 
exchange in most of the municipalities in Kosovo (in this regard, the existence of the so-
called ‘enclaves’ has played a very negative role); finally, in the a lack of pro-active 
approach by any of the parties, accepting the issue of Albanian/Serb relations in Kosovo 
in a status quo of no communication (OSCE 2009b). 
Most of the international organizations involved in multicultural projects to 
education such as OSCE, Council of Europe, US Embassy, UNICEF have addressed one 
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or more education issues of a given community without a comprehensive and trans-
community approach. The OSCE report found that curricula for community-specific 
‘national’ subjects for the most vulnerable Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani, Kosovo 
Croat and Kosovo Montenegrin communities have not been developed yet (OSCE 2009b: 
1).  
The Ministry of Education of Kosovo claims that specific attention has been paid 
to the education of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities by stimulating their 
participation in the formal education system and by developing curricula in Romani 
language, which includes elements of their culture and history as an optional subject 
(MEST 2011b: 29). In 2011, MEST with support by the OSCE Higher Commissioner for 
National Minorities (HCNM), was developing two textbooks designed for boosting 
intercultural education: a textbook for learning Albanian as second language for 
minorities’ students and a textbook for civic and intercultural education (MEST 2011b: 
29).  
Although the legislation adopted by the new state provides for comprehensive and 
specific educational rights “[t]he right to receive public education at all levels in one of 
the official languages (Albanian and Serbian), in areas inhabited by communities whose 
mother tongue is not an official language, students belonging to these communities are 
entitled to receive pre-school, primary, and secondary public education in their mother 
tongue” (OSCE 2009b: 1), for non-majority communities, implementation is weak 
characterized by a number of deficiencies (OSCE 2009b: 1). There are insufficient 
textbooks for primary level and lack of textbooks in Turkish and Bosnian languages.  
Kosovo Serbs do not face difficulties accessing curricula and textbooks for 
primary, secondary, and higher education. Kosovo Bosniak and Gorani students who 
choose the Serbian curricula are quite satisfied with its quality, although they complain 
that it lacks sensitivity over their cultural diversity. Quality and availability of curricula in 
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the Kosovo curricula depend on the language in which they are developed (i.e., Albanian, 
Turkish, Bosnian). The Kosovo curricula lacks the same sensitivity when it comes to 
community-specific ‘national subjects’ (OSCE 2009b: 5). 
The promotion of multiculturalism as a tool for resolving ethnic conflicts and 
achieving a peaceful political resolution (one of the key tenets of the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm) has informed the international peacebuilding agenda in Kosovo since 1999 
(Randazzo and Bargués 2012). As shown in chapter three, the respect of the rights and 
interests of minority communities has led to the promotion of decentralization policies 
along ethnic lines with consequences felt in the fragmented and decentralised education 
system(s). Decentralization has emerged as the panacea for the international community: 
it ‘freezes’ ethnic conflict by territorially insulating potentially problematic units, and 
ultimately it may help avoiding the necessity to deal with the reasons and root causes 
behind a given conflict (Monteux 2006: 163). However, while the aim has been to 
prevent conflict, pursuing it through territorial decentralization, has been 
counterproductive (Randazzo and Bargués 2012: 27). The Kosovo Human Development 
Report in 2010 concluded that local issues including the quality of teaching has not 
improved where decentralization has been implemented (UNDP 2010). 
 
4.4.3 Reforming higher education 
 
There are two areas in which the international community has been more active in the 
field of higher education (HE): the promotion of the ‘Bologna process’, which aims to 
integrate Kosovo’s universities into the European system, and initiatives that could 
strengthen the autonomy of higher education versus party politics.    
 
The Bologna process  
 
As Kosovo emerged from hostilities, higher education in Kosovo went through dramatic 
changes and reforms. The peculiarity of the process lies in the fact that it was not initiated 
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from internal needs of the University of Pristina, but emerged as a result of decisions 
taken by the international community. In the early, post-conflict phase reforms in higher 
education were planned and implemented by international agencies and foreign 
consultants. Local university staff or experts were not consulted or made part of the 
process, while the reforms caught many professors unprepared for the demanding process 
(Rexhaj 2001).  
There were several communication and policy-making gaps, and underlying 
power relations that hampered local ownership in the sector of higher education. 
Moreover, the same ‘tabula rasa approach’ was adopted by the international community, 
ignoring structures, contents, and institutional legacies that were in place prior to the war. 
As with the rest of the education system, UNMIK’s intentions were a new brand higher 
education, since the system inherited from the past was not deemed suitable for the 
reforms. According to Tahirsylaj, not crediting university professors and treating them as 
outsiders from the process may have been the biggest mistake committeed by the 
international community in higher education (2010: 177).  
Since the beginning, there has been a strong focus on Kosovo’s capital – that is, 
on the university of the ruling elites: the University of Pristina, in particular, was 
completely spoiled with donor money. The sudden availability of funds caused 
difficulties in effectively managing resources across overlapping projects.45 For trivial 
that it may seem, one reason for an overflow of assistance and money to the University of 
Pristina is that NGOs and INGOs had better and easier access to institutions in the capital 
city.46 The Dutch NGO Spark in 2010 launched an International Business School in the 
northern city Mitrovica with the aim of bringing together students from both sides of the 
                                                
45 Skype interview with former employee with the Dutch NGO Spark, 21 November 2013 
46 Ibid. 
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ethnic divide. However, the process was characterized by obstructions and the NGO 
received threats, apparently for crossing a red line.47  
The OSCE, which never had a mandate on education, created a department on 
higher education and communities and made a link between higher education and 
processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding. What emerges from the Council of Europe, 
World Bank, OSCE, and EU projects and NGO work such as Spark’s, is the existence of 
strong confidence – almost faith - on the fact that higher education is a vehicle for state 
formation and as a critical vehicle for progress.48  
The Bologna process and the transposition of the discourse of ‘knowledge-based 
society’ have been an important point of reference for interventions in Kosovo’s higher 
education (Bacevic 2014). Curriculum, teaching and learning strategies, and assessments 
were the areas on which the reforms focused the most (Mustafa et al. 2004). Although 
commentators and interviewees tend to give much credit to the inclusion of the Bologna 
process as the driving force behind the reforms, there exists little evidence that the 
process actually altered teaching and learning strategies. Despite training in these 
directions, traditional learning and teaching strategies (teacher-centred direct instruction) 
remain the most applied method. One may suspect that the Bologna process has been 
used as an alibi to justify all sort of changes and decisions, regardless of the actual 
content.  
As mentioned above, in terms of principles and objectives guiding the reforms, 
planning and implementation, one encounters in the field of Kosovo’s education little 
understanding and little explanation of what is actually meant by European standards 
(OECD 2001: 38). In daily reality, the main activity in university life remains teaching, 
while little research is undertaken by the faculty in departments, with more than 50 
percent of university professors having a second job, often teaching at private institutions. 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
 166 
Depending on the interlocutor, the Bologna Declaration came to be seen as either 
the utopia (an alibi for inaction) or the realistic imperative (an alibi for unpopular 
reforms) that paved the way to the urgent changes in higher education in Kosovo. The 
adoption of the Bologna Declaration was the first step undertaken by the University of 
Pristina right after the war. As early as in 2000, the University of Pristina established the 
Committee for Strategy and Reforms (later known as the Bologna Working Group), a 
body in charge of implementing the Bologna process (Beqiri 2003). The Council of 
Europe was contracted by UNMIK for a two-year project sustaining the University of 
Pristina to reach European standards in legislation and management. Based on the experts 
contracted by either the Council of Europe or locally, the law on higher education was 
drafted and passed by the Kosovo Assembly. At that time, Kosovo had the first law in 
Europe based upon the Bologna Declaration (Beqiri 2003). 
The objectives of the Law on Higher Education were “[t]o establish, develop, 
protect and transmit scientific knowledge and research,” functional to cultural, social and 
economic development (MEST 2002: 5 quoted in Tahirsylaj 2010: 179). In the same 
document, MEST admitted that the biggest challenge for higher education in Kosovo was 
to establish a link with the economy. According to the Employment and Skills 
Observatory of Kosovo - ESOK (2004), the university of Pristina concentrates on 
academic learning rather than on workplace competencies. Beside its role for economic 
development, the University of Pristina has to play a role as an agent for the 
democratization of the country (MEST 2004).  
According to the new Statute of the University of Pristina, the institution aimed to 
become a leading centre for the advancement of knowledge, ideas and science in Kosovo, 
along with its full integration in the regional and European higher education space 
(University of Pristina 2004). Indeed, one of the rationales behind the hasty 
implementation of the Bologna process was to integrate Kosovo into the European higher 
 167 
education sphere. However, applying the Bologna framework for Kosovo – namely, the 
poorest country in Europe, just emerging from the war with a disastrous institutional 
structure in place – was in many respects problematic. Among other problems, the 
process was launched without a reading of the local contect and an idea of the impact it 
may have (Rexhaj 2001). After more than a decade of reforms based upon the Bologna 
process, the University of Pristina does in no way compare with universities from other 
European countries. The diplomas, knowledge, and skills it produces do not match those 
demanded by the economy and are not competitive in the European market (Tahirsylaj 
2010: 174; ETF 2015).  
 
Universities and party politics 
 
Higher education and politics have been inextricably linked for the Albanians and Serbs 
in Kosovo. As it was before the war, soon after the cessation of hostilities in 1999, 
university life in Kosovo became deeply intertwined with inter- and intra-ethnic politics: 
“[c]lose association between national schooling, on the one hand, and a national state, on 
the other, eventually became an impendiment to the implementation of any gradual 
solution to the contested sovereignty in Kosovo” (Kostovicova 2005: 211). The politics of 
higher education reform in post-war Kosovo has been contentious, revealing the faultlines 
and the political struggle within the Albanian political and academic elite and between the 
first two and the international community. 
As for the Albanian/Serbian clash over higher education, Kosovo Serbs preserved 
the Serb-dominated Pristina University now based in north Mitrovica. The pursuit of 
higher education in Serbian in Kosovo was institutionalized through a compromise 
agreement in 2001 between UNMIK and the Serbian Education Ministry.  
In the beginning, UNMIK tried to reopen the University in Pristina, as a 
democratic, non-segregated institution regardless of ethnic background. The inclusion of 
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Serbs at the Albanian Pristina University, as more in general the inclusion of Serbs in the 
Albanian education system, rather than educational was a political issue. The acceptance 
of Serbs in the University before the solution of the Kosovo political status was rejected 
by the Albanian leaders now chairing Kosovo state authorities, on grounds that it could 
have been interpreted as compromising the Albanian quest for independence 
(Kostovicova 2005). Moreover, some Albanian lecturers and students were involved in 
the war, and in clear violation of UNMIK regulation had been deeply involved in 
Kosovo’s politics at times holding also civils service posts as party representatives 
(Gjurgjeala and Shala 2004). While conducting interviews within MEST and the 
university of Pristina, I noted that those appointed at the most important positions at the 
Ministry of Education had been involved with the Kosovo Liberation Army, whose most 
of the combatants had conflated within the PDK party, the political party that led the 
government during my fieldwork in November 2013.   
The clash for the control of higher education in which  local political elites were 
embroiled emerged after the creation of the Kosovo provisional government institutions. 
Between 2002-2004 and 2004-2006 arm-struggling took place between MEST (controlled 
by LDK party) and the university rectorate, which was conquered by the rival PDK party. 
Quite tellingly, the ministry did not recognize the outcome of the elections for the new 
rector, denouncing irregularities and frauds. The Rectorate, for its part, defended itself 
behind a call for the autonomy of the university.49 
In the beginning, the local governments maintained a restrictive approach towards 
higher education, avoiding any opening to private universities. This situation changed 
after the declaration of unilateral independence of 2008, as the local government gained 
more power and liberalization was extended to the university field, with a corollary of 
corruption accusations touching both LDK and PDK parties. By the end of 2013, a 
                                                
49 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
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country of approximately million inhabitants had 8 public higher institutions, six 
vocational training institutions, and 23 private colleges.50 According to the Deputy 
Minister of Education, Science and Technology, one of the strategies for making Kosovo 
a “knowledge state” has been boosting development of the higher education sector, which 
includes its liberalization.51 As the Kosovo public sector, strictly monitored by 
innternational financial institutions, does not have the potential to absorb most of the 
young people that are educated in the current education system, one of the rationales 
behind the development of higher education and vocational training has been the 
development of a workforce equipped with the skills for competing and integrating in the 
European labour market.52 In an interview, the Deputy Minister of Education claimed that 
the development of higher education pursued the goal of strengthening Kosovo’s 
legitimacy at the international level and increasing political support for the government in 
power.53 
The proliferation of private and public universities throughout Kosovo, has had 
little to do with market demands, and much more to do with  private interests and political 
agendas.54 Judging from the amount and the type of cases brought to the attention of the 
public opinion, and comments I could gather through interviews and subsequent 
exchange with Kosovo’s scholars and civil society representatives, the liberalization of 
higher education in Kosovo brought about a devaluation of knowledge, quality and 
diplomas.55 It comes as no surprise that, following a report from the local centre of 
investigative journalism Preport, the University of Pristina was swept by student protests 
                                                
50 Interview with Deputy Minister of Education, Science and Technology, 6 November 2013, Pristina, 
Kosovo 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo 
55 Interview with assistant professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Pristina, 2 November 
2013, Pristina, Kosovo; Interview with investigative journalist, Preport, 10 November 2013, Pristina, 
Kosovo 
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against the rectorate and clientelistic system that have characterized the appointment of 
administrative and academic staff (Boletini 2013; Kalaja 2013).  
The growing emphasis on higher education and the proliferation of a number of 
public university and private colleges all over Kosovo regardless of budget and 
demand/supply considerations illustrate the widespread phenomenon of ‘populist use’ of 
higher education on the part of those elites that have captured it.56  
 
Conclusion  
 
As the analysis has tried to show, the Kosovo case illustrates the close and deep link 
between the education system and conflict. After the short-lived experience of unification 
during WWII under the auspices of a puppet entity bolstered by Italian Fascism (during 
which young Kosovars were exposed to Albanian-language administration and 
education), Kosovo’s Albanian identity was cultivated in virtual isolation from Albania, 
which remained a remote and not accessible site of romantic cultural propagation. 
Attempts to bridge the gap by the Yugoslav authorities were reversely engineered as the 
Federation entered crisis and politics in Belgrade designated Kosovo as the first battle to 
reassert nationalism.  
When the collapse of communist regimes removed Cold War barriers, the 
resurgence of nationalist narratives that swept ‘Eastern Europe’ brought the question of 
national education back to center stage. Kosovo Albanians came to that appointment with 
history following two decades of struggle whose epicenter had been the sphere of 
education, the University of Pristina, and the construction of a parallel schooling system 
whose sized matched that of the Kosovar society.  
Education acquired a crucial role as the symbolic producer and the amplifier of 
nationhood and a political expression of statehood, and Kosovars lacked no generation of 
                                                
56 Ibid.  
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intellectuals and activists, having a host of teachers from Pristina with a background in 
Albanology that due to the Serbian repression in Kosovo had expatriated into the newly 
emerging indepentent Republic of Macedonia, in whose Western districts they set up in 
1994 their own constroversial colony – the University of Tetovo. Initially met with police 
repression by Skopje, the new spin-off of the University of Pristina was eventually 
regulated and recognized, and later flanked by a newly conceived Tetovo-based 
‘University of South-East Europe’ that was funded by former OSCE Commissioner on 
National Minorities Max van der Stool with a view to matching the region’s educational 
need for educated administrators through externally assisted higher standards of academic 
performance. 
Throughout this trajectory, the emphasis shifted from ‘class’ during Yugoslavia to 
‘identity’ during the nationalist revival of the 1990s (Bacevic 2014). The international 
community that stepped into Kosovo following the war followed this trend, further 
reinforcing the ethnic discourse, but attempting to shift the focus onto (multi-) ethnic 
identity.  
The UN experiment in post-war education reform, as its broader engagement in 
post-war reconstruction in Kosovo, can be characterized as one following a tabula rasa 
approach. Its ‘reinventioning’ approach was turning away from Kosovo’s educational 
past, and started constructing from scratch an education system based upon European and 
Western standards. Although the international community has strongly emphasised 
education during the post-conflict phase, the fact that responsibilities to local authorities 
were handed over quickly shows that education was not a strategic sector in the 
peacebuilding agenda in Kosovo.  
The propulsive character of education as the driving force behind the national 
question was to be mitigated and education had to respond increasingly to security and 
stability imperatives. While before the war education rallied around the Albanian national 
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question, increasingly education needed be reorganized in ways that it would contribute 
to build a tolerant, multi-ethnic society.  
In this regard, a human rights-based framework–enabled through a proliferation 
of short training programmes–and a multi-ethnic/multicultural perspective, shaped 
education reform. Education had to be modernized, de-nationalized, de-ethnicizised, and 
made compatible to European and international standards, turning away from its 
Communist and nationalist past.  
Moreover, education had to be redesigned to be compatible with the new 
economic framework and market reforms put in place by the international community. 
Although economic and development strategies were not drafted either before or after the 
declaration of independence, a number of actors and documents highlighted how 
education were expected to serve the needs of the new economic structure. As shown by 
the first draft document that laid out the privatization strategy, education was expected to 
play the role of the legitimizer by institutionalizing consensus on the new economic 
model and privatization recipes enacted by the international community in Kosovo.  
Despite the rhetoric about local ownership, in the aftermath of the war, reforms in 
education were characterized by a serious lack of local involvement in the process of 
educational reform. After more than a decade of technical assistance there are clear 
deficiencies in local capacities. Curriculum and higher education reforms have been 
externally driven and neglected institutional memory and context. The EU-funded Sector 
Wide Approach was introduced to increase ownership, but it has been hampered by low 
absortion and human capacities at the local level. As has been the case in other post-
conflict settings, donor assistance has been chaotic and has lacked coordination.  
The process of curriculum reform in Kosovo has been tied to the broader political 
dispute between Kosovo and Serbia over the status issues. History curricula and 
textbooks remains among the most contentious and underdeveloped issues. In the struggle 
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between majority and minority over history curricula one finds a segregation and 
multiplication of exclusivist and opposite readings of history(ies) and a lack of 
communication between such readings. They procede in parallel as the more general 
education system(s) in Kosovo. 
The politics of higher education reform has been characterized by the political 
struggle within the Albanian political and academic elite and between the first two and 
the international community. An assimetry in donor funding and assistance versus the 
Pristina-based Albanian university has fuelled the self-imposed isolation of the 
Mitrovica-based Serbian university and has furthered separation at the level of higher 
education between the Albanian and Serbian communities.  
The Bologna process and the transposition of the hegemonic discourse of 
‘knowledge-based society’ have informed interventions in Kosovo’s higher education. As 
the Bologna Declaration becomes the benchmark against which progress in higher 
education reform is assessed, the Europeanization of higher education in Kosovo is made 
in a hasty and de-contextualized way.   
The liberalization of higher education is paving the way to the devaluation of 
knowledge, quality and diploma, and it is addressing in a problematic way youth 
unemployment. Even though in the past six years there has been a refocusing on 
vocational training from a number of international donors, there is no coordination nor a 
strategy that could match the booming young population of Kosovo, the building of skills, 
the informality of the economic structure and market needs, and a strategy of employment 
generation.  
There has been a proliferation of private and public colleges that through the 
conferement of degrees have postponed the moment in which students enter the job 
market. In this way, the situation that has been determined is one in which unemployment 
rates are kept fictionally low and the explosive link between a frustrated, educated youth 
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and unemployment is managed through postponement of graduation and the 
multiplication of degrees per each student. The same structural problems that 
characterized Kosovo during Yugoslavia, such as those related to unemployment, 
underdevelopment, demographics in Kosovo have not been properly addressed in and 
through today’s education reform.  
Education has been and still remains one of the main settings of tensions and 
conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Education policies have been directly 
influenced by the unresolved political status in Kosovo. Even after the unilateral 
declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, the structure of the education system – 
characterized by spatial segregation and separation – has been a reflection and a 
perpetuation of such conflict. The politics of Serb-Albanian relations, intra-Albanians 
relations, and international intervention at post-war education reform have made the 
challenge of education to prevent conflict a complex and difficult task, leading one to 
consider education as a problematic foundation for building peace in Kosovo.  
Albeit not explicitely linked to the peacebuilding agenda, the peacebuilding 
model that prevailed in Kosovo informed choices and priorities made by international 
actors in educational reform. A tension arose between using education to build social 
cohesion through building national identity and reforming education in ways that could 
not threaten stability. In this regard, the very notion of which, whose and how many 
nations or states (and which state/s) were there in Kosovo was an underlying problematic 
aspect.  
In the post-war context, the international liberal agenda identified local culture 
and ethnicity as the primary causes for the conflict, thus proposing as the solution a 
governance of decentralization that would accommodate and institutionalize  difference 
preventing any space for cross-level, dialectical interaction between different groups.  
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A narrow understanding of multiculturalism has been primarily based upon a 
notion of identity leading to the creation of a multiethnic society which is homogenised 
within ethnic groups but it is polarized among diverse groups, which are territorially 
divided into a system of decentralized municipalities. Such approach has taken for 
granted the existence of pure ethnic identities and has ommitted the possibility for hybrid 
or ambiguous identities that might have existed prior to the war. In the end the result is 
the perpetuation and institutionalization of ethnic division that were further polarized as a 
result of the war.  
As the chapter has tried to show, the politics of education reform in post-war 
Kosovo has been strategically negotiated between Kosovo local authorities, Serbian 
authorities in Belgrade and Mitrovica and international and transnational actors involved 
in education assistance in Kosovo. The perspective that has shaped the (re)construction of 
an education system as part of an externally-assisted effort to build peace is one that sees 
Kosovo as a post-communist country with an ethnic problem but which overlooks the 
existence of a development question.  
 176 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CONFLICT, PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING IN 
EAST TIMOR 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The fact that the main cause of conflict was removed when the Indonesian occupier 
withdrew induced many observers to believe that building peace in East Timor would be 
easier task than in other post-war settings. The emphasis that international and local 
actors laid on statebuilding and the priority accorded to short-term reconstruction goals 
(as opposed to long-term development) seems to suggests that the country was not 
regarded as in need of peacebuilding. East Timor was soon labeled a successful story of 
UN statebuilding and peacebuilding intervention, implying that the getaway of 
Indonesian troops was sufficient for building peace. The task forward was narrowly 
defined by international actors as one of building the state and constructing the nation.  
Albeit not as highly and explicitely divisive as other post-war settings such as 
Kosovo, historical or present-day divisions in East Timor have been and still remain those 
between the East and the West, between different ethno-linguistic groups, and between 
different political parties and elites. Moreover, potential conflict drivers that are worth 
analytical consideration appear to be those social, economic and gender inequalities that 
still hamper the country’s development.  
The chapter first offers an introduction to the history of colonization and conflict 
in East Timor, showing how the modern history of the country (including the history of 
education itself) has been shaped and influenced by a plethora of external actors and 
factors. Second, it critically analyses external intervention patterns - both those happening 
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inside and outside the UN mandate - and it reflects about the lack of conflict 
sensitivity/analysis on the part of international actors despite the fact that the root causes 
of conflict were far from removed after the referendum. It highlights how the narrow 
focus on liberal statebuilding has produced a fragile if not failed state, inducing a 
reformulation of  peacebuilding priorities only following the violent political crisis that 
swept the country in 2006. 
 
5.1 A history of conflict and colonization  
 
Conflict has characterized East Timor historical development since early human 
settlements (Paulo Castro Seixas 2006 quoted in Ofstad 2012: 4). When the Portuguese 
arrived in 1513, they did not find a united people and they exploited these local 
differences in order to tackle resistance, according to a ‘divide and rule’ approach 
(Ramos-Horta quoted in Ofstad 2012: 5). The long period of Portuguese colonisation 
(1513-1975) had an impact on the Timorese identity in terms of culture, language and 
religion (Anderson 1993). During this long period, formal and informal relations systems 
took place between the Portuguese and the Timorese elite. The Portuguese invested very 
little on the social, economic and physical infrastructures of East Timor concentrating on 
the extraction of sandalwood (Gunn 1999). The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal 
led to regime change and the new government started the process of decolonisation.  
As the colonial power left East Timor hastily in August 1975, what followed was 
a brief and violent civil war between local political factions over the leadership in post-
colonial East Timor (Fox and Soares 2000). According to the final report of the Truth, 
Reception and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR) “[t]he brief civil war was over by 
early September, but it had changed the situation irreversibly. The fighting took up to 
3,000 lives and left deep and enduring scars.” The Frente Revolucionària de Timor-Leste 
Independente (FRETILIN) came out victorious and unilaterally declared independence on 
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28 November 1975. The other four political parties flew to Indonesia and signed the 
Balibo Declaration proclaiming integration with Indonesia. The Indonesian military, 
which had been conducted small-scale incursions for one year, invaded the country on 7 
December 1975, on the basis of an alleged political vacuum (CAVR 2005). 
Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor was actively promoted by the Indonesian 
political leadership of General Soeharto, who justified the invasion on grounds of 
common geographical, historical and cultural ties, and defined East Timor as  Indonesia’s 
27th province (Cribb 1997). The Indonesian leadership managed to gain support from the 
West also by depicting the Timorese leadership as communists that could threaten 
regional stability. Besides being an ally of the West against communist expansion in the 
region, Indonesia was also a supplier of natural resources such as oil and gold, making the 
US, Australia and other countries to turn a blind eye regarding the invasion and 
widespread human rights abuses (Nevins 2005). 
Large-scale military operations were initially launched with the aim of eradicating 
and destroying the FRETILIN. Civilians that were considered to be close to FRETILIN 
suffered torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings. Around 100.000 people died from 
starvation as a consequence of forced migration and the destruction of agriculture (CARV 
2005). 
The violence and destruction that characterized the invasion did not spare 
teachers and their families. While school directors and Indonesian teachers were seen as 
sympathetically serving the regime and its purposes of assimilation, Timorese-born 
teachers transmitted to the future generations the values of resistance and the 
distinctiveness of East Timorese culture and history (Arenas 1998).  
Notwithstanding large-scale Indonesian attrocities, “[m]any Timorese sided with 
the occupying power,” as during Portuguese colonization (Ofstad 2012: 5). The Chega! 
report found that in the period June-September 1981, 60,000 people were forcibly 
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recruited by the Indonesian army to fight the Armed Forces for the Liberation of East 
Timor [FALINTIL] (CAVR 2005: 65). 
However, atrocities were perpetrated by both sides: 29 percent of all unlawful 
killings and disappearences were perpetrated by forces that were affiliated with 
FRETILIN/FALINTIL (CAVR 2005: 59, 61). Violent conflicts emerged within the 
resistance movement too, showing that conflicts occurring during the brief civil war and 
the ensuing occupation years were multifaceted and complex (Gusmao 2000). In the 
crucial years 1974-1976 the Catholic Church did not play a mediating role, nor did it 
promote dialogue among the different and conflicting Timorese factions: “[i]t took sides 
and fanned the flames of the conflict” (CAVR 2005: 55).  
However, this situation changed during the 1980s, which was a decade 
characterized by guerilla warfare, resistance and mobilization – whereby the Catholic 
Church emerged as an important actor supporting and channelling resistance against the 
Indonesian state; this change marked an increase in the number of Timorese affiliated to 
Catholicism (Hughes 2009). The Church became an active supporter of the perspective of 
independence, a task it performed by also encouraging the development and use of Tetum 
as the language of resistance. 
Throughout the 1990s, Indonesian control over the region was weakened by the 
increasing international visibility given to the repression and brutality of Indonesian 
forces. This brought to the forefront the issue of the illegal occupation of the island with 
the international community increasingly condemning it. Other factors such as national 
protests in Indonesia against the economic decline and the 1997 Asian financial crisis led 
to the demise of Soeharto’s dictatorship (Jones 2010). His successor, president B. J. 
Habibie accepted the possibility of a UN-supervised referendum in the island, through 
which the Timorese population would choose between full independence or greater 
autonomy under Indonesian rule.  
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Tripartite negotiations with Portugal and under the auspices of the United Nations 
were resumed to discuss the future of East Timor and would soon lead to the Agreeement 
between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East 
Timor on 5 May 1999.57 According to the Agreement if the option of greater autonomy 
within Indonesia would be rejected by the referendum “[t]he Secretary-General [would], 
subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor 
to begin a process of transition towards independence.”58  
On August 30th 1999, over 78 percent of the Timorese voted for independence 
from Indonesia. Soon after and until the arrival of a multinational peacekeeping force, the 
withdrawing occupation forces and their local militia proxies were embarked upon a 
campaign of destruction of most of the infrastructure  - schools, hospitals, roads, 
government buildings – that were present in East Timor, forcing 300,000 refugees into 
Indonesian West Timor while internally displacing two-thirds of the population. 
Throughout 1999, around 1,500 were killed, with thousands more displaced (CAVR 
2005). A culture of martial arts gangs emerged and divisions within the population were 
instrumentalized by Indonesian in the aftermath of the referendum and partly explained 
the chaos that followed afterwards. When the UN peacekeeping forces arrived in late 
September 1999 little was left of the educational infrastructure. The damage of 
educational infrastructure was worsened by the massive escape of the Indonesian teachers 
from the island.  
As this section has shown, the history of East Timor has been more conflictual 
and divisive than is usually debated and thought.  Early ethnic divisions, Portuguese 
oppression, the 1975 ‘civil war’ and 24 years of Indonesian occupation have rendered 
                                                
57 (http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org/UN/indonesiaportugalonquestionofeasttimor.html, last accessed 
15 September 2015). 
58 Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East 
Timor, UN, May 5th 1999, art. 6 
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East Timor a traumatized society, with deep divisions, personal conflicts, mistrust and an 
overall lack of national cohesion (Ofstad 2012: 7).  
The local elite requested both support to end the violence and to construct a new 
state upon different institutional and economic basis. The local leadership requested a ten-
year transition to independence but this was not accepted as a possible commitment from 
the international community. Ironically, the UN with a number of missions remained 
officially engaged in East Timor for more than 10 years (1999-2012). Successive UN 
missions with a mandate that was to be anually renewed could not conceive a long-term 
strategic development plan (Vieira and Engel 2011: 4).  
International actors that were faced with the huge challenge to build a new state 
from scratch and with the ambitious plan to do so within two years, lacked the intentions 
and tools to conduct a thorough background knowledge of the Timorese society. 
Underpinning their commitment was a widely-shared view that the 24 years of struggle 
for freedom against Indonesia had united the population. The UN focused more on the 
relationship with Indonesia and related issues such as border management. Yet, not taking 
into consideration internal conflicts was surprising with consequences that violently 
emerged in 2006 and in the different bi-annual political crisis that have characterized East 
Timor since 1999. 
 
5.2 INTERVENTION OUTSIDE AND INSIDE UN MANDATES 
 
5.2.1 The UN and the Timorese question 
 
Like in Kosovo a few months earlier, East Timor was supervised under the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was tasked with the role for outlining the mandate and 
organization of the mission (Ofstad 2012: 9). According to Ofstad, “[t]he fact that DPKO 
 182 
was given the job instead of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) implies that East 
Timor was considered a peace-keeping and not peace-building case, a choice that was 
clearly inadequate in light of the situation and history of Timorese society” (2012: 9).  
The mission architecture was a further evolution of the peacekeeping missions of 
the 1990s, whereby the international community’s role in maintaining peace and security 
was to be achieved through political and economic means along more traditional military 
operations (Atwood 2002; Ruffert 2001): “[e]conomic-policy formulation was largely 
outsourced to other agencies, primarily the World Bank, and was to a large extent 
divorced from political considerations. The World Bank also led development efforts in 
strategic sectors, including agriculture, health, education and community development” 
(Engel and Vieira 2011: 5) 
After two years of UN transitional administration, East Timor gained full 
independence on May 20th, 2002.59 According to Engel and Vieira, the support of the 
international community after independence did not change, following a “[l]imited-state, 
market-driven economic model,” thus failing to gradually move from a heavily subsidised 
economy under Indonesia to a liberal, market-driven economy under UN and Timorese 
lead (2011: 5). Despite strong emphasis in institution-building by the international 
community through technical support to ministry officials aiming at developing the 
legislative and administrative frameworks of the new state, the link between the state and 
its citizens remained weak with the latter “[s]truggling to adapt to the new laissez-faire 
economic model” (Engel and Vieira 2011: 5).  
 
5.2.2 Externally-driven statebuilding  
 
                                                
59 Covering half of the island of Timor and with a population of approximately one million, it became 
the youngest nation in the 21st century. Outside its capital Dili, East Timor remains a village-based 
society with sixteen different languages, and a geographical landscape that has favoured isolation and 
different local traditions.  
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The different UN missions that were established in East Timor between 1999-201260 have 
promoted peacekeeping and statebuilding agenda and have been defined as “[g]overnance 
or national building missions” (Suhrke 2001: 1; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005; 
Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000; Dunn 2003). The UN role in Timor-Leste was similar 
to the role that the UN played in Kosovo and Cambodia by assuming full authority under 
a transitional phase until self-government. Similar to the pillar structure that was adopted 
in designing UNMIK in Kosovo, UNTAET had three pillars: governance and public 
administration (GPA), humanitarian aid and rehabilitation and peacekeeping (this third 
component was the largest) (Suhrke 2001: 7).  
However, in East Timor the UN went further by assuming full sovereignty with 
administrative, legislative and executive tasks: local actors were deemed to lack 
capacities to self-govern (Richmond and Franks 2008: 188). Its centralized approach to 
exercising political authority has been criticized as arbitrary and authoritarian, while its 
unwillingness to share power has led critics to define the UN approach as an expression 
of neocolonialism (Richmond and Franks 2008: 190).  
As it had been the case in other UN missions, UNTAET failed to incorporate 
locals and be accountable to them. Such a failure affected capacity building efforts  in the 
civil service despite later efforts to develop political mechanisms for local consultation as 
a result of the pressure from the Timorese and donor governments for greater 
Timorisation (Richmond and Franks 2008: 190). In Suhrke’s view the mission was a UN 
operation staffed with internationally recruited people that lacked local knowledge and 
did not understand indigeneous languages, and which did not recognize local counterparts 
(Suhrke 2001: 11). 
                                                
60 UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 1999 that oversaw the referendum regarding 
independence/autonomy from Indonesia; UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
between 1999-2002  mandated with peacekeeping/statebuilding objectives and which oversaw the 
transition to independence;  UN Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET) 2002-2005 promoting 
post-independence development; UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) 2005- 2006 mandated to phase 
out the UN mission; UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 2006-2012 following the 
outbreak of violence in 2006. 
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The UN failed to recognize the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction 
(CNRT) as a local partner for development which led to a contest of authority between 
the CNRT and the UN. By not engaging it politically, “[a] gap therefore developed 
between the UN’s de jure authority on paper, and the CNRT’s de facto control in the 
field,” and the CNRT developed its own parallel structures (Chopra 2002: 32). Local 
actors lacked the mandate to enact long-term strategic reforms. This was more 
problematic in those sectors of intervention that were left to local actors, a fact that was 
justified with the fact that they were a national prerogative. One such of them was 
education.61  
The international community adopted a market-driven model of limited state: 
although it invested substantially in institution-building, the absence of the state or the 
presence of a limited state(hood) was felt by most of Timorese citizens with 
consequences for state legitimacy. The approach to institution-building was a mechanical 
one, following a model of governance ultimately resting on technocratic expertise, 
without much consideration of the question of legitimacy: the latter was narrowly defined 
and understood as supported by the electoral process. Underlying this understanding one 
might see the expectation that legitimacy would be built not so much on inputs, but rather 
by outcomes, i.e. by building the capacity ‘to deliver.’ The extent to and ways in which 
state legitimacy is defined by the capacity of the state to effectively deliver and provide 
social services were overlooked and therefore not properly tackled (Engel and Vieira 
2011: 9).  
The nexus between conflict and state legitimacy has been increasingly recognized 
by a number of international agencies intervening in post-conflict or fragile contexts. In 
its World Development Report Conflict, Security and Development, the World Bank 
explicitely linked state legitimacy to violent conflict, suggesting that institution-building 
                                                
61 Interview with Social Protection and Education Economist, World Bank, 18 June 2013, Dili, East 
Timor 
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and service delivery are central to the consolidation of post-conflict legitimacy (World 
Bank 2011).  
The development and consolidation of state legitimacy was essential in East 
Timor also in view of emerging antagonisms and regional cleavages for years overlooked 
or obscured by the struggle against the common enemy identified in the Indonesian 
occupier (Engel and Vieira 2011: 2). The international community failed to consider such 
cleavages nor it incorporated them into policy-making, hampering its own state-building 
efforts: 
 
widely held attitudes of the international community regarding the absence of 
conflict in the post-independence period; its efforts to transpose international 
‘best practice’ onto a perceived blank slate; and the application of a ‘limited-
state’ model and reliance on market-driven economic growth reduced the ability 
of the state to shape its relationship with the population” (Engel and Vieira 2011: 
2).  
 
In the aftermath of independence, the international community did little to promote a 
sense of national identity, in terms of engaging and stimulating the local leadership “[o]n 
the merits of promoting a sense of shared history and to make resources available to that 
end” (Engel and Vieira 2011: 11) Throughout the different UN mandates, the approach 
and focus remained on institutional development and top-down liberal governance while 
the active and politicised agency of Timorese citizens was ignored (Richmond 2011: 85). 
The form of statebuilding that came to characterize international intervention in East 
Timor over time was based upon: 
 
top-down peacebuilding and governance at the expense of bottom-up 
peacebuilding, social justice, and welfare. [...] in Timor, this marginalised the 
political experience, history, culture, and needs of its subjects. Its focus on 
secular, public spaces for politics, on marketisation, on rights over needs, and on 
various institutions and programmes, effectively disenfranchised the vast bulk of 
the population, often through strategies of romanticisation (Richmond 2011: 87).  
 
The Timorese government was instrumental in seeking to develop a locally-led 
statebuilding process which was elaborated within the g7+ Agenda for Statebuilding. It is 
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part of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding which emerged in 
the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness which was held in Accra, Ghana in 
2008 (Wyeth 2012). The Dialogue represents a platform for bringing together donors 
(traditional or new ones, bilateral or multilateral partners), recipient countries and civil 
society actors for addressing root causes of conflict and fragility and to enhance the 
effectiveness of aid delivery.  
The g7+ was formally formed in East Timor in April 2010, and the group’s vision 
for peacebuilding and statebuilding was elaborated within the Dili Declaration. The group 
emerged out of the recognition that in conflict-affected countries there were serious gaps 
in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in aid 
effectiveness. It aimed to draw attention to common challenges and dilemmas shared by 
countries affected by conflict, fragility and external intervention/assistance with the 
overall objective of advocating for better international developmental policies.  
The g7+ was initially led by East Timor while it is currently led by the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and it includes around twenty countries affected by 
conflict such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire 
among others. The g7+ call for a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was 
endorsed in the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in  Busan, Korea in 2011. 
The New Deal has elaborated a number of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PBGs) 
or priorities that are considered to be essential pre-conditions for development in fragile 
contexts: 
 
1. Legitimate politics: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution 
2. Security: establish and strengthen people’s security 
3. Justice: address injustices and increase people’s access to justice 
4. Economic foundations: generate employment and improve livelihoods 
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5. Revenues and services: manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and 
fair service delivery 
 
The New Deal sets out three sets of principles which should be taken into consideration in 
any intervention in conflict-affected and fragile states: 
 
1. A focus on the five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals 
2. A focus on nationally-led planning and priority-setting based on fragility and 
conflict assessment 
3. A focus on increasing and building trust between national and international actors 
by promoting aid transparency, delivering a timely and predictable aid, 
strengthening capacity, and sharing risk.  
 
The above-mentioned objectives are very similar to those proposed, elaborated or 
implemented by the international community in conflict-affected countries, although a 
greater focus is placed over justice and employment. Yet, the g7+ has gained recognition 
for being the first platform to bring together some of the most fragile and conflict-
affected countries with the aim of putting forward an agenda for change in aid practice 
(Denney 2011 quoted in Rocha Menocal 2013). It has sought to be context-sensitive and 
it has advocated country-led and country-owned peacebuilding and statebuilding 
processes for addressing fragility, conflict and for achieving resilience and sustainable 
development, ultimately seeking to achieve or at least propose a mutual accountability 
between governments, civil society and international actors/donors.  
 
5.2.3 Which peace, whose peace in East Timor? 
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The first three UN missions in East Timor did not include reconciliation and political 
dialogue in their respective mandates (Ofstad 2012: 8). However, from its very beginning, 
UNTAET took some reconciliation steps, and therefore it could be said that to some 
extent it conducted peacebuilding activities. Moreover, it promoted refugees’ return, 
cross-border dialogue, and it launched a programme ‘The future of democracy in East 
Timor’ that was based upon the promotion of “[c]ivic educaton  on constitutional 
development, the rule of law, as well as political education” (Ofstad 2012: 13). The civic 
education programme was evaluated by the majority of Timorese as insignificant, 
although credit was given to the UN for its effort. It is a rare example in which education 
has been used for democracy promotion in post-1999 Timor-Leste. 
 The UN most significant effort in reconciliation was establishing the Commission 
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) between 2001-2005, expected to 
investigate and report on serious crimes and conduct reconciliation activities and dialogue 
processes between victims and offenders. The final CAVR report Chega! in 2005 
recommended large-scale reconciliation activities but they were neither taken into 
consideration nor implemented. The Chega! report was not enthusiastically received by 
President Xanana Gusmao, who adopted a conciliatory approach with Indonesia rather 
than putting emphasis on the pursuit of justice: indeed, very few perpetrators have been 
charged and the majority of the Timorese victims have not received justice or 
reconciliation (Ofstad 2012: 19). Therefore, the government has been supporting 
peacebuilding through a form of reconciliation that has not dealt with past crimes.62 
Contributions for the stabilization of peace in the early phase emerged outside the 
formal UN mandate, specifically from UNDP, the World Bank and the IMF, with 
programmes focusing on institution building, poverty reduction, community and 
infrastructural development (Ofstad 2012: 14).  
                                                
62 Interview with former advisor at the Ministry of Education on ‘Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual 
Education –MTB-MLE-Policy for Timor-Leste,’ 26 June 2013, Dili, East Timor 
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Despite such efforts, the UN with its missions did not adequately sustain political 
dialogue on national unity among different local political actors, did not prosecute 
atrocities, missed an early monitoring mechanism for conflict assessment and did not pay 
attention to sources of violence such as the martial arts groups (Ofstad 2012: 12). Most 
importantly, reconciliation was formally and explicitely included within the UNMIT 
mandate following the 2006 crisis, that is seven years later.  
In March 2006, around 591 soldiers from the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-
FDTL) (roughly 42 percent of the army) went on strike over poor working conditions, 
lack of advancement opportunity, discrimination and nepotism in the armed forces 
(Ofstad 2012: 3). Shortly after, they were fired by the then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. 
As army and police started fighting each other, youth gangs took control of Dili, looting 
shops and destroying property (Brown 2009; Harris and Goldsmith 2009; Scambary 
2009). In the ensuing weeks, social riots paralyzed Dili, houses were burned, foreigners 
left the country temporary going to Indonesia.  
Violence quickly spread beyond the capital: social and political tensions that had 
remained unresolved after the end of the Indonesian occupation came back to the surface. 
The clashes resulted in 150.000 people displaced and 6.000 properties destroyed (Taylor 
2011). The ensuing episodes of violence, included clashes between people from the East 
and from the West. Although, the crisis was primarily interpreted as a clash between the 
police and the army, it also reflected old divisons between the East and the West dating 
back to the years of resistance against Indonesia. Some politicians instrumentalized such 
divides for their own interests, blowing on the fire. The Prime Minister eventually 
resigned and an international peacekeeping force was again deployed under Australian 
guidance.  
While until 2006 the UN mission and the international community focused on 
state building rather than peace building, after the 2006 crisis, it increasingly focused on 
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peacebuilding. Such refocusing represented an inversion to the approach of the 
international community in the aftermath of the 1999 war. Following independence and 
the establishment of elected representatives and local government, much of the UN 
mission was withdrawn by early 2006: dire social conditions, poverty and unemployment 
were not addressed by the UN, IOs, INGOs and were not considered a threat to political 
stability. There was general tendency to put political rights over economic and social 
rights, an assumption that proved dangerous for stability as the 2006 crisis showed shortly 
afterwards. 
Indeed, by 2006, the economy was stagnating, with unemployment on rise and 
human development indicators such as health and eduation remaining low (UNDP 2006c; 
ICG 2013). Some blamed the donor-led ‘good governance agenda’, which had brought 
the state to use resources to boost its economy (Hughes 2009). Others pointed to the 
withdrawal of the UN mission in 2005 and the reduced donor presence which had a 
significant impact on the stagflating economy in the capital Dili (Moxham 2008).  
It was acknowledged that the UN mission in 2006 withdrew too soon, and the exit 
strategy has been ill-prepared. In the aftermath of the 2006 violence, the UN Secretary-
General report identified socio-economic factors as leading to the collapse, in particular 
poverty, deprivation and unemployment.63 Indeed, it is for this reason that after 2006, 
local governmental and non-governmental actors started negotiating country poverty 
reduction strategies (Richmond 2011: 85). 
After the 2006 crisis, the Security Council resolution gave the UN Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) a mandate which aimed among others: “[t]o support 
the Government in consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, 
                                                
63 UN Secretary-General’s Report on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1690, 8 
August 2006 
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and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring 
about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion.”64 
Yet, conflict roots and the Timorese welfare, culture, languages, and history were 
still neglected due – among other things - to a persistent over-emphasis on liberal state-
building and neoliberal economic policy. The exclusion of Timorese from the 
internationals’ statebuilding project and the failure of Timorisation of  local government 
structures reflect the lack of a social contract between the citizens, the government and 
the internationals: “[t]he disregard of the socio-economic situation, the neglect of grass-
roots welfare and social justice [...] has left a mass of discontent amenable to political 
entrepreneurship.” (Richmond and Franks 2008: 197) 
In a report published on September 2009, the local NGO Centre of Studies for 
Peace and Development (CEPAD) pointed out a number of obstacles to peace which were 
related to the link between modern democracy and traditions of East Timor; the lack of 
local participation in development; divisions and distance between politicians and the 
population; persisting issues of poverty, unemployment and corruption; lack of peace 
dividend for different groups; and lack of a shared national narrative and other identity 
problems connected to language issues (CEPAD 2009). 
According to the then president Xanana Gusmao, “[t]he experiences of 
peacebuilding in Timor-Leste indicated that peace was not just a normative aim but a 
basic human right that involved preventing not just international and civil violence, but an 
engangement with socio-economic deprivation, a lack of development, and an 
engagement with the experience of recipient communities on the part of internationals” 
(Gusmao 2004 quoted in Richmond 2011: 88). 
Using Richmond’s categorization of peace in post-war context, the type of peace 
that has been built in East Timor has had elements of the conservative peace since it 
                                                
64 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1704, S/RES/1704 (2006) 
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required military intervention and elements of the orthodox peace consisting in 
externally-driven and imposed top-down peacebuilding methods, while emphasizing the 
role of civil society (Richmond and Franks 2008: 191). 
According to Richmond, the peace that was built in East Timor has been an 
hybrid, “[p]art liberal, part local”, that is a mediation of what local and international 
actors aimed for (Richmond 2011: 91). The hybridity as a concept does not add much to 
the substance of the peacebuilding model in East Timor, as in such contexts more than in 
other ones everything could be said to be a mediated or unmediated form of the 
interaction between international and local social forces.  
What is important for understanding the type of peacebuilding process unfolding 
after the war is the fact that the UN and the broader range of actors involved in country 
did not or were not able to engage with a number of contextual issues. The peace that has 
emerged, as argued by Richmond among others, is a virtual one with a state subject to 
frequent political crisis, failing to address conflict roots, paralysed by a lack of capacities 
and with problematic levels of unemployment and poverty (Richmond and Franks 2008: 
191, 197). The aspect of virtuality is linked with the fact that the state has had little 
substance if measured against the impact on the everyday life experience of the majority 
of the population and their welfare requirements.  
Although since the last elections in 2012 the country has enjoyed relative levels 
of stability, in many aspects, East Timor remains a fragile state that can easily become a 
failed state. With 70 percent of the population under the age of 30, unemployment and 
youth bulges problems have been exhacerbated by the growing affiliations to martial arts 
groups, which have been involved in crime and episodes of violence (Horta 2013). 
Furthermore, substantial gas and oil revenues (estimated at 2 billion dollar a year), at least 
since 2010, have led to a ‘double-digit growth rate’, but they also have deepened the gap 
between rich and poor, with growing problems of crime and insecurity (Horta 2013). 
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5.3 The missing analysis: conflict roots and social fragmentation  
 
 
The lack of a comprehensive conflict analysis hampered the UN’s 
efforts, and represented a surprising omission, given East Timor’s 
conflict history. [...] no overall plan or strategy to guide peace or 
statebuilding activities was created by the UN, and few explicit 
efforts were made for longer-term reconciliation or conflict 
resolution. (Ofstad 2012: 2). 
 
This section will reflect upon the lack of conflict analysis from the part of the 
international community in the aftermath of the referendum and in the first years of the 
intervention. It claims that this was a surprising neglect given the highly divisive nature 
of the Timorese society. After presenting some of the conflict roots that still continued to 
play a role even after the withdrawal of Indonesia, the final part will focus on current 
cleavages and conflict drivers, particulary those social and economic issues that represent 
potential sources of conflict in the present or near future.  
 
5.3.1. Conflict roots pre- and post-1999  
 
When it started its efforts to build the state in 1999 the international community was 
confronted with a complex situation. One critical aspect had to do with the scars left by 
violence between pro-autonomy and pro-independence groups, as well as by the broader 
legacy of Indonesian repression. A second aspect regarded ideological and political 
disputes within the political elite that were dating back to the 1980s and were 
reinvigorated once the new political system opened up space for power competition. 
Another important question was the precarious socio-economic situation of the country, 
as the flaring up of the 2006 crisis would show so clearly only a few years later. 
However, UNTAET was confronted with an element that could rarely be found in other 
peace missions: the occupying power had withdrawn, and the local interlocutor could be 
found speaking under a single authority or political actor – i.e., the CNRT.  
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The approach of the international community was one that regarded East Timor a 
tabula rasa, in which international best practices could be transposed and implemented 
into a context- and historic-free setting where the Indonesian legacy was ignored, 
underestimated and fought.  (LeMay-Hébert 2011).  Illustrative in this regard was the 
Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) background paper commissioned by various 
international actors in 1999,65 which - quite tellingly indeed - claimed that “[a]ny plan for 
the future must start from zero” (JAM 1999: 2). The same approach could be found 
among the myriad of social forces and political parties representing the local elite. In the 
opinion of a then international consultant working with the UN mission, the local 
authorities were putting pressure on the international interlocutors regarding the need to 
start everything from scratch.66 
As mentioned above, reconciliation and conflict resolution activities were mainly 
incorporated in UN operations in East Timor only after the 2006 crisis. However, most of 
them failed to tackle those conflict roots or proximate triggers that were crucial to the 
2006 crisis and to previous/subsequent political crisis.67 The international community did 
not incorporate within its various efforts any form of appreciation or reflection upon the 
Timorese historical context. Intervention(s) took place within an environment that was 
considered to be devoid of the possibility of new violent conflict. In this regard, an Early 
Warning System (EWS) was not even  conceived for East Timor until 2006, unlike in 
Kosovo, where such a mechanism was established already in 2002 by the UNDP via 
quarterly early warning reports.  
For both, international and local actors, the withdrawal of the Indonesian military 
and its militias represented the end of the conflict. No domestic conflict dynamics were 
                                                
65 The paper was a product of a joint mission of experts from East Timor, bilateral donor countries, 
UN agencies, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.  
66 Informal interview with a practitioner working with the UN mission in 1999, 16 September 2015, 
Oxford, UK 
67 The United Nations Common Country Assessment (CCA) for Timor-Leste “Building Blocks for a 
Country” (2000) provides a good overview of root causes of conflict. 
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identified as threats to the stability and sustainability of the state-building project (Engel 
and Vieira 2011: 5). For example, the World Bank and its programmes limited reference 
to ‘conflict prevention’ advocating for ‘development’, ‘capacity building’ and 
‘empowerment’ (Engel and Vieira 2011: 5). 
Established in 2001 and functioning until 2005, the Timor-Leste Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) was the only domestic mechanism to pay 
and draw attention to those cleavages arising in post-independence East Timor, which 
solidified upon pre-existing strata of divisions among elites. Its final report of 2005 
suggests that attention should be paid to conflict dynamics, and called for reconciliation 
within communities and among political elites. These recommendations were largely 
ignored (CAVR 2005). 
According to Engel and Vieira (2011: 6) the main issues that could potentially 
lead to violent conflict and that were largely ignored by the international community in 
the first phase were: individual/communal antagonisms during the civil war and 
resistance to occupation; the patronage structures in post-independence; the relationship 
between the population and the elite partly coming from the diaspora; the opportunity 
disparities created by the international community; large-scale rural-urban migration; 
competition for scarce land and employment. 
 These issues became more evident during and after the 2006 political crisis, 
when the UN recognized that the political crisis was the result of chronic and deep-rooted 
problems (United Nations 2006: 1). Indeed, in a report following the 2006 riots, the UN 
identified the “[u]nderlying causes” of the crisis as “political and institutional” but 
suggested that “poverty and its associated deprivations including high urban 
unemployment and the absence of any prospect of meaningful involvement and 
employment opportunities in the foreseable future, especially for young people, have also 
contributed to the crisis” (United Nations: 9). This argument was confirmed by the UNDP 
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in 2007, which identified both poverty and (youth) unemployment as causes of the 
ongoing (political) crisis (UNDP 2007). To sum up, the international community failed to 
underpin “[t]he cross-sectoral analysis and programme design” on the historical context 
and fragility of post-independence (Engel and Vieira 2011: 6). 
 
5.3.2 Current conflict-potential drivers: social and economic issues 
 
East Timor has the fastest growing population in the region (2.14 percent) and one of the 
youngest population in the world (Curtain 2010: v). With 20 percent of the population 
aged 15-24 years and 54 percent of all Timorese under the age of 19, the country will 
have a very large segment young population, at present and for some time to come 
(Curtain 2010: iv; Narten 2012). Such a ‘youth bulge’ will increase demands for services 
such as access to education and decent work opportunities.  
Youth bulges have been linked to conditions that may favour social and political 
violence, and a pressure on the economy (Barakat and Urdal 2009; Urdal 2011). The 
2014 BELUN report confirmed an increasing number of incidents involving young 
people, indicating that youth issues coupled with other economic and social factors 
increased conflict potential at the national and district level (2014: 23). Youth issues 
entailed youth (un)employment, internal migration from sub-district/district to main cities 
to look for jobs, the lack of training or development programmes involving young 
women/men coupled with insufficiency in employment opportunities (BELUN 2014: 21; 
24).  
Relevant social indicators that have a strong bearing on conflict potential have 
been “[a] lack of dialogues or activities between youth groups and martial arts group to 
strengthen peace and unity”, a decreasing number of “[d]ialogues and workshops on 
conflict resolution or peacebuilding in the community [...] a lack of activities to integrate 
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people from different groups [languages, religions, different clan totem houses, etc.]) and 
reconfirmed data on domestic violence (BELUN 2014: 22).  
While violence has downsized since the then prime minister Xanana Gusmao 
outlawed martial arts groups in the late 2011– considered as one of the biggest sources of 
conflict between 2011 and 2012 – root causes of violence have not been addressed. 
Indeed, youth unemployment coupled with widespread poverty, lack of prospects, forms 
of dislocation and displacement, especially among the young male population, that have 
moved from rural areas to Dili and Baucau, remain critical potential sources of conflict.68 
GIZ has been on of the few international organizations that through its Peace 
Fund programme has tried in recent years to raise awareness about the link between 
peace and youth promotion under a rationale of conflict prevention.69 In interviews and 
focus groups conducted with young people within the framework of the Peace Fund 
programme, possibilities for education and labour market perspectives are confirmed to 
be perceived as central (Narten 2012: 2).  
The youth dimension has been addresed within the Timor-Leste’s National 
Strategic Development Plan, the most important strategic document issued by the 
Timorese government, which has identified young people as an important human asset for 
its implementation: according to the plan, youth development is to be supported through 
education, health, employment and social development (Timor-Leste Strategic 
Development Plan 2010). In terms of education, “[t]he Plan states that young people shall 
be allowed to achieve their potential by providing good quality of education and 
expanding their life opportunities” (Curtain 2010: 2). In this regard, key strategies for the 
development of education include the improvement of pre-school education, basic 
education, secondary education, higher education, vocational and recurrent education. In 
                                                
68 Interview with former conflict analyst, Joint Information Centre, UNMIT, 19 June 2013, Dili, East 
Timor  
69 (http://www.peacefund-timorleste.org/background, last accessed 15 September 2015) 
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terms of employment, the vision enshrined in the Development Plan is one pursuing the 
creation of jobs in all sectors, assuring economic growth through the improvement of the 
training system.  
Nonetheless, until recently there have been few successful attempts at preventing 
the potential of violence of young people (Narten 2012: 1). With a country whose 
economy is low labour intensive and 60 percent of the population under 25 years old, no 
synergic strategy has been put in place between the education system and the job market 
currently unable to absorb the skilled workforce. While the internationally-driven 
statebuilding process had been inspired by neoliberal doctrines since its very outset, local 
actors have been gradually pushing towards the development of a welfare system. 
Reflecting this, the National Development Plan is aiming to tackle inequalities through a 
“[s]tate organised form of development and redistribution” (quoted in Richmond 
2011:169).  
Following state collapse and failure in the 2006 political crisis, addressing 
poverty and providing a basic form of welfare included payments for war veterans and 
some forms of job schemes (Richmond 2011: 89). The drafting of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper illustrated the local attempts at making peacebuilding economically 
sustainable and acceptable. It mobilized  many Timorese voices and was internally 
drafted equating peace with “[s]ecurity, freedom, tolerance, equity, improved health, 
education, access to jobs and food security” (IMF 2005b: xvi). 
However, the economic stability of the country rests upon weak foundations and 
it is considered as one of the factors bearing a strong conflict potential. As a matter of 
fact, East Timor is often defined as a rich country with poor people (Richmond and 
Franks 2008: 196), with 80 percent of the population still depending on subsistence 
economy and between 40-56 percent unemployed (Richmond 2011: 160). East Timor is 
the second most oil-dependent country in the world, whose GDP is made by 90 percent of 
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oil revenues, a figure arguably representing the highest dependency rate on a single 
commodity in the world (World Bank 2013). The government has maintained (fragile) 
political stability by extending patronage networks and by making substantial use of gas 
and oil revenues for that purpose (Horta 2013). Nonetheless, a number of studies estimate 
that the country’s gas and oil reserves will last for no more than another 15 years (Horta 
2013).  
The so-called ‘resource curse’ and the destabilizing effects that come with it have 
been addressed through the creation of a World Bank administered petroleum fund 
(Timor Gap) that is modelled according to the Norwegian pension fund. A small 
percentage of the fund has been funding trainings for people working within the oil 
sector, and some recent strategy has focused on short term job creation. However, most of 
the revenues from the fund have focused on infrastructural projects (Richmond 2011: 
160).  
The draft report of an internal evaluation by the World Bank’s Independent 
Evaluation Group covering the period 2000-2007 asserted that, by following the advice of 
the World Bank itself, East Timor had chosen to save much of the petroleum revenues 
rather than spending them on social projects: this circumstance  contributed to high levels 
of poverty and unemployment (Knowlton 2011). Poverty, according to the draft report, 
“[r]ose significantly through most of the evaluation period and declined only after 2007, 
when the government, against bank advice, increased its spending using petroleum 
resources” (quoted in Knowlton 2011). 
Another current dimension of conflict is represented by the strong East-West 
cultural divide within East Timor that has roots in the Indonesian occupation and in 
perceptions regarding the role played during the resistance. As mentioned above, the 
East-West divide, in its turn, is closely linked to the enduring rift between the army and 
the police. The West, which was most advanced during the Indonesian occupation, is 
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usually identified with a preminence of the police, while the East with the army. Since the 
2006 crisis, the army/police divide has been addressed and mitigated through new more 
balanced recruitment and promotion policies in the army and via Australia, Malasya and 
Portugal-promoted trainings for both the police and the military. Yet, economic and 
social imbalances between the East and the West have not been properly addressed, 
remaining (potentially) a problematic source of conflict.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Back in 1999, the international actors involved in the process and in the practice of 
statebuilding in East Timor perceived the country as a tabula rasa where virtually 
everything was to be rewritten from scratch. The state model that the main international 
actors aimed to build, in tune with what had been envisioned for Kosovo a few months 
earlier, was by all means a liberal democracy based on the free market. In transplanting 
the same standard model of democracy, the international community failed to recognize 
the existing forms of traditional authority and the structures and systems that had been 
institutionalized during Portuguese colonization earlier and the brutal Indonesian rule 
later (Jones 2010), as well as the existence of disputes among the new national elite. 
These disputes did not spare the role and the forms that  education should have in the new 
independent state. 
Based on a critical analysis of the literature and on interviews conducted on the 
ground,  it seems that East Timor is ‘paying for peace’ rather than building peace: in other 
terms, peace is first of all configurated as the stability of a system where former war 
veterans are given key power and political positions. As with other cases of post-war 
intervention, the notion of peace over time has been aligned with a narrower definition 
than previously thought and proclaimed: a definition that comes closer to stability than 
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development and emancipation. The field of education pays a price for this state of 
affairs.  
Between 1999 and 2006, peacebuilding was more aligned with a form of 
statebuilding focusing on the development of a neoliberal model of free market, a 
political system based on successful and free elections, and the building of institutional 
capacities. The violent crisis provided with the space for the local elite to play a more 
prominent role in the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda. Indeed, after the 2006 
crisis, a focus on poverty reduction was first of all elaborated by the local government 
and representatives from the civil society. 
However, within this reframing of priorities, the full potential of education for the 
development of key sectors of peacebuilding and statebuilding was neither envisioned nor 
unlocked. As mentioned above, education has only played an uncoordinated role for 
democracy development and national reconciliation with scarce results.  
The lack of an overall peacebuilding strategy and the lack of a comprehensive 
conflict analysis in the first years of the intervention hampered UN efforts at building the 
state and consolidating a sustainable and socially just peace. Conflict analysis tools were 
developed only after the 2006 crisis. This represented a surprising neglect given East 
Timor’s conflict history and the many cleavages that were present pre- and after 1999. 
Conflict roots were neither identified nor addressed.  
Based of the latest UN’s definition of peacebuilding, one could say that the UN 
failed to conduct and achieve peacebuilding in East Timor since it failed to address those 
conflict roots and conflict drivers, failed to promote national reconciliation and social 
cohesion. Moreover, it did not promote or simply neglected the Timorese local context, 
i.e., culture, language, history. More broadly, the international community failed to 
promote or lay the basis for a transformative and emancipatory peace by not focusing on 
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social change and welfare and by not encouraging or pushing the local elites to address 
social (in)justice. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 THE ‘UNKNOWN PATH’ TO PEACEBUILDING THROUGH EDUCATION 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
As discussed in chapter five, for most of its modern history East Timor’s identity and 
politics have been shaped by conflict patterns in which external actors have had a 
determinant role. Following a long period of Portuguese colonization, more than 20 years 
of Indonesian occupation and few years of transitional UN administration, in 2002 East 
Timor became the first independent state in the 21st century. Since 1512, Portugal 
controlled the eastern part of the island of Timor through Catholic missionaries, without 
caring about establishing a proper civilian administration (Hill 2002). The provision of 
education never featured among the priorities of the Portuguese metropole: mirroring a 
tradition rooted in pre-modern era, the church took main responsibility in handling this 
task.   
The FRETILIN that was formed by Timorese intellectuals and other members of 
the local elite that were studying in Portugal (where they were inspired by the trajectory 
of education movements in other African colonies) declared independence from Portugal 
on November 28, 1975. With the purpose of fighting decolonization, they established 
literacy classes, health clinics and agricultural cooperatives (Cabral and Martin Jones 
2008), adopting and adapting Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed to their own 
context (Freire 2007). 
Nine days after the declaration of independence, Indonesia invaded the country, 
embarking on an occupation that would last for more than two decades. Under Indonesian 
rule, the world of education played an ambivalent role. For the Indonesian state, it was 
supposed to act as a force of ideological indoctrination and assimilation of the Timorese 
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society under Indonesia. During the period of 1975-1999, characterized by active and 
passive forms of resistance that were met with growing repression, education institutions 
and schools were often to be found standing both on the side of the victim and of the 
perpetrator. As in other colonized settings, schooling became a crucial battlefield in itself, 
as well as an arena for mobilization of further conflict due to the messages that were 
produced and transmitted in classrooms. 
Prior to the UN-supervised referendum on independence held in 1999, the 
Timorese elite in exile gathered in Australia with the aim of formulating a national 
development plan, which envisioned that “[a] new East Timor would aspire to have an 
education system that enhances the development of our national identity, based on our 
selective cultural and universal human values” (CNRT 1999). The plan envisaged the 
transformation of the teaching learning process through the introduction of critical 
learning skills and methods and the promotion of indigenous forms of learning (Millo 
2002). 
Against this historical background this chapter adopts the lenses of the ‘critical 
cultural political economy analysis’ presented in chapter five, in which the main patterns 
characterizing the East Timor conflict and external intervention were examined, aiming to 
locate education in the specific Timorese context by looking at the processes that have 
shaped the sector and its relationship to peacebuilding and statebuilding: historical 
legacies, patterns of external intervention, processes and types of externally assisted 
peacebuilding and statebuilding.  
The first part of the chapter looks into the politics of educational reconstruction 
by mapping out educational programming and priorities. The second part will delve into 
the hybrid governance of education and how the relationship and role of international and 
local actors have changed during more than a decade of educational reform. It will put 
under scrutiny the actors and institutions that have had a key role vis-à-vis the education 
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sphere, in terms of laws, regulations and specific aspects of formal education that have a 
link with processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Finally, it investigates the specific 
nexus between education, peacebuilding and statebuilding by focusing on three specific – 
controversial and conflictual – aspects of curriculum reform: (1) the multi-lingual 
foundations of the new nation; (2) the role of religion, and more specifically Catholicism 
in the new state; (3) the question of traditions and history in the new curricula.  
 
6.1 The politics of post-1999 educational intervention 
 
6.1.1  Legacies of colonialism and occupation  
 
Modern education in East Timor has been shaped by those foreign actors that have been 
active in distinct historical periods. The legacy of the Portuguese colonial period (1515-
1975), the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999) and the United Nations administration 
(1999-2002) are still  quite tangible today. Each of these foreign administrations has 
introduced a different language, civil service and structure into the education system. The 
Portuguese rule and the Indonesian occupation had different impact upon education and 
language policy. The Portuguese introduced a Western model of education administered 
by the Catholic Church, which emphasised the quality of education for a small elite that 
was functional for colonial maintenance; by contrast, the Indonesian occupier focused on 
quantity, using (mass-) education as a means of indoctrination, spreading the Indonesian 
language and promoting Indonesian national unity (Nicolai 2004: 19, 30). During the 
Indonesian occupation, a clandestine resistance movement emerged: its promotion of 
popular education would leave its legacy too.  
The Portuguese legacy is mainly to be found in the presence the Portuguese 
language and Catholicism, as well as in political ties with Portugal which make the 
country distinct from the rest of the region. The post-1999 political elite has fuelled and 
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emphasised some of these features, for example by making Portuguese one of the official 
languages of the new state, as well as by developing preferential ties with Portuguese-
speaking countries. By travelling to Dili, one still finds a distinctive presence of agencies 
from the Lusophone world. By contrast, the decision to make East Timor a secular 
country initially excluded a role for Catholicism in the primary curriculum. In spite of this 
reversal, the Catholic Church has remained a key religious and social institution affecting 
all public life.  
During the Portuguese rule, the Church served as the major education provider, 
offering non-governmental educational services in the form of colegios: moreover, it also 
founded and funded kindergardens, primary schools, and a teacher training institution 
(Wu 2000: 3). In 1992 it assisted the then provincial government in establishing the 
University of Timor-Leste (World Bank 2004: 2).70  
According to Millo and Barnett, religious education under Portugal served as 
“[t]he main tool for building a submissive local elite.” (2003: 5) Overall, the Portuguese 
rule was characterized by lack of emphasis on mass education: its objective was the 
formation of a small administrative elite, located in the urban centres of Dili and Baucau. 
This was achieved by opening a few schools for upper-class Timorese: most of today’s 
Timorese leaders studied in those schools.71 The first public secondary school was 
founded in 1952; throughout the 1960s there was an expansion in education provision 
with figures at primary education rising fivefold while at the secondary level doubled. By 
the time the Portuguese left in 1975, the illiteracy rate was 90 percent (Saldanha 1994 
quoted in World Bank 2004: 2).  
Those that studied under the Portuguese claimed that the quality of education was 
higher with a sense of “[w]ider ‘literature’ and ‘culture’, and that teaching was superior” 
                                                
70 Catholic schools represent approximately 10 percent of enrollments in primary and secondary 
education (World Bank 2004: 2) 
71 (https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/, last accessed 15 September 
2015) 
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(Odling-Smee 1994: 14 quoted in Nicolai 2004: 42). While this might have been the case, 
it is a fact that it was achieved by encouraging Portuguese culture and Catholic values at 
the expense of local culture and geography (Nicolai 2004: 42). Beside legacies of 
language and religion, many of those in leadership positions in the education sector have 
studied under the Portuguese system.  
When Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 it substituted the Portuguese system 
of education with mass-education in Bahasa Indonesian. During the first years of 
occupation, FRETILIN organized literacy programmes and ran schools while hiding in 
the mountains, yet these efforts stopped soon as the Indonesian occupation increased 
control over the population. During the following 24 years enrollment in primary and 
secondary education increased rapidly with primary education compulsory, and available 
in most villages. Between 1975-1999, primary school enrolment increased from 10,000 to 
165,000 students (World Bank 2002: 55), while secondary education enrolments grew 
from 315 to 32,000 students and senior secondary education grew from 100 to 15,000-
19,000 students (United Nations 2000; Lee 2002). 
However, enrollment was not universal and public spending on education 
remained much lower than in the rest of the country. Enrolment rates were lower than in 
Indonesia, and differences between urban and rural areas remained more pronounced in 
East Timor than in Indonesia, with distinctively increasing gaps at higher education levels 
(World Bank 2004: 5; UNDP 2002b). The expansion of education in East Timor was part 
of the broader Indonesian development plan, which saw in a well-educated population a 
key element of economic development. However, in East Timor the education sector 
served both the purpose of integration and control: spreading the Indonesian language and 
propagating the concept of ‘one nation’ were crucial, since Indonesians spoke neither 
Portuguese nor any of the other East Timorese languages.  
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According to the UNDP Human Development Report, two main limitations of the 
Indonesian approach to education in East Timor have been the use of education to 
‘Indonesianize’ the population and the low quality of teaching standards (2002: 5). There 
were high levels of abstenteeism and widespread lack of professionalism since many of 
the East Timorese teachers were not adequately trained. High repetitions rates were a 
constant feature of the system and rote learning was used extensively. Moreover, 
classrooms had the minimum of equipment with shortage of school textbooks (Odling-
Smee 1999; United Nations 2000, both quoted in Nicolai 2004: 47). Indeed, despite the 
introduction of mass-education, East Timor remained the second poorest province of 
Indonesia.  
Low educational attainment affected employment prospects and kept East Timor 
within a circle of dependency, whereby teaching and administrative positions were 
assigned to people coming from other parts of Indonesia. The fact that most Timorese 
lacked administrative, technical and professional expertise and experience that were 
essential for administrative and government functions was felt when the skilled 
Indonesians left the country following the 1999 referendum. It was in this vacuum that 
the international community strategically drove its wedge, when it parachuted onto Dili a 
squad of internationally-recruited staff and external consultants. Expectations about 
strong discountinuity were at that point quite high: some of these expectations would be 
soon betrayed by the generation of a new cycle of dependency, this time on international 
professional expertise.  
Expectations regarding the role of education in the process of Timorese nation 
building were envisioned before the declaration of independence. The vision that a 
“[n]ew East Timor would aspire to have an education system that enhances the 
development of our national identity, based on our selective cultural and universal human 
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values”, was enshrined in the development draft plan that was presented by resistance 
leaders in Australia in August 1999 (CNRT 1999).  
More specifically, some of the strategic goals included: developing an appropriate 
education system similar to the Portuguese system; an appropriate curriculum with 
teaching of Tetum from kindergarten and Portuguese from grade 1 (both languages would 
be taught in parallel until year 9), together with the teaching of East Timor’s history and 
geography; introducing Portuguese literacy programmes and developing/intensifying the 
teaching of Tetum; developing vocational studies within non-formal education; enhancing 
students’ achievement by establishing networks that encourage local community 
participation and by including human rights and civic education in the national 
curriculum: upgrading the level of teacher training; developing an adequate 
pedagogy/methodology; developing the East Timorese history and culture (CNRT 1999).  
 
6.1.2 New developments  
 
The violence that broke out following the referendum, brought the education system 
nearly to a total collapse, whereby 95 percent of schools were either severely damaged or 
destroyed. Moreover, the majority of supplies and equipment were looted and most of the 
teachers fled to Indonesia (Nicolai 2004: 19). In terms of infrastructure, the school system 
became a tabula rasa. Timor Aid, an NGO of East Timorese from the Diaspora describes 
the situation in the education sector as follows: 
 
At the end of 1999, East Timor was a strange land. There was no government, no 
official language or currency, no system of law, no media, and no shops or 
schools. Not only was the country physically plundered and raped, but also no 
former structure existed which could be used as a base for rebuilding (quoted in 
United Nations 2000: 18) 
 
By the start of the 2000 school year the education system became operational, with many 
schools rehabilitated and a new workforce of teachers hired. In the ensuing years, 
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enrollment increased rapidly72 and between 2001-2003, primary school teachers increased 
from 2,992 to 4,080 (World Bank 2004: xviii).  
Nicolai identifies three phases of educational response by local communities, East 
Timorese leadership and the international community between 1999-2002: an emergency 
phase that followed the referendum and lasted until August 2000; a second, transitional 
phase until East Timor became an independent country on May 20, 2002, and a third 
phase following since 2002 (2004: 20-21).  
The first emergency phase between the referendum and the official re-opening of 
schools in October 2000 was characterized by a preminence of localized response; the 
second transitional phase lasting until independence focused on physical reconstruction, 
the increase of primary school enrolments, recruitment of teachers and the setting up of 
the administrative foundations of the system; a third phase starting since independence 
(May 20, 2002) focused on system reconstruction, including the establishment of the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports (MECYS) and a whole range of 
administrative, legal and financial issues (Ibid.).  
Overall, during the first five-year phase following the referendum four were the 
priorities that shaped the reform of education: (1) reopening the schools with the goal of 
establishing some sense of normalcy by bringing children back to school; (2) teacher 
recruitment made on a voluntary base; (3) reintroduction of Portuguese and Tetum as 
languages of instruction; (4) reconstruction of educational infrastructure in a context of 
constrained and limited resources.73 Throughout this phase, three constitutional 
governments were changed, and the system was built in absence of a regulatory 
framework or national educational act. In a context of emergency, the main objective was 
just the provision of education. Nicolai (2004) highlights how the focus on system 
                                                
72 In primary education, the gross enrollment ratio GER rose from 89 percent before 1999 to 110 
percent in 2011 while the net enrollment ratio NER rose from 51 percent to 70 percent.  
73 Interview with former minister of education 2007-2012, 1 July 2013, Dili, East Timor 
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reconstruction in practice amounted to giving priority to physical infrastructure rather 
than policy reform. 
Between 1999 and 2002, intervention initiatives in the education system were 
funded by the World Bank, and they were implemented in partnership with UNTAET and 
other donors. During this period, projects aiming to reconstruct education were poorly 
accountable to local citizens; as with other similar cases, the main focus was on 
documenting achievements to the headquarters, thus undermining the “[l]egitimacy of 
UNTAET’s and the World Bank’s efforts [in education]...[and] promoting mistrust and 
tension” (Millo and Barnett 2004: 730, 734).  
Following the achievement of full independence in 2002, in the aftermath of  the 
peaceful elections of the Constituent Assembly, education was expected to play a leading 
role in the transformation of Timorese society. This is clearly seen by the first National 
Development Plan (NDP), which envisaged a society that was “[w]ell educated, healthy, 
highly productive, democratic, self-reliant, espousing the values of nationalism, non-
discrimination and equity within a global context” (Nicolai 2004: 177). Its goals were: 
“[t]o improve the education status of the people; to contribute to the improvement of the 
economic, social, and cultural well-being of individuals, families, and communities in 
Timor-Leste; and to promote gender equity and empower women in Timor-Leste” (World 
Bank 2004: xviii). 
Key programs in education as elaborated in the NDP aimed to expand education 
access and improve internal efficiency of the school system; improve the quality of 
education; build management capacity and improve service delivery; promote non-formal 
education and adult literacy; promote East Timor culture and arts; promote physical 
education and school sports; promote youth welfare; and develop tertiary education, 
among others (NDP 2002: 152-157).  
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For the World Bank, education is central to the country’s equitable development 
as “[i]t provides a foundation for democratic discourse through literacy; it helps increase 
productivity; and it provides skills and abilities for an increased workforce in the formal 
sector” (2004: xvii). This was confirmed by a national survey which showed that seven 
out of ten Timorese listed it as the top national priority for the country’s future (Planning 
Commission 2002 quoted in Nicolai 2004: 29).  
After 2002, the UN started to devolve powers to the elected national authorities. 
The UN commitment was confirmed but redesigned, and the United Nations Transitional 
Administration gave way to the United Nations Mission of Support (UNMISET). Donor 
engagement remained high and focused on capacity development and strengthening state 
institutions. Capacity development focused on improving fiscal responsibility, 
transparency and accountability in government institutions through the establishment of a 
set of norms and rules. Technocratic solutions were prescribed; the existence of 
embedded social conflict over power and resources within such institutions was ignored 
(Moxham 2008; Hughes 2009). 
Between 2002 and 2005, the assistance approach towards the education system 
shifted from the early reconstruction efforts to more qualitative reforming, focusing on 
pedagogy, content and forms of assessment underpinning education, and teacher 
training/selection. In 2003, with significant donor assistance, the Ministry of Education 
commenced the process of design and implementation of a new curriculum for the 
country’s primary schools (approved in October 2004), which would be better aligned to 
the aspirations of East Timor as a nation and a state, and more relevant and inclusive to 
its citizens. The implementation phase started in 2006 until 2008, with teacher’s guide in 
both official languages and student and teacher textbooks in Portuguese that were 
distributed in schools.  
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While the process of primary curriculum reform was guided by UNICEF, the 
curriculum for secondary education, which started years later (2010), was guided by the 
local government, although design and implementation were once again outsourced to a 
foreign institution, this time the Portuguese University of Aveiro. 
By 2005, East Timor was regarded as a successful example of multilateral 
interventionism that had led to the establishment of a sustainable state and peaceful 
society. Full confidence in the sustainability of the peace process led to the departure of 
the UN mission and the peacekeeping forces (Ballard 2008). Soon after, divisions inside 
the Timorese army spread into the streets of Dili and led to the ‘2006 crisis’. 
During the 2006 crisis, schools were closed and the emergency needs of restoring 
educational provision postponed the longer term plan for curriculum reform. From being 
a ‘successful example of state-building’ the country was downgraded to the status of 
‘failed state’.74	  An International Stabilisation Force (ISF) that included a large contigent 
from Australia and New Zealand joined the United Nations Integrated Mission (UNMIT), 
which was extended up to December 2012 and aimed at supporting the government in 
restoring stability, security, rule of law, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, 
and fostering greater social cohesion amongst citizens.  
Since 2006, the security situation in the country has considerably improved: the 
government has gradually taken control of all core state functions, and its action has been 
fuelled by oil revenues, with economic growth reaching unprecedented growth rates of 12 
percent per annum (Taylor 2011). Among other things the return to political stability 
meant that education reform continued. In 2008, the government claimed that the new 
primary curriculum was successfully being introduced. In 2010, the Prime Minister 
revealed a 20-year strategic plan for development focusing on human resource 
development and infrastructural improvement. According to the plan, “[T]imor-Leste has 
                                                
74 Since 2008, the country has been listed as a failed state according to the Fund for Peace Failed 
States Index (http://global.fundforpeace.org/, last accessed on 25 March 2013) 
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entered a period of rapid double-digit growth, extended stability, and growing confidence, 
and the slogan became ‘Adeus Conflito, Bienvenido Desenvolvimento (Goodbye 
Conflict, Welcome Development) (RDTL 2011: 6). By December 2012, following the 
peaceful set of presidential and parliamentary elections in the summer of 2012, the ISF 
and UNMIT mission withdrew from the country. 
Since then, three ministers of education have been changed within the same 
constitutional government. The reduction of the National Institute for Training of 
Teachers and Education Professionals’ (INFORDEPE) funds suggests that teacher 
training is not a priority despite the existing gaps in the sector.75 Some of the interviews 
on the ground confirm that the focus of the current ministry of education has been on 
vocational training and pre-school education.76 Recent primary curriculum reform 
(discussed in detail in section 6.3) focusing on language and local context suggests an 
attempt to tackle and address those problematic issues pertaining the relevance of 
education content-wise.  
 
 Education between the referendum and the transitional phase 
 
While local communities engaged in activities for re-establishing schooling, the 
international community arranged its emergency response in line with the Joint 
Assessment Mission (JAM) which gathered information regarding the damage of the 
education sector and its needs, ultimately identifying short-term reconstruction initiatives. 
UNICEF acted initially as the ministry of education given the struggle over legitimacy 
and authority between UNTAET and the CNRT. Special focus from UNTAET, CNRT, 
                                                
75 Interview with international consultant, INFORDERPE, Ministry of Education, 9 July 2013, Dili, 
East Timor 
76 Interview with New Zealand Aid advisor within the Ministry of Education on pre-school level, 18 
June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with head of education section, AusAid, 17 July 2013, Dili, East 
Timor 
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the Catholic Church, several INGOs or local organizations and UNICEF itself were given 
to educational provision, in particular for children and young students with special needs, 
and for children separated from their families (Nicolai 2004: 20, 73). Moreover, several 
local associations addressed the needs of adolescents and youths with initiatives that 
sought to integrate them educationally and socially (Nicolai 2004: 20).  
The JAM, co-ordinated by the World Bank, and composed by a team of major 
donors, UN agencies and East Timorese specialists, assessed the situation and the needs 
of eight sectors (including education) during a ten-day mission in November 1999. 
According to the JAM report, the destruction of education was so widespread (more than 
95 per cent of schools and education institutions were destroyed) that it required repair or 
reconstruction. Beside reconstruction, teacher recruitment and training was the other 
pressing issue as around 80 percent of administrative staff and secondary teacher (at both 
junior and secondary level) had departed (World Bank 1999: 6). Other issues identified 
were the feasibility of official languages at the school level, and the sustainability of the 
education system which it was suggested had to be redesigned in stark contrast with the 
former Indonesian system that was characterized by mass education and a large and 
ineffective administrative body (JAM 1999).  
JAM identified four urgent priorities in the education sector: (1) primary and 
secondary education (coupled with rehabilitation and repair of classrooms); (2) teacher 
training and (administrative) capacity building; (3) education and training for out of 
school youth; (4) tertiary and technical education (JAM 1999). Of this priorities, only the 
first recommendation has been addressed quite successfully despite still existing 
challenges. Recommendations regarding teacher training and the low youth and adult 
literacy levels were overlooked in subsequent reforms.  
The return to schools and their opening were in the beginning a job made by the 
local communities’ willingness and efforts. Schools and teacher recruitment were 
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functioning on an ad-hoc basis, yet shortage of teachers especially at secondary level of 
education increased the student/teacher ratio. Teachers, initially working on a voluntarily 
base, were organized and paid by UNICEF and later on by UNTAET.  According to 
Doyle (2001), while everything else was missing, local communities were inspired and 
enthusiastic to bring their children back to school. Local communities organized District 
Education Committees that were responsible for data collection, school feeding 
programmes, supply distribution (JAM 1999).  
Schools officially opened one year later in October 2000, yet primary schooling 
during the first year gained significant results and the World Bank stated that “[t]he 
massive increase in enrolment by the poor, girls and rural children” was the “[m]ost 
phenomenal accomplishment” (WU 2002: 2). Net enrolment in primary education rose 
from 65 percent before the referendum to 75 percent by 2000 (TFET 2002).  According to 
Wu, it narrowed “[g]aps in school participation rates between the richest and the poorest, 
boys and girls, and urban and rural areas” (2002: 2).  
As in other post-conflict contexts, the destruction of the former Indonesian system 
provided with the opportunity to spur change regarding educational policies and 
curriculum design. In particular, this was translated in the introduction of “[p]ro-poor 
policies such as the removal of school fees, examination fees, and the withdrawal of 
required uniforms”, which contributed to the rise of net enrolment in primary education 
(United Nations 2000: 64). 
Two levels of education - i.e., early childhood and secondary education - were 
neglected during the emergency phase, both in terms of national priorities and donor-
funded activities (United Nations 2000: 63). Secondary education was re-established 
according to the Indonesian model, but enrolment rates declined comparing to the pre-
1999 level (Joint Donor Education Sector Mission 2000).  
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Technical and vocational training had little success with shortage of teachers and 
equipment (Sanderson 2001). During Indonesia, the TVET had little connection with the 
needs of the workplace (UNDP 2002). During the transitional phase 10 schools were 
opened which provided training in agriculture, construction, electronics, manufacturing, 
tourism, oil and gas and small businesses. The rationale behind the choise of which 
sectors to prioritize in technical education was based upon reported labour shortages 
(Nicolai 2004: 86).  
In terms of higher education, the National University of East Timor (UNATIL) 
opened unexpectedly in October 2000 due to pressure by 6,000 students and one of the 
early problems was over-enrolment. Immediately after, a number of private institutions of 
higher education were opened, and by 2003 there were 14 of them, a disproportionate 
number for a country with such a small population (La’o Hamutuk 2003). Moreover, 
between 1999 and 2002, there were approximately 170 Catholic schools and 26 non-
Church private schools operating in East Timor (UNDP 2002: 50). The Catholic Church 
played a significant role in re-establishing the education system in the early days, from 
encouraging local communities to re-start government-run schools to re-starting its own.  
During this phase, adult literacy received a small amount of funding despite 
“[E]ast Timor high illiteracy levels” which were then at around 55 percent with 
differences between urban and rural areas respectively at 18 percent and 63 percent 
(World Bank 2002a: 21; UNDP 2002: 27). In the 2002 budget, the overall expenditure for 
non-formal education and language training was 3 percent (World Bank 2002a: 21). Non-
formal education has been provided on a small-scale and has been led by local NGOs 
such as GFFTL, which focused on literacy courses in the Tetum language (Silva 2002). 
Brasil has targeted a portion of 3,500 adults through a literacy programme called 
Alfabetizaçao Solidària and a programme called Telessalas which used television to 
improve the language skills of those already speaking Portuguese (UNDP 2002: 54).  
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In this context categories requiring a special support (as they face barriers to 
access) typically included girls, children with disabilities, and children from minority 
religious groups. Moreover, other categories whose educational opportunities were 
affected by the 1999 violence were included: children from rural areas, separated 
children, and adolescents. In primary school, gender parity was achieved early; albeit, this 
was not the case in upper grades where the gender gap is wider (Planning Commission 
2002 quoted in Nicolai 2004: 89). While – perhaps tellingly - ethnicity has not played an 
important role in access to education, religion has: by 2004 there was only one Islamic 
school in Dili (Nicolai 2004: 89).  
Rural/urban inequality patterns in educational access were reinforced following 
the 1999 referendum especially at the secondary level of education. Restoring boarding 
facilities for secondary education in rural areas were a low priority for donor partners. 
Exception here were the World Food Program (WFP) that arranged programmes of food 
supplies and the UNHCR providing blankets and cooking utensils (Nicolai 2004: 91).  
In 2001, Oxfam (Great Britain) and UNICEF assessed the education needs of 
rural East Timor: their goal was to “[p]ublicize the educational needs of people living 
outside the urban areas of East Timor, especially those in rural and remote communities” 
(Field et al., 2002: 1). Their research revealed that rural communities had no sense of how 
education could improve their lives. What emerged as relevant educational issues for 
rural communities were language difficulties faced by teachers and students that had to 
conform to the introduction of Portuguese with the majority not being able to speak it. 
Others stressed the need for adult literacy classes in Tetum and others emphasised the 
long distances for reaching junior seconday school (Field et al., 2002: 34).  
Adolescents and youth were categories that did not directly and immediately 
benefited from the increased enrolment rates in primary education. By 2001, enrolment 
rates of those over the age of 14 were lower than in 1998 (Wu 2002: 2). Nicolai argues 
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that “[C]onsequences of neglecting this area have included delinquency, unemployment 
and human resource development problems” (2004: 93). Young people were important in 
building networks, organizing protests and in preparations during the voter education 
campaign prior to the 1999 consultation (Nicolai 2000: 9).  The International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) together with local NGOs and student organizations were involved in 
non-formal education by organizing lesson plans to be used by youth study groups in 
discussion-based activities. The groups that took part in this project were (Nicolai 2000: 
21):  
 
• Forum Democracy Maubere (Fordem) established by East Timorese students 
studying in Indonesia, whose aim was the promotion of people’s democracy 
movements and who organized lessons on indigenous culture. 
• IMPETU was formerly established and organized by the Indosian military to 
support East Timor’s integration, it was taken over by pro-independence students 
that were working on a civic education programme and were involved in writing 
lessons on reconciliation.  
• East Timor Teacher(s) Association was involved in teacher training and the 
design of high school curricula, specifically writing lessons on traditional story 
writing. 
• Grupo Feto FoinSae Timor LoroSae (GFFTL) was organized in 1998 with the 
aim of increasing women involvement in the political dialogue. Following the 
referendum they focused on a literacy campaign. 
• Commisaun Direito Humano Timor LoroSae (CDHTL) was established by young 
people working on post-conflict human rights. They were involved in civic 
education and writing lessons on conflict resolution.  
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Albeit locally-based and involving original activities, most of these groups ceased to exist 
after the first three years that followed the referendum.  
 
Education in the transition to independence 
 
In the second phase (August 2000-May 2002), the East Timor Transitional 
Administration (ETTA) – jointly formed by UNTAET and CNRT – took the lead in 
education through its Education Division. ETTA was an attempt for overcoming the 
competing leaderships between UNTAET and CNRT that had operated during the first 
year as two parallel structures. According to Yiftach Millo, in education this meant “[a] 
dual system of authority, with CNRT’s legitimacy rooted in support at the local level, and 
the UNTAET’s legitimacy rooted in international law” (Millo and Barnett 2003: 9). Such 
confusion over leadership hampered decision-making in the moment in which needs were 
more urgent (Nicolai 2004: 98). The process of power-sharing that led to the merge of 
structures and staff came to be known as ‘Timorisation’.  
During the transition to independence the focus remained rebuilding educational 
infrastructure and bringing children back to school, while policy problems and quality 
issues were postponed (World Bank 2002b: 58). Moreover, scarce efforts were directed 
towards addressing decentralization. ETTA took over the management of the multi-donor 
Emergency School Readiness Project (ESRP), which aimed to ensure safety in school 
buildings, provide furniture and other learning materials, and management support 
(Nicolai 2004: 21).  
Within the framework of ESRP, the focus remained on collecting and providing 
materials for primary schools, for which textbooks were acquired from Portugal, 
Indonesia and Finland. Portugal and Brasil were providing materials for pre-secondary 
and secondary education. The transitional curriculum that was introduced had a strong 
Indonesian base. Controversial content related to history and national identity was 
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removed from the Indonesian textbooks. Textbooks were chosen based upon familiarity 
rather than any link with real education aims for the future (Nicolai 2004: 110). 
Portuguese was introduced as the language of instruction in years one and two.  
Moving from issues of infrastructural rehabilitation and delving more into 
classrooms and the policy-making process throughout transition, Doyle argues that 
“[E]ast Timor seems like a case of lots of project and activity underway, but little policy 
development underpinning them” (2001 quoted in Nicolai 2004: 114). The reluctance to 
be involved with policy issues stemmed in part from the nature of the international 
administration. According to Gorjao, “[O]n the one hand, [international transitional 
administrations] have enormous influence concerning the political decisions to be taken 
during the transition to democracy... On the other hand, their lack of a democratic 
mandate constrains significantly their political power” (2002: 230).  
Despite the fact that the World Bank (2002b) emphasized the important role that 
teachers had to play to improve the quality of education, there were only few efforts in 
terms of training and professional development during the transition. Developing 
teachers’ skills was deemed a priority from UNDP (2002) given the low levels of 
qualification and experience of the new teacher workforce. Teachers were facing 
challenges in terms of missing proficiency in Portuguese, teaching without a finalized 
curriculum and the need for incorporating a different pedagogy based upon active 
learning methods and multi-grade teaching (Nicolai 2004: 117). Yet, as UNICEF (2002) 
had warned, there was a lack of substantial attempts to effectively train teachers. 
Curriculum development was postponed to a later stage, in spite of its being a 
precondition for other related educational issues, such as textbook selection, in-service 
teacher training and students learning outcomes.  
Throughout those phases, and since independence language has been a divisive 
issue, with the East Timorese leadership opting strongly for the re-introduction of 
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Portuguese as language of instruction as early as grade one. The decision had 
implications in terms of teacher performance (recruitment and training) and quality of 
students’ learning achievements, which are felt still today. Governance issues related to 
authority, decentralization and corruption hampered the broader process of reform: as 
section 3.2 (below) will show, donors’ support was influenced mainly by geopolitical 
rationales and/or historical links.  
During the two years that led to indipendence, education reform remained heavily 
focused on infrastructural reconstruction. The ESRP’s implementation completion report 
concluded that the “[t]ransitional government authority made it impossible... to reach a 
consensus on policy formulation issues”, not tackling issues as urgent and relevant as the 
“[s]tructure of the MECYS, the national education law, teacher training, curriculum 
reform and production and distribution of teaching-learning materials” (World Bank 
2003: 3). Reflecting upon that period, Millo and Barnett argues that “[w]hile attempts at 
educational reconstruction were partially successful, the opportunity for transformation 
was missed” (2003: 8).  
 
Education in the new country 
 
In the aftermath of independence, the only framework within which education policy was 
formalized into law was the Constitution of Timor-Leste, which laid out the most basic 
principles of the new political order. With specific regard to education, the Constitution 
(Section 59) states that “[a] public system of universal and compulsory basic education 
[...] that is free of charge in accordance with its possibilities and in conformity with the 
law” has to be supported. Emphasis is put to ensuring access to each level of education 
for every citizen. Yet, education for youth and vocational training has to be promoted 
“[a]s may be practicable” (Section 19).  
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Areas of priority for intervention and further development were identified the 
following: a National Education Law providing state policy on education; a Law and 
regulation on private schools; a Law or Charter for the National University of Timor-
Leste; guidelines on the national curriculum, for primary and secondary levels of 
education (Ministry of Planning and Finance 2002: 6). According to the World Bank, “[a] 
commitment to ensuring that all children complete at least primary school should be the 
top priority – and is achievable in the first years of independence” (2002b: 66). The 
expansion of junior secondary education “[w]ill depend on [the supply of trained 
teachers] and the availability of additional resources” (Ibid.) 
Educational planning in the aftermath of independence and its essential role for 
East Timor’s development was based upon: first, the National Development Plan 
(developed a few months before indipendence), which set a 20-year vision including 
programmes of action; second, a Countrywide Consultation which found that “70 per cent 
of the population prioritized education as the most important sector to be developed for 
the country’s future” (Planning Commission 2002: 143); third, a poverty assessment and 
eight working groups within the minister of education.77 According to the National 
Development Plan, interventions in the education sector should expand access, improve 
service delivery and quality. In the short-term, consolidating reconstruction was set as the 
priority, focusing on enhancing educational provision, and building human and 
institutional capacities. In the longer term, the aim was curricula development, 
prioritizing teacher training and enhancing management efficiency. Gender issues and 
adult literacy programmes were also mentioned in the National Development Plan.  
 
6.1.3 Challenges in the education sector: access vs. quality? 
 
                                                
77 Interview with former director of Planning and Curriculum, Ministry of Education, 26 June 2013, 
Dili, East Timor 
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Throughout the fifteen years that constitute my observation period, the system has faced a 
number of challenges in terms of access, distribution, internal efficiency, student 
achievement, and sectorial management capacity (World Bank 2004: xviii).  
In terms of access, Timorese children tend to either enter school late or drop out 
early, with such problems most prominent in rural areas. While access to education has 
been expanded since independence, dropouts and repetition rates remain high and are 
“highly correlated to poverty” (World Bank 2004: 33). Enrollment numbers have put the 
system under pressure, since “[t]he number of students enrolled in East Timor’s schools 
reached 364,000 in 2014 – a 50 percent jump in 12 years.” (Harson 2015). Yet, the 
government’s most important targets of reaching the Millennium Development Goals of 
gender parity in enrollment by 2005 and universal enrollment in and completion of 
primary education by 2015 have not been met.  
As a matter of fact, access to schools in rural areas is still a problem with primary 
schools/pre-secondary schools having very poor infrastructure.78 A large access gap 
between urban and rural areas remains, with gross enrollment rate at pre-secondary and 
secondary level at 100 percent for urban residents and only 60 percent for rural residents 
(Ramos and Patrinos 2015), while 10 percent of children have never enrolled.  
The schools face different challenges. Studies point out that despite the 
construction and the rehabilitation of more than 570 school buildings, after more than a 
decade of UN intervention and independence, there is a significant shortage in the 
number of schools, with most of them remaining underfunded and/or lacking basic 
infrastructure and sanitation facilities (World Bank 2014). One of the most problematic 
aspects is a persistent shortage of trained teachers (many of them have completed only 
secondary education) in a context in which approximately 58 percent of the adult 
population remains illiterate (UNICEF 2013). Other challenges concern a high degree of 
                                                
78 Interview with director, NGO La’o Hamutuk, 25 June 2013, Dili, East Timor 
 225 
student/teacher absenteeism, a culture of violence in schools from teachers which have a 
background from the past teaching practices (Portuguese and Indonesian),79 difficulties 
with the language of instruction, curriculum’s lack of relevance, a mismatch between 
skills and the job market with persisting high rates of unemployment (World Bank 2004: 
xix, 33).  
Quality issues are a major problem with student learning outcomes remaining 
problematic and this has been increasingly acknowledged by international donors too. 
Recent economic data show that on average it takes children 11,2 years to complete six 
years of primary schooling (MoE 2010). According to a World Bank study, 70 per cent of 
Grade One students fail to read a single word in Portuguese and the native Tetum 
language, decreasing to 40 percent by the end of Grade Two (World Bank 2009). This has 
led a number of major donors in education reform such as the World Bank, AUSAid, 
New Zealand Aid shifting their discourses and priorities in educational assistance towards 
quality of education (learning outcomes) for all levels of formal and non-formal 
education rather than quantity (number of students enrolled and access to education).80 
Despite these challenges, the education sector seems less of a priority for the 
current government, as data from 2012-2013 show that the rise in education budget has 
been from 0.1 to 0.4 percent, with considerable resources invested in overseas 
scholarships.81 Government expenditure on education went from 13 percent in 2004 to 25 
percent in 2010 (Ramos and Patrinos 2015). However, in the 2013 state budget only 8,4 
percent were invested in education (Marx and Pinhero 2013), 11 percent in 2004, with 
                                                
79 Interview with former Director of Planning and Curriculum, Ministry of Education, 26 June 2013, 
Dili, East Timor 
80 Interview with New Zealand Aid advisor within the Ministry of Education on pre-school level, 18 
June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with international World Bank advisor within the Ministry of 
Education on Recurrent and Non-formal education, 24 June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with 
Social Protection and Education Economist, World Bank, 28 June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview 
with international advisor, UNESCO, 9 July 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with head of education 
section, AusAid, 17 July 2013, Dili, East Timor 
81 Interview with Director, NGO La’o Hamutuk, 25 June 2013, Dili, East Timor 
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percentages decreasing at less than 7 percent for the 2015 budget for education (Harson 
2015).  
These figures point to the opposite direction of the Incheon Declaration, which 
calls for increasing “[p]ublic spending on education […] and urge adherence to the 
international and regional benchmarks of allocating efficiently at least 4-6% of Gross 
Domestic Product and/or at least 15-20% of total public expenditure to education.”82 As 
an interviewee suggested, rather than on building the state apparatus through education, 
the main preoccupation in Dili seems to have become forming a small elite of 
government bureaucrats and people working in the oil industry.83  
This seems to be in contraddiction with a speech that the then Prime Minister 
Xanana Gusmao addressed to the UN in New York in 2012, in which the role of 
education to the country’s aspiration of overcoming conflict and bringing development 
was confirmed by, claiming that “[E]ducation not only changes the loves of people [...] it 
drives the future of nations” (ETAN 2012). A growing gap exists between what is stated 
in the main documents regarding educational priorities and what has been effectively 
invested in education in the past years.  
To sum up, as in other post-conflict settings, the focus of externally assisted 
reforms in the initial period 1999-2002 was on educational reconstruction. In a second 
phase, after the country became independent, the focus shifted towards pedagogy and 
curriculum reform, with access remaining the priority together with teacher training. By 
the end of the observation period, quality issues (e.g., learning outcomes) were 
dominating the discourse(s) proposed by those international donors that are engaged in 
education reform.  
                                                
82 Incheon Declaration, Education 2030: Towards inclusive and equitable quality education and 
lifelong learning for all, World Education Forum, 19-22 May 2015, Incheon, Republic of Korea 
83 Interview with Director, NGO La’o Hamutuk, 25 June 2013, Dili, East Timor 
 227 
More than a decade after independence, poverty, poor school infrastructure, a 
shortage of quality teachers and language issues remain major challenges in the education 
system (Harson 2015). For many years, the main emphasis has been on primary education 
while the last government’s emphasis has shifted towards pre-school education84 and 
vocational education. The focus on vocational training may suggest that the nexus 
between education, employment and the demographic structure of the Timorese society is 
no longer only evoked, but also that it has started to be tackled,85 although to date a 
proper strategy has not emerged. The fact that the education sector itself has never 
featured as key for peacebuilding and statebuilding might help us understanding why.  
 
6.2 The hybrid governance of education 
 
Hybridity in the governance of education reform refers to the fact that the education 
sector, once a national prerogative (often an exclusive national domain), is increasingly 
shaped and reformed in the interplay between international and local actors that operate 
in, through and beyond the nation-state, as chapter four and the current one show. In the 
aftermath of the 1999 Timorese referendum, and of the violence that followed shortly 
afterwards, international organizations did not have a formal mandate for intervention in 
the education sector. Yet, the UN mission sat on a governing role, having full authority 
for managing the territory, including ensuring service provision, and therefore education.  
 
6.2.1 Donors engagement and the relationship with the local leadership  
 
In took almost one year for UNTAET to have some sorts of leadership in education 
reform. In the beginning education was managed by UNTAET District Administrators 
                                                
84 The situation in pre-school education has been one in which there have been more private pre-
schools than public ones. 
85 Interview with New Zealand Aid advisor within the Ministry of Education on pre-school level, 18 
June 2013, Dili, East Timor 
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and each district office was assigned a District Education Officer that was hiring local 
staff (World Bank 2000). As mentioned above, UNTAET’s education efforts were 
directed towards the first priority as recommended by JAM - i.e., bringing children back 
to school.  
In the absence of a national education authority during the emergency period, 
UNICEF took the lead becoming a de facto Ministry of Education (Nicolai 2004: 75). It 
provided basic education supplies through the ‘School-In-A-Box’ kit; took the lead in 
managing repair and re-roof of schools; it also launched a psychosocial programme called 
Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) implemented at eight different sites. In the aftermath of 
independence, UNICEF commitment continued in the areas of teacher training and 
curriculum development (UNICEF 2002).  
In the months following the referendum, CNRT had started establishing District 
Education Committees made up mainly by a voluntary team of central education 
administrators (World Bank 2000: 6). CNRT education representatives were better 
informed of local realities than internationals (Doyle 2001). As mentioned above, CNRT 
and UNTAET worked in parallel (rather than partnership) in the education sector. While 
more informed and rooted to the local context, CNRT’s education division was 
characterized by “[i]nexperience and [...] a top-down management culture that left people 
with little confidence to take decisions” (UNDP 2002: 49). The Catholic Church was one 
of the first local players to quickly re-open its schools and encourage communities to 
open public schools. While quality of Catholic schools and its authority were not put into 
discussion, the relationship with international agencies was not smooth or 
straightforward, leading to an absence of co-ordination in the emergency response to 
educational provision (Doyle 2001).  
Among the international players in education reform as from the emergency 
phase, the World Bank has been a key one. It co-ordinated the JAM and administered the 
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education grant from the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET). The World Food Programme 
(WFP) was responsible for a large school feeding programme, providing daily snacks 
(WFP 2001).  
During the transitional period, education reform remained heavily reliant upon 
donors’ contributions. Such reliance had implications for legitimacy as the extensive role 
that the international community had in setting the education agenda implied that 
“[a]ccountability was therefore primarily to foreign stakeholders and the UN in New 
York.” (Millo and Barnett 2003: 9). During this period, UNTAET and the broader 
international community prioritized education, which budget-wise was second to 
infrastructure in funds allocations. Multi-donor funds represented the bulk in education 
investments. Contributions from Portugal and Brasil came through individual support to 
education, focusing on strengthening Portuguese as the language of instruction, language 
training for teachers, textbooks procurement, non-formal education through literacy 
campaigns and vocational education (Nicolai 2004: 101). 
The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) provided 
capacity building through consultancy on school-reconstruction, technical and vocational 
training, and co-funding teacher training. The Japanese International Co-operation 
Agency (JICA) supported infrastructural reconstruction too. USAID and the European 
Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO) supported school rehabilitation (Joint 
Donor Education Sector Mission 2000). A number of international donors supported 
university students through scholarships to complete their studies in Indonesia or 
undertake them at universities in supporting countries. Some of these supporting donors 
included Portugal, Australia, Ireland, Norway, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Caritas 
Norway through its Bishop Belo Scholarship Program (La’o Hamutuk 2002).   
Throughout the transition years the most important, large-scale effort to restore 
the education sector was the School System Revitalization Programme (SSRP), which 
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was regarded as a sector-wide approach to education assistance. Administered by the 
World Bank, representatives from UNTAET’s Division of Education and CNRT, and 
designed according to findings from the JAM education assessment, CNRT’s pre-
consultation work on education, its overall purpose was “[t]o improve the quality and 
relevance of education available to East Timorese children and youth” (World Bank 
2000: 3).  
In the first phase, ESRP’s emphasis was on rebuilding school infrastructure with 
an overall emphasis on primary education. In the second phase, the Fundamental School 
Quality Project (FSQP) followed on the ESRP. Reconstruction and restoring primary and 
secondary education enrolment to the pre-1999 levels were confirmed as priorities but 
there was a shift in emphasis towards recovering quality by re-building quality standards 
schools and by providing instructional materials (World Bank 2001b). 
The ESRP was a success in terms of infrastructural rehabilitation and distribution 
of instructional materials. It was criticized for being “[t]oo heavily focused on 
infrastructure, too centralized and too reliant on CNRT information alone” (Nicolai 2004: 
104). Issues outside physical reconstruction, such as the need for a national education 
law, curriculum reform and MECYS’ work were neglected. Moreover, some of its 
assumptions regarding “[d]ouble-shifting, community participation and distribution of 
materials, were not realized” (Ibid.).  
After independence, the role of multilateral and bilateral partners shifted from one 
substituting the state in delivering core services to one aiding state institutions for 
efficiently and effectively delivering services to its citizens; “[i]n this transition, within 
the framework of aid effectiveness, the international community is following rather than 
leading the state towards stability and long-term development” (Shah 2011: 71-72).  
Between 2002-2004, Portugal was the leading player in teacher training because it 
met the need of the national government to introduce Portuguese as one of the two 
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official languages in the classrooms. In the aftermath of the war, approximately 20 
percent of primary teachers and 80 percent of secondary teachers left the teaching 
profession permanently and relocated in Indonesia (UNESCO 2008: 122). A major need 
and challenge in the period of emergency and reconstruction was thus to recruit and 
introduce in the system a new workforce of teachers.  
Teacher training was organized on an ad-hoc basis failing to reach most of the 
teachers, especially in rural areas. Education remained heavily influenced by the logic of 
emergency whereas “[t]eacher training and administrative capacity-building were treated 
as being of lower priority” (King’s College London 2003: 253). 
A number of studies assessing the progress of East Timor’s educational system 
agree on the fact that the approach ‘access first, quality later’ adopted by UNTAET and 
the national government had determined a number of long-term problems, such as high 
student attrition rates and low student achievement (Millo and Barnett 2004; Nicolai 
2004; Beck 2008; World Bank 2004). However, throughout those years (and until 2008) 
in-service training provision of primary and secondary teachers was considered as one of 
the priorities by a number of donors and by the same national government (Shah 2011: 
75).  
Provision of teacher training mirrored well the limitations and the problems of 
reconstructing education system through a plethora of local and international actors. 
Training provision was plagued by fragmentation, competition, duplication of efforts, 
poor coordination, monitoring and accountability, leading to inefficient use of teacher’s 
time and resources that were invested in these programmes (Romiszowski 2005; World 
Bank 2009).  
As far as cooperation was concerned, the subsequent partnership arrangements 
between the international actors and the Ministry of Education shifted the locus of power 
within the education sector from being one driven by donors’ agenda(s) to one articulated 
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by the Ministry of Education (Shah 2011).86 One of the dilemmas that the donors 
involved in the education system have increasingly faced in the last years has been 
whether to support the state in its drive to efficiently qualify all teachers (often focusing 
more on quantity and outcomes rather than quality and impact), or – alternatively – to 
target and tailor interventions in the sector to meet the actual needs of the teachers. 
Leading donors have often opted for the first scenario, while smaller donors such as the 
Norwegian Refugee Council have followed the second option, finding themselves 
excluded in the process of education reform (Shah 2011).   
During the period under observation (1999-2014), the leading international actors 
in the education sector in terms of reconstruction, reform and capacity-/system-building 
have remained the World Bank, AusAID, UNICEF,87 and - to a smaller degree - New 
Zealand Aid. They have remained key players at times interchangeably, taking either the 
position of donor or service provider. Throughout this period, Portugal and Brazil have 
been working with the Timorese national authorities on a cooperative basis.  
 
6.2.2  Civil society and education 
 
Of those international NGOs that were mainly active during the emergency phase, and 
whose focus was non-formal education, one may mention the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), Oxfam Great Britain (GB), Save the Children US, Timor Aid, the 
International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT), the Jesuit Refugee 
Service (JRS). Local NGOs such as Grupu Feto Foinsa’e Timor Lorosa’e (GFFTL), and 
KSI and Sahe Institute that focused on literacy education. 
                                                
86 Cooperation and co-ordination between international and local actors have been problematic since 
the beginning. In the aftermath of the 1999 referendum and ensuing violence, OCHA coordinated all 
humanitarian efforts. Subsequently, UNICEF took this role (due also to the fact that it led the sectoral 
Working Group for Education). Until independence, the UNTAET Division of Education was 
responsible for co-ordinating efforts in education reform and provision. 
87 Despite several attempts at approaching past or current UNICEF officials, I received no reply, thus I 
was not able to interview any representative from the organization. 
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The NGO Forum, a co-ordinating platform for local and international NGOs 
engaged in policy formation, together with Oxfam GB, launched in 2000 an education 
working group that included 21 civil society organizations. In June 2001, it presented a 
paper which criticised the lack of a coherent national vision or strategy for education 
from the side of UNTAET. The paper argued that the difficulty for civil society actors to 
engage in education reform was partly due to the lack of such a strategy (Millo and 
Barnett 2003: 13).  
In the first years, there was resistance on the part of the local leadership with 
regard to interventions and initiatives on education coming from non-profit, civil society 
actors that went beyond the focus on rehabilitation of school infrastructure (Doyle 2001). 
As Nicolai reports from several interviews, at the beginning  “[m]ost NGOs did not seem 
to see education as an emergency issue at first, when they showed interest in the sector 
they were rebuffed by the centre” (2004: 127).  
One of the most active NGOs in education was OXFAM GB, which in 1999 had 
set up a programme on education and civil society focusing on in-service teacher training, 
specifically organizing workshops on children-centred teaching and approaches to dealing 
with conflict-affected children (Nicolai 2004: 127). As it was not feasible working on the 
formal education sector, OXFAM GB re-focused its activities on non-formal education 
and literacy programmes working with local women’s organizations. Timor Aid, founded 
by the East Timorese from the Diaspora, was another NGO that focused its commitment 
towards literacy education (Timor Aid 2002). 
Another international agency active in education was the Jesuit Refugee Service 
(JRS), which focused on supporting Catholic Schools in areas around Dili, Luro and 
Maliana by providing teacher training methodology. One of the rare projects that 
addressed the psychological needs and recovery of the children through schools and 
which involved partnership between an international NGO and East Timorese teachers 
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was conceived and implemented by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture 
Victims (IRCT) in 2001. Teachers were trained for delivering classes that emphasized 
play, song and co-operative group work with contents drawing on East Timorese culture. 
It resulted in a guidebook called ‘Trauma recovery through play’ and in its second year 
the project added a number of peace education modules, with a geographical reach 
beyond the capital (IRCT 2002).  
Another organization that worked with peace education during this period was the 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), through a programme called Culture of Peace focusing 
on peace building in community-based organizations and targeting in particular young 
people. Within this programme the CRS collaborated with local organizations to work 
with in and out of school youth groups. Through participatory workshops a school peer 
mediation programme was developed which focused on conflict resolution and 
communication skills (Nicolai 2004: 91). 
 
6.2.3 The capacity gap: discourse and reality 
 
In the first years following the 1999 referendum, the terms of UNTAET’s ‘direct 
governance versus capacity building’ were not always clear: “[U]NTAET staff members 
often worked diligently in an effort to carry out their technical functions at the expense of 
transferring skills to their counterparts” (King’s College London 2003: 256). 
The interviews that I conducted reveal that the logics and approaches of donor 
partners in terms of building capacity within the Ministry of Education or at the broader 
sectoral level have been mainly divergent instead of convergent. While the relationship 
and the power dynamics have since the beginning been far from smooth, in the past few 
years they have considerably changed, moving towards a greater decision-making power 
and a more pro-active role on the part of local actors. In brief, local and international 
voices agree on the fact that the change of the Timorese government in 2012, the 
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elaboration of the g7+ agenda for statebuilding (2010-2011), and the withdrawal of the 
UN mission by December 2012, have led to a change of approach vis-à-vis donor partners 
from the side of local actors. In the specific case of education, this has meant that the 
political will emerging is one that sees the minister of education and the vice ministers 
willing to take technical and political decisions, from the macro to the micro level. 
Some interviews confirmed the confusion that exists with regard to different 
modes of international assistance and intervention, particularly between capacity building 
and technical assistance. The official discourses as they emerged from interviews with 
both international and local staff emphasized the fact that ownership was and is local, 
especially with regard to the political decisions that had to be taken. In particular, some of 
the international staff working for donor partners were very keen on drawing clear lines 
between technical vis-à-vis political decisions, the former usually taken by international 
donors or international consultant working within the ministry of education while the 
latter usually taken by local actors. ‘Technicising’ the fundamentally political nature of 
assistance in education carries a risk of   depoliticization of decisions, with implications 
in terms of responsibilities and accountability of the decision maker.  
A relevant problematic aspect, on which the literature and field interviews tend to 
converge, is the fundamental absence of coordination among international actors with 
regard to education.88 Lack of coordination is also observed among local and international 
counterparts, within the Ministry of Education and among different ministries.89 
According to a local advisor within the Ministry of Education, there is little coordination 
among national/regional/district offices. Lack of coordination, absence of a clear vision 
                                                
88 Interview with local advisor on Human Resources Development, Ministry of Education, 20 June 
2013, Dili, East Timor 
89 Interview with local advisor on capacity assessment, Ministry of Education, 19 June 2013, Dili, East 
Timor; interview World Bank international advisor within the Ministry of Education on Recurrent and 
Non-formal education, 24 June 2013, Dili, East Timor 
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and the overweight of (international) advisors mainly concentrated in Dili is reflected in 
poor policy implementation.90  
One of the most contentious issues in the governance of education reform and 
assistance remains the role and presence of international advisors/consultants. This has 
been one of the recurrent themes in interviews, especially the consequences in terms of 
policy-making and implementation. A relevant number of technical advisors are from 
Portuguese-speaking countries. According to a local advisor within the Ministry of 
Education (MoE), the main problem is that often international advisors/consultants lack 
knowledge about the local reality while being little propensed to coordinate with their 
local counterparts.91  
Most of the interviews acknowledged the widespread lack of capacity within the 
MoE emerged, at the operational, budgeting, accountability level. However, there is also 
widespread recognition that there are a lot of hard-working people within the MoE, which 
remain little incentivized.92 Although international technical advisors have substantially 
shaped and influenced the decision-making process, one has to note that the elaboration 
of strategic choices and the extent to which external advisors or organizations do 
influence decision and policy making increasingly depends on the agency of the (local) 
leadership in each of the directorates.93 
Most of the interviews with international and local actors confirmed that 
education was built and reformed with the expectation that it would contribute to 
peacebuilding. However, none of the interviewees were able to tell me how, nor to 
describe expected causal dynamics, a circumstance that suggests that education has not 
been informed by an explicit reflection on peacebuilding objectives. What emerges from 
                                                
90 Interview with local advisor on capacity assessment, Ministry of Education, 19 June, Dili, East 
Timor 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
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the interviews instead is both an unspecified ‘lack of political will’ problem, and the 
absence of a strategy that could link education, the building of the new state and the 
consolidation of peace.  
 
6.3 Reforming curricula  
 
Motivations to reform curriculum in post-conflict, or post-colonial states 
are often driven by the need to (re)construct a cohesive and publicly 
legitimated national identity that is starkly different to that which existed 
prior (Shah 2012: 31) 
 
In post-conflict situations, education reform is tied to the state’s need to restore public 
trust and regain political legitimacy (Moxham 2008). According to Miller-Grandvaux 
(2009), for education to mitigate rather than exacerbate existing divisions in post-conflict 
societies, it has to be reformed by taking into account principles such as shared 
ownership, trasparency of decision making and community participation. 
Curriculum reform in East Timor has been part of a broader process of fostering 
social cohesion in the society. The key challenge in post-conflict countries is to identify 
the appropriate time and place for these reforms to occur (Shah 2012). However, in post-
conflict fragile states, there are a number of competing imperatives for rapid curriculum 
reform such as the need to show rapid action from the government to meet access and 
quality benchmarks of global educational agendas or the expectations to reform and adapt 
the curriculum for preparing a labour force for the economic needs (Davies and Talbot 
2008; Al-Daami and Wallace 2007).  
As the curriculum had to deal with “[d]efinitions of Timorese identity, nation 
building, cultural values and religious morality,” its reform was recommended to be 
started at a later state once independence was achieved (Millo and Barnett 2003: 10).  
However, even after independence, the lack from the government of financial and human 
resources for supporting curriculum reform beyond the stated intention to do so, led to a 
situation in which the international community, often through ungovernable flows of 
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assistance, has made significant contributions to support this area of education reform 
(Shah 2012). According to Hughes (2009), large inflows of donor assistance have 
exhausted government’s capacity to effectively deliver services, thus perpetuating a 
condition of fragility and dependency.  
The multiplicity of donor projects within the education sector has made it difficult 
for the Ministry of Education to coordinate and take ownership of reform initiatives. It 
has been specifically the case of the primary (basic) curriculum, funded by UNICEF and 
implemented by a university in Portugal. Concerns have also been raised regarding the 
involvement of Portugal and Brasil in providing human and financial resources to support 
government plans to introduce Portuguese as one of the two official languages in the 
classrooms. According to Millo and Barnett (2004), the introduction of the two official 
languages in the classrooms have been implemented in an unequal way in the curriculum, 
and such an inequality has been in large part determined by the involvement of external 
actors in the process.  
Insights stemming from research conducted in similar contexts confirm the gap 
that exists between well-intentioned policies to the goal of nationbuilding and detrimental 
outcomes to the achievement of such goal because of the involvement of donor 
assistance. (Tawil and Harley 2004; Vongalis-Macrow 2006; Murray 2008). Moreover, 
decisions regarding education have been made within the government without sufficient 
public consultation, dialogue or information-sharing (Molnar 2010), leading to a picture 
of political leadership that is widely recognized as lacking transparency with its 
constituents. In particular, primary curriculum reform in East Timor has missed 
ownership and legitimacy by civil society, widening the gap between the state and its 
citizens, undermining the precursor to building social cohesion that is public trust 
(Colenso 2005 quoted in Shah 2012: 34). 
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According to the World Bank, “[i]mproving the quality of education requires the 
development of a relevant curriculum that addresses the needs of the country, that 
manages the transition of the language of instruction from the child’s mother tongue to 
the official languages of Portuguese and Tetum, the provision of teaching and learning 
materials, and the undertaking of periodic student assessments and continual in-service 
teacher training” (2004: xxiii).  
 
6.3.1 Primary curriculum reform 
 
In 2005 the adoption of the National Development Plan redefined the purpose of 
education in the new state, by explicitely proposing a key role for the development of 
individual capacities and for the overall improvement of the Timorese society. According 
to the plan, education would contribute to the construction of a society that was “[w]ell 
educated, healthy, highly productive, democratic, self-reliant, espousing the values of 
nationalism, non-discrimination and equity within a global context.” (Nicolai 2004: 
177). In the same year, the ratification of the new Constitution defined education as 
a right for all citizens, and the state was expected to create a public education that 
was free, mandatory and universal (Art. 59).  
In 2003, the delegates participating at the first National Education Congress 
recognised that “[t]here is a conception of education, teacher and school that is 
different from the one we now seek...this means we need to change” (MECYS 2007, 
p. 4). What emerged from the Congress and from subsequent reports was a critique of 
the transitional curriculum (1991-2001), which was by all means a continuation of 
the Indonesian curriculum with some minor adaptations (Nicolai 2004). By that time 
it was recorded that a high number of students were withdrawing from school because 
families either perceived what was taught was not reflecting Timorese’s struggle for 
independence or the language in which it was taught was not reflecting society’s needs 
and composition (World Bank 2004, Nicolai 2004). Drafted in 2003 by the Ministry 
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of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport with donor assistance, the first National 
Education Plan reflected the above-mentioned concerns, the need to alter the 
curriculum and effectively promote change.  
The national primary school curriculum plan that included a new curriculum was 
developed throughout 2003 and approved in 2004: it aimed at creating a new system of 
teaching and learning that would both reflect and contribute to build a new post-colonial 
and post-conflict Timorese national identity (Chadwick 2004, MECYS 2004). 
Shah contends that what emerged from discussions regarding the pedagogy, 
content, and implementation was a need for the reform and the curriculum to be 
democratic, i.e., meeting the needs of most students; flexible and locally-based, i.e., 
adapting to local needs and context; inclusive - i.e., explicitely committed to recognizing 
gender, cultural, language and geographical limitations that were embedded in processes 
of teaching and learning (2009: 4-5). The overall goal was to make a curriculum that was 
perceived by teachers, students and the broader society as socially and culturally relevant 
to the context of East Timor (MECYS 2004). The ability to equitably and effectively 
provide mass education was considered to be key to enhancing state legitimacy.  
Content-wise, the curriculum emphasized the need to promote academic fluency 
in both official languages. The development of Tetum was expected to be implemented 
particularly in the lower grades with a gradual transition to Portuguese. Both languages 
were expected to be equally utilised in Mathematics and Environmental Studies (Quinn 
2008). Religion, which had been a mandatory subject under the transitional curriculum, 
became optional. This change reflected the secularist approach adopted by the state and 
enshrined in the new Constitution (Berlie 2007). Called Estudu do Meio, Environmental 
Studies was a new subject that incorporated social sciences, science, geography, history, 
civic education with the goal of developing an understandings of East Timor as a 
nation and as a country at the primary level (Heyward 2005). 
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Reports regarding the implementation of the primary curriculum and interviews 
from the fields both confirm that the reform and implementation of the basic curriculum 
education reform has been hampered by limited institutional capacities, low teachers’ 
skills, and dependency on external donors’ assistance and support. This is recognized by 
governmental officials and development partners in interviews, a fact that confirms that 
the slow path of reforms has been determined by the lack of local ownership, especially 
in the early years. Following the approval of primary curriculum, and other educational 
reforms, teachers have been relying extensively on textbooks in Portuguese due to 
shortage of resources or lack of textbooks in Tetum (Heyward 2005). 
The development and introduction of the primary curriculum represented an 
improvement and the accomplishment of a fundamental need in the education sector: 
however, it was written outside East Timor by non-Timorese, and was characterized by 
limited reference and relevance to East Timor’s context.94 The 1st to 6th grade curriculum 
has been regarded as having serious gaps in terms of contents, which are not anchored to 
local culture and realities. Needless to say, textbooks produced in Portugal have failed to 
address convincingly the links to life, languages, and geography of East Timor.95 
Since a new government took office in 2012, a revision of the primary curriculum 
tried to tackle some of these gaps, limitations and problems - i.e., high drop out and 
repetition rates, low rural enrolment rates, widespread lack of knowledge of Portuguese 
among students and teachers. The revision has involved a group of national and 
international experts – with a predominance of Timorese including teachers, trainers and 
educational consultants – and has involved research, consultation and field visits. 
Underpinning the new curriculum has been the need to assure equal access to quality 
education for all children without discrimination, thus making it child-centered, based on 
                                                
94 (https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/, last accessed 12 September 
2015) 
95 Ibid. 
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active learning and principles of inclusion and positive discipline.96 The goal has been to 
make the new revised curriculum an indigenous one that will seek to approach all 
concepts from a local perspective.97 
According to the new government, recent curriculum reform has been 
underpinned by ‘the theme of applied learning’, which is explained by the Prime Minister 
as the prioritization of two key principles: “[t]he curriculum must be connected to local 
culture and the Timorese way of life, and it must ensure the development of the whole 
person.”98 Among other objectives, curriculum objectives lay emphasis on “[T]imorese 
culture and history to create a sense of nationalism and tolerance of others.”99 In this 
regard, East Timor’s pre-colonial history – non-existent in the first basic curriculum – is a 
new entry. The very broad subject ‘Estudo do Meio’ has been split into two distinct 
subjects, Social and Natural Sciences.100 
Beside the subject of history, the revision of the primary curriculum has tried to 
tackle East Timor’s complex linguistic reality through a sequential learning approach. 
The new curriculum devotes more hours to Tetum literacy than to Portuguese in the first 
cycle. The prioritization of the Tetum language spoken by approximately 90 percent of 
the population should develop a strong base of literacy when students are deemed fluent 
in oral and written Tetum, they will start reading and writing in Portuguese.101 Changes in 
the primary curriculum reflect what was envisioned by the Ministry’s Curriculum 
department many years ago, when such a curriculum was first written. In other terms, the 
                                                
96 Asia Pacific Analysis, ETAN, 10 March 2015 
97 (https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/, last accessed 15 September 
2015) 
98 Government of Timor-Leste, “Prime Minister underlines the importance of Education in the 
development of Timor-Leste,” Dili, July 15th, 2015, (http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=12723&lang=en, last 
accessed 12 September 2015) 
99 Ibid. 
100 (https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/, last accessed 15 September 
2015) 
101 Asia Pacific Analysis, ETAN, 10 March 2015 
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primary curriculum should be contextualized, child-centered, integrated, relevant and 
effective.  
 
6.3.2 Secondary curriculum reform 
 
After the restructuring of the primary curriculum, the country embarked upon the reform 
and implementation of the new general secondary education curriculum. As with primary 
curriculum years earlier (2004), the secondary curriculum (2010-2013) was conceived 
and developed outside Timor-Leste, through the support of Portuguese institutions.  
The University of Aveiro in Portugal was assigned the responsibility to design 
and develop all didactic resources (i.e., programs, textbooks and teachers’ guide) for the 
secondary curriculum (Capelo et al., 2015: 239). Simultaneously, a group of Portuguese 
teachers recruited by the same university has been providing in-service teacher training 
for Timorese teachers (Capelo et al. 2015: 239). The overall objective of the project was 
twofold, assisting the development of a system of quality secondary education through 
curriculum reform and strengthening Portuguese as the language of instruction (Lucas et 
al. 2015: 734). 
Meetings were held between different stakeholders with the aim of making the 
process participative and understanding the expectations vis-à-vis the new curriculum 
(Martins, Moreira and Ferreira 2009; Martins et al. 2010, all quoted in Lucas et al., 2015: 
734). Recommendations that came out from the round of meetings included “[t]he need to 
simplify language used, [...] the need to include evaluation methodologies and resources, 
[...] the need to integrate more Timorese references in the resources” (Ferreira et al., 2011 
quoted in Lucas et al., 2015). The project was concluded in 2013, with implementation 
starting in 2012 for the 10th grade, in 2013 for the 11th grade and in 2014 for the 12th 
grade (Lucas et al., 2015: 734).  
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The secondary curriculum focuses on students’ competencies by developing skills 
that would enable their participation in the Timorese and the global society; by promoting 
critical skills and respect for diversity; and by “[c]ontributing to the construction of a 
world perspective that takes into account its social, cultural and linguistic diversity” 
(Lucas et al., 2015: 735). The curriculum offers two educational paths, one in Sciences 
and Technology and the other one in Social Sciences and Humanities, with both sharing a 
common set of subjects aimed at building transversal skills within an integrated 
perspective, which includes among others Citizenship and Social Development; Religion 
and Moral Education but it excludes History which is a specific subject of the Social 
Sciences and Humanities path.  
Albeit in its early phase, an evaluation project from the same University of Aveiro 
pointed out to a number of implementation challenges of the secondary curriculum. These 
refer to the linguistic flaws in the use of Portuguese language, limitations in the 
pedagogical training of teachers, and the limited organizational, pedagogical and 
administrative management capacities in most of secondary schools (Lucas et al. 2015: 
736-737). 
Quite tellingly, the evaluation report issued by the same University that designed 
the curriculum, presents the choice of Portuguese as the language of instruction as the 
“[a]ppropriate option for Timorese society” (Lucas et al., 2015: 737), firstly because 
Portuguese is one of the official languages as enshrined by the constitution, and secondly, 
because Tetum “[s]till lacks a solid structure and does not comprehend enough technical 
and scientific vocabulary to support a new curriculum”.102 Training in Portuguese seems 
to remain a priority, which is being provided by Portuguese personnel that is in charge 
also of the training on the new secondary curriculum. 
                                                
102 Director of the National Directorate of School Curriculum and Assessment quoted in Lucas et al., 
2015: 737 
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The reform process of the secondary curriculum has been characterized by the 
same challenges that were encountered in the design of the primary curriculum less than a 
decade earlier. Although more attention seems to have been paid to issues of context and 
relevance to the Timorese society, the whole process was led by an external institution, 
based far away from East Timor. It is not clear to what extent the University of Aveiro 
was aware of and neutral vis-à-vis the promotion/adoption of one of the most conflictual 
aspects of education reform, i.e., the use and prioritization of Portuguese as the language 
of instruction.  
While meetings have been held with officials from the Ministry of Education, 
policy-makers, religious leaders and other national and international institutions the 
whole process remains pretty much top-down, and it is not clear to what extent the 
broader civil society and local communities have been involved. Notwithstanding this, 
once the curriculum was designed, several other meetings were held including district-
level officers and Timorese teachers (Lucas et al., 2015: 734).  
 
6.3.3  The language issue 
 
The complexity of the language issue dates back to at least the Indonesian occupation of 
the island (1975). The occupation had a significant impact on the language situation in the 
island. On the one hand, it underpinned Tetum as the language of national unity, and it 
created the condition to make Portuguese - once the language of the colonizers - the 
language of resistance. On the other, the expansion of education led to an expansion in 
proficiency of Bahasa Indonesia among the Timorese society. Furthermore, the 
introduction of English in 1999 due to the presence of the international community 
rendered the language landscape in the island more complex. 
It became clear since 1999 that the choice of language would become a dangerous 
divisive issue (Simonsen 2006). In December 1999, the Constituent Assembly voted by 
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almost at unanimity to pass Tetum and Portuguese as the two official languages in the 
island; while in the later 2002 Constitution Bahasa Indonesia and English are described as 
‘working languages’. Tetum became the Lingua Franca during Indonesian occupation 
used by the Catholic church to conduct its services since 1980, and in an attempt to win 
the hearts and minds of the population, Indonesia introduced Tetum as the second official 
language in 1990 (Oenarto 2000 quoted in Simonsen 2006).  
Portuguese was the language of instruction for the small elite that had received 
education during Portuguese rule, and it was the language of the elite in exile, who used 
to study in Portugal or Mozambique. Furthermore, it was used as the language of the 
clandestine networks among the resistance leaders. Political elites chose Portuguese with 
the intention to strengthen a distinct post-independence Timorese identity and because 
Portuguese would provide more opportunities in the global economy/market. However, it 
meant little to the majority of the East Timorese, who had received their instruction in 
Bahasa Indonesian, and the language was understood by 90 percent of the population 
under the age of 30, and 50 percent of those over 30 (Oenarto quoted in Simonsen 2006: 
585). When Indonesia pulled out in 1999, 80 percent of primary school teachers were 
East Timorese and 20 percent were Indonesian; while in secondary school and above the 
relationship was the opposite. Indonesian teachers left the country in 1999, and among the 
Timorese 90 percent were teaching in Bahasa Indonesia.103 
The UN mission used the FRETILIN’s unifying definition of Timorese identity 
based upon anti-colonial feeling and the euphoria of independence (Richmond and Franks 
2008: 195). Beyond the surface of euphoria, however, social cohesion was rather weak. 
The choice of Tetum and Portuguese as the two official languages of the new nation was 
made by FRETILIN, that represented the new political elite in power, but was also 
representative of the Portuguese-speaking, educated and urban elites. The rest of the East 
                                                
103 Interview with Armindo Maia quoted in Simonsen 2006: 588 
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Timorese, mostly living in poorer and rural districts, speak one of the 16 indigeneous 
languages, of which Tetum – the lingua franca during resistance for the majority of the 
population – is the most widely used.  
Although the decision was taken by the local government, Millo and Barnett 
(2004) suggest that the choice to introduce Portuguese in classrooms as one of the 
official languages, was in part influenced by Portugal’s commitment to support the 
whole process by funding language courses for teachers and providing a set of 
curriculum resources in Portuguese. Both Portugal and Brasil have been important 
donors in the education sector, and most of their assistance has consisted in 
introducing Portuguese into classrooms, either in the form of language courses, 
Portuguese teachers or textbooks. The introduction of Tetum in schools and 
textbooks, on the contrary, have been carried out by smaller NGOs, New Zealand Aid 
and Ireland. In particular, the Mary MacKillop Institute of East Timorese Studies in 
collaboration with Catholic education authorities have been developing teaching-
learning materials in Tetum for primary and secondary school children in 60 Catholic 
schools (Mary MacKillop Institute 2003).  
The situation that emerged in the following years, shaping much of the debate and 
tensions around the language issue, was one that saw Portuguese as the official language 
in documents, Tetum as the language of choice for conversation purposes, and Bahasa 
Indonesian (and increasingly English) as the working language spoken by the majority of 
educated East Timorese for doing business.  
Such a complex mosaic of written and spoken languages has had repercussions in 
the classrooms throughout the past fifteen years in terms of teaching performance and 
learning outcomes. The choice of language(s) in the classrooms can be a critical aspect of 
reinforcing or undermining state legitimacy as well as contributing to grieavances against 
the government (Tawil and Harley 2004; Miller-Grandvaux 2009). Despite the fact that 
Bahasa Indonesian was the official language in classrooms and the majority of the 
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population still spoke Bahasa in the wake of independence, its exclusion from the 
curricula was made with the intention of relinquishing the recent colonial past. The 
preservation of Portuguese was decided on the basis of the fact that it represented the 
language of resistance following the 1975 Indonesian occupation (vonKaltenborn-
Stachau 2008). 
However, for the majority of Timorese, the Portuguese language is not strongly 
associated to national identity, while a segment of Timorese society sees it as a form of 
cultural imposition or neo-colonialism (Leach 2007; Taylor-Leech 2008). On the other 
hand, the Tetum language is widely regarded as key to everyday existence and a source of 
identity formation. Teachers in schools are highly motivated to use and teach in Tetum 
because they see it as the language of identity and civic participation, while Portuguese is 
used out of compliance to government policy (Quinn 2008). 
The choice of Tetum and Portuguese as the two national languages in the new 
state was strongly defended by the Foreign Minister and Nobel Prize laureate José Ramos 
Horta, who explained “[i]t was a strategic decision to strengthen the uniqueness of East 
Timor, the national identity of East Timor.”104 However, the choice of Portuguese 
sparked intense debates within the international community too, with most donors 
criticising the decision to emphasize the teaching of Portuguese over Tetum in the 
curriculum and in classrooms.  
In 2009, the statement made by NGOs at the Development Partners’ meeting 
suggested that the government should prioritize Tetum, a first language in East Timor 
and essential for the development of children and people’s cultural identity. Tetum, 
according to the statement, could serve as a vector and facilitate the “[i]ntegration of 
Timorese culture and languages into the curriculum, to ensure a relevant and 
culturally-appropriate learning environment for Timorese children” (Development 
Partners 2009 quoted in Shah 2012). 
                                                
104 Comment made by José Ramos Horta, BBC News Talking Point Forum, June 12, 2002 
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In theory, East Timor’s primary curriculum stresses the equal importance of  both 
languages (Taylor-Leech 2008), with teaching initially building on Tetum literacy to a 
gradual transition to Portuguese (Chadwick 2004). However, as Quinn shows (2004) the 
Ministry’s documents and decisions illustrate that in practice in 2004-2007 schools were 
told to prioritize Portuguese over Tetum. Progressively Tetum was reduced to the level of 
auxiliary language in the teaching process. According to Taylor-Leech (2008), the 
government position on Tetum reduced it to a symbolic official language rather than to a 
substantive and a real one.  
Against this background, the implementation of the language policy has been 
problematic from day one. According to the World Bank (2004), when the primary 
curriculum framework was introduced in 2004 only 6 percent of the teachers reported 
fluency in Portuguese.105 The Ministry of Education enacted large-scale compulsory 
Portuguese language training courses, while it did not do the same for Tetum on the basis 
that the language was widely spoken among teachers.  
Due to its little official use, teachers are proficient in spoken Tetum, while they 
lack any proficiency in written Tetum (Quinn 2007, 2008). Furthermore, a few hours of 
weekly Portuguese has proved not enough for teachers to master the new language, let 
alone to impart knowledge and skills through it. Student studying under non-proficient 
teachers in Portuguese most likely will not master the language sufficiently well with 
repercussions on students achievements. Moreover, Portuguese remains the third or 
fourth language for most of the students (World Bank 2004: xxi). Shortage of language-
learning materials has made it difficult to develop literacy in any language (Ibid.). Lastly, 
Tetum is mostly used in schools attended by children of the poorest families while 
Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesian are mostly used in schools attended by children of the 
richest families.  
                                                
105 Precisely those teachers that finished secondary education before 1975 
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Thus, the introduction of Portuguese has been more problematic in poorer areas, 
further reinforcing economic divisions and social fragmentation. In the longer-term, the 
prioritization of Portuguese in schooling, in a situation in which the vast majority of the 
East Timorese do not feel a strong association to it, will further alienate the formal 
schooling system from the people it is supposed to serve (Shah 2012).  
The draft of an internal evaluation report by the World Bank challenged the 
choice of the Bank to distribute teaching materials in Portuguese at the request of the 
Timorese government: the report suggested that a more useful approach could have been 
developing indigenous or English-language texts, as these languages are far more widely 
spoken than Portuguese, which at the time was spoken by 5 per cent of the population 
(Knowlton 2011). The result of this choice the report stated is that by 2009, more than 70 
percent of students tested at the end of the first grade “[c]ould not read a single word” of 
a simple text in Portuguese, suggesting that after 10 years of efforts, “[a] full cohort of the 
population may by functionally illiterate” (quoted in Knowlton 2011). The language issue 
and the prioritization of textbooks in Portuguese raise the issue as to when and who can 
resist government policies if these seemed ill-advised (Knowlton 2011). 
According to Simonsen, while a golden rule to resolve the conflictual language 
situation of East Timor does not exist at present, “[w]hat might have served national unity 
and nation building better than the current policy of rigid emphasis on Portuguese (and 
half-hearted investment in Tetum) is a more pragmatic approach, acknowledging that 
Indonesian and English too will remain, and that all four languages have roles to play in 
the country” (2006: 588).  
A multilingual approach to education has been discussed and promoted in the past 
few years, especially since the change of government following the 2012 elections. As a 
matter of fact, the ministry of education in 2013 adopted a pro-mother tongue approach, 
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with bilingual texts starting to be printed out and distributed across the country.106 Prior to 
that, in February 2011, the National Education Commission’s Language in Education 
Working Group launched the ‘Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education –MTB-
MLE-Policy for Timor-Leste’ with the aim of increasing literacy rates for children who 
speak other languages than the official ones and with the goal of improving learning 
outcomes at the pre-school and early grade of primary schooling levels.  
The program emerged out of the recognition that “[a] comprehensive ‘language in 
education’ policy, clearly rooted in Timor-Leste’s educational and linguistic reality and in 
international best practices” was much needed” (UNESCO 2012: 1). Using mother 
tongue in pre-primary schooling and early grades of primary education can build 
students’ “[c]onfidence and independence, knowledge and understanding, skills and 
strategies, use of prior and emerging experience, and critical reflection” (Klaus et al. 2001 
quoted in World Bank 2004: 91).  
During an important conference on bilingual education organized in Dili at the 
Ministry of Education in December 2011, local officials and senior education officials 
from CARE, UNICEF, UNESCO, Plan International, ChildCare, the Alola Foundation 
and the World Bank debated who was going to lead the process of multilingual education, 
specifically the implementation of the MTB-MLE pilot program. The issue was 
unanimously recognized to be sensitive and complex. The main recommendation that 
came out from the conference was that East Timor had to develop a multilingual 
education.107  
Assistance for MTBE-MLE project has been provided by UNESCO, whereby 12 
schools are participating in the three districts of Lautem, Manatuto and Oecusse, with 
activities ranging from teacher training, community education, writing workshop and 
                                                
106 (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/timor-leste-rethinks/844334.html, last accessed 
11 October 2013) 
107 Interview with New Zealand Aid advisor within the Ministry of Education on pre-school level, 18 
June 2013, Dili, East Timor 
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classroom implementation (UNESCO 2012: 1). The whole process was ill-received by 
the Portuguese development cooperation agency, which defined the multiligual approach 
as anti-constitutional. The program fuelled a tense and politicised debate about the virtues 
of the MTBE in establishing literacy and numeracy among young children. It soon 
became the hottest issue in the country, with the public opinion divided.108  
A brief UNESCO progress report dating 2012, revealed the discrepancy that 
existed between political elites on the national level and communities on the ground, with 
the latter recognizing the benefits of acquiring literacy skills in mother tongue (UNESCO 
2012: 3). Although how the Ministry of Education may manage the process is far from 
clear, the goal has been to start the pre-school level and early grades of primary schooling 
in mother tongue education, and gradually move to Portuguese and Tetum at later grades 
in  primary education and subsequent grades.109 In an attempt to address the disparity 
between Tetum and Portuguese, the Asia Foundation, in collaboration with the Alola 
Foundation and with support from USAID’s All Children Reading Program, has been 
developing Tetum language books for first through third grade students and for teacher 
training.110 
A sense of identity, essential for nation building, and transmitted through 
language(s) has remained a problematic concept and process in East Timor, with 
consequences for the implementation of more complex concepts such as human rights 
and the rule of law (Richmond and Franks 2008: 196).  
 
6.3.4  The religion question 
 
Over time, the Catholic Church played an important role during Indonesian occupation 
because it recognized human rights violations committed by Indonesians; it recognized 
                                                
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/timor-leste-rethinks/844334.html, last accessed 
11 October 2013) 
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common sufferings by the Timorese regardless of their ethnic or cultural backgrounds, 
and it encouraged Tetum as the lingua franca during occupation (Kingsbury and Leach 
2007).  
According to the World Bank, private schools, especially Catholic schools have 
been important for the Timorese education since the Portugal rule: “[b]y injecting 
diversity and competition into the system, private schools have the potential to provide 
alternative approaches to quality improvement. [...] Since the transition period, the public 
sector has treated Church and government schools equally with regard to teachers’ 
salaries and instructional materials” (World Bank 2004: 72).  
Nowadays, East Timorese identity remains closely tied to Catholicism. For the 
important part that the Catholic Church played in national identity formation, it was 
recommended that in the curriculum development process the government and the 
Catholic Church “[c]ollaborate to develop curriculum and teaching methodologies which 
are values-based [...] and that will promote a culture of peace, non-violence and human 
rights” (CAVR 2005: 166).  
Interviews pointed out the existence of concerns regarding those national 
narratives that have been transmitted through the primary curriculum and the extent 
to which they are representative of ‘true’ Timorese identity or are shaped by liberal 
and modern values of other societies (see also Leach 2007a). One example of this is 
the decision to exclude the teaching of religion from the basic curriculum, making it 
optional, since for the government religion held no place in the construction of a modern 
and secular state (Molnar 2010). While the government may have taken such decision 
to symbolize the creation of a new state based upon liberal, democratic, progressive 
and modern values in line with donors’ expectations (Berlie 2007), it did not consider 
the fact that contemporary Timorese identity has been and still is strongly tied to 
Catholicism.  
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Indeed, the decision was contested by both the church and civil society 
organizations, which saw in a curriculum excluding Catholicism as ‘un-Timorese’. Two 
prominent bishops wrote in 2005 that the decision made by the government regarding the 
new curriculum implied the divorce of Catholicism from Timorese identity (Ricardo and 
Nascimento 2005 quoted in Shah 2012). To their call for reintroducing religious 
education in the curriculum, the government initially did not react. Faced with refusal 
from the government, the church organised a number of demonstrations in Dili between 
April and May 2005. The then prime minister, Mali Alkatiri, a former guerrilla leader, 
ordered the police to block the protesters, in a display of unwillingness to make 
concessions (Berlie 2007: 410). Following demonstrations in which the church 
mobilized hundreds of protestors, leading to months of unrest, a compromise was 
reached, reinstating religion into the curriculum at the discretion of each school.  
This was the first large-scale challenge to the legitimacy of state decisions by the 
Catholic establishment (Berlie 2007; Leach 2007b), and it reflected social fragmentation 
and disconnect between the political elite ruling the state and its constituents. These 
manifestations of dissent can be said to have served as a precursor to the more violent 
clashes in 2006 that led to the forced resignation of the then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri 
(Kingsbury and Leach 2007; Brown 2009; Scambary 2009). In the words of 
vonKaltenborn-Stachau, it reflected “[a] disillusioned  and disempowered population who 
consider state institutions as politicized, distant and not serving the public interest [...] 
giving space and voice to destructive non-state actors [...] who manipulated political 
grievances [in 2006]” (2008: 52).    
 
6.3.5  The history conundrum 
 
Through the development of the primary curriculum, the state recognized that a central 
objective of history education should be to 
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[C]ontribute towards the defense of national identity and independence and to 
the strengthening of identification with the historic matrix of Timor-Leste, 
raising awareness as to the cultural legacy of the Timorese people, by way of a 
growing interdependence and solidarity among peoples, and the duty to consider 
and valorise different knowledge and cultures (Republica Democratica de Timor 
Leste 2008, Art. 5b). 
 
Despite the recognition of the importance of history education, the primary curriculum 
diminished the significance of the study of history by incorporating it into the 
abovementioned broader subject called Estudu do Meio (MEC 2005). In the same year, 
the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation recommended that a cornerstone of peace 
and reconciliation in the country would be the development of a history curriculum that 
discusses the complexity of the Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999 (CAVR 
2005).  
However, the government and the donors have not directed any effort to the 
development of a complex and endogenous history curriculum, perhaps with the idea that 
it is still too early for such a process (Shah 2012). Simplified historical narratives, typical 
in post-conflict states, can in the long-term divide a nation (Vongalis-Macrow 2006; 
Weinstein et al. 2007; Murray 2008). In absence of subject specific materials regarding 
East Timor history, teachers have been found to use historical texts and readers donated 
by Portugal, while others have been found using old Indonesian textbooks (Leach 2007a). 
Such a situation can in the long-term delegitimise the post-colonial and transformative 
purposes of education in a fragile state (Shah 2012). Following the conflict in 2006, in the 
same year the Secretary-General to the United Nations stated that “[t]he resurfacing of 
divisions that pre-dated 1999 has highlighted the need to address the past as part of the 
nation-building process.” (quoted in Leach 2007a: 200 quoted in Shah 2012) 
While in the short-term it may be necessary to appeal to simplified narratives of 
the past, in the long run the addressing of past divisions requires the development of a 
more complex and nuanced historical narrative. Weinstein et al. (2007) maintain that it 
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should be an endogenous process that is developed through consensus and consultation 
and that ultimately foster critical thinking and debate. 
The Ministry of Education (in partnership with the local NGO Timor Aid) is 
developing a curriculum for civics that is participatory and bottom-up in the 
determination of topics and content (Leach 2007a). The content of civics curriculum 
should include some of the most contentious issues such as human rights, national 
identity and the place of religion in Timorese society (Timor Aid 2009).  
History education remains a politically sensitive issue. The fact that to date there 
is no history department at the national university suggests the approach of the post-war 
Timorese elite with regard to issues of reconciliation and how it has been (not) dealing 
with the past. This is illustrated by the approach of the then Timorese government 
concerning the Chega! report’s recommendations for specific large-scale reconciliation 
activities.  
These recommendations were neither taken into consideration nor ever 
implemented. Since the end of the 1990s, the various Timorese governments have chosen 
the path of a conciliatory approach towards Indonesia, offering inclusive images of unity 
in the name of independence to the different Timorese linguistic and ethnic groups. This 
has led to a form of reconciliation that has not been informed by justice: transitional 
justice has been non-existent, and past crimes have not been prosecuted.  
Fernanda Ludovica, secretary of the post-CAVR, has been quite firm on claiming 
that there is no peace without justice.111 Within the framework of the peace programme 
‘Road to Peace’, an MoE project that is implemented by CAVR itself - and that is 
supported by the EU, HIVOS and the Norwegian embassy, Insist press, and the 
                                                
111 Interview with technical secretary post-CAVR, 1 July 2013, Dili, East Timor 
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International Centre for Transitional Justice – has been tackling the issue of history 
education at the primary level by publishing five books of history curriculum.112 
 
Conclusion  
 
Recent research work by scholars and international organizations suggests that in 
conflict-affected and fragile countries, education is a key sectors for statebuilding, since it 
restores public confidence and enhances state legitimacy (DFID 2011, Davies 2009). 
Both the literature review and the interviews conducted in East Timor confirm the 
existence of high expectations concerning the transformative and nation building role of 
education, but that – in spite of this - education was never formally and explicitly 
included within a peacebuilding/statebuilding strategy. Officials interviewed for the 
present research were not able to envision paths through which education may play a 
peacebuilding role. 
Given the functions and the expectations that education is expected to perform in 
a 21st knowledge economy/society in terms of identity construction and skill-building, 
there is no way one can elude the fact that it is a difficult and complex sector to (re-
)construct. A crucial need related to enacting educational reform and change is the 
building of capacities: this emerges without any doubts as a central theme in interviews, 
while it keeps being identified as a vulnerability in the sector.  
Resources and capacity have been scarce in education reform, and more than a 
decade after independence, the education system if still fraught with a number of 
limitations and problems. While the ‘capacity missing and building’ rhetoric has allowed 
to detect vulnerabilities, it has also contributed to the shaping of a discourse through 
which donors have been legitimizing their own interventions and priorities in education 
reform. Growing emphasis on human and social capital has surrounded the discourse on 
                                                
112 Ibid.  
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education, which is typically expected to build both, within a framework in which citizens 
have been seen and defined as economic actors.113 
Although most of the interviewees did link education to both peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, little clarity remains as to whether and under what conditions education 
could contribute to building both peace and the state. In this regard, education policy 
could perhaps be labelled an anti-policy: significant discrepancy characterizes actual 
outcomes and existing expectations, while the absence of strategic thinking obscures 
possible linkages, preventing the emergence of a public debate on socially just and 
sustainable peace and/or stable state institutions.   
One example upon which this chapter has shed light is the process of curriculum 
reform. Despite the fact that curriculum reform in East Timor aimed to a more inclusive, 
democratic and distinctive Timorese educational system, important elements of the new 
curriculum have ended up alienateing and further fragmenting segments of the Timorese 
society (Shah 2012). The expectations and attempts to trigger rapid change in the 
aftermath of the war through curriculum reform worked at cross purposes with the 
aspiration to use it at the service of nation building. 
The reform and implementation of the primary curriculum have to some extent 
responded to statebuilding imperatives and principles and have hampered nation building 
objectives and processes. The radical reform of education was one of the main priorities 
of the nascent state together with development partners. Beside the reconstruction of 
education infrastructure and the rehabilitation of education provision, a key component of 
educational reform was the overall transformation of the primary curriculum-in terms of 
content, language and pedagogy-in ways that what was taught and how could support 
broader objectives of state reconstruction and social cohesion.  
                                                
113 Interview with Director, NGO La’o Hamutuk, 25 June 2013, Dili, East Timor 
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Supported by the primary curriculum, state promotion of a certain version of 
Timorese identity (i.e., secular state and Portuguese as first language) did not recognize 
the perceptions and beliefs of the wider Timorese society. Nor did it recognize the many 
divisions that exist in the society (Shah 2009: 2). Crucial elements of the new curriculum 
– e.g., the Portuguese language and the presence of religion - have been perceived as 
elite- and/or donor-driven.  The design, reform and implementation of the basic 
curriculum reform was characterized by public-contestation, by confusion at both school-
level and in the broader educational governance. The decision to make Tetum and 
Portuguese the two official languages of the nation and the way in which this has been 
done so far keeps polarising Timorese society (Moxham 2008; Taylor-Leech 2008). 
In overall terms, the goal of education contributing to social cohesion remains a 
chimera for contemporary East Timor. The language policy has suffered from lack of 
capacity/resources for an efficient implementation of a multi-lingual system of education. 
Choosing the language(s) for the new nation has been characterized by tensions, 
resistance and pressure by international actors, leading to the estrangement between the 
state and its citizens. Two other controversial aspects of curriculum reform – i.e., religion 
and history curricula, both strictly tied to the elaboration of a post-war national Timorese 
identity - have hampered rather than enhanced the legitimacy and the trust of the new 
state or donor partners.  
After 2012, a focus on mother tongue education, vocational training, as well as 
greater attention paid to the teaching of history can be seen emerging, as a possible 
indication of the way in which the Timorese government seeks to address some of 
shortcomings underlying the no longer deniable process of social polarization 
characterizing the post-independence phase.  
With regard to the role that international actors have played in educational 
reform, mapping out their commitment has proved far from easy. Field interviews 
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confirm a significant degree of exogeneity in educational development and 
reconstruction. Although education might have still been marginal in the 
peacebuilding/statebuilding processes, the sector can be seen as an example of complex 
hybrid governance, where the multiplicity of actors involved in various forms of 
intervention allow to see education as a site of contestation among different agendas. One 
aspect that certainly would deserve further investigation and research are the sites of 
resistance and agency that exist within the Ministry of Education, in schools, and in the 
broader body of the Timorese society. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Comparing and contrasting internationally-driven education reforms 
 
This chapter puts the empirial findings of the previous four chapters in a 
comparative perspective. It is organized along the three main objectives that are laid 
out in the introduction, with an eye on those themes that emerged out of chapters 
three, four, five and six.  
 
7.1 The models of education in post-conflict Kosovo and East Timor 
 
7.1.1  The politics of education reform in a state of perpetual fragility 
 
Post-war reconstruction efforts in Kosovo and East Timor have led to the emergence 
of externally-driven education systems: especially at the beginning priorities appear 
to have been set by a plethora of international actors, lacking coordination among 
them and with local authorities. As with other post-conflict contexts, in both cases 
the main focus of intervention and reforms in the early emergency phase was on 
reconstruction: reconstruction, in its turn, mainly consisted in the physical rebuilding 
of educational infrastructure as well as the provision of education services that would 
bring children back to school and increase overall access (especially at the primary 
level). The focus on reconstruction was more prominent in East Timor, whereby 
longer-term reforms were postponed for quite a few years. By contrast, in Kosovo, 
reconstruction and reform were launched simultaneously.  
In East Timor, of the four priorities that were identified by the international 
community in the aftermath of war – that is, the rehabilitation and reopening of 
primary and secondary education; teacher training and capacity building; training for 
out of school youth; tertiary and technical education – only access and enrolment in 
primary education has been successfully addressed. Although in the beginning of the 
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process some associations tackled the needs of adolescents and youth, one has to 
conclude that in overall terms these two categories have not been a priority for the 
past fifteen years. Early childhood, secondary education, higher education and 
vocational training have also been overlooked by both national projects and donor-
funded activities. Moreover, despite high and persisting illiteracy rates, adult literacy 
and non-formal education have never ranked among the priorities.  
By contrast, in Kosovo the UN engaged in a grand-scale experiment of 
simultaneously managing educational reconstruction and reform. Infrastructural 
reconstruction and teacher recruitment/training along with increasing access for 
minority groups were identified as the most urgent needs and were therefore 
prioritised. The existence of a segregated, fragmented and bifurcated education system 
along ethnic lines - with a multiplicity of textbooks and curricula - had made 
educational access for minorities an urgent problem. 
During the first three years of intervention, UNMIK’s educational strategy 
was articulated in three distinct phases (i.e., infrastructural reconstruction, curriculum 
reform and gradual transfer of competencies to the local government): it aimed at 
creating a unified and working education system. Beside education provision and the 
creation of a unified education system, its main goal was the transformation of 
education along modern European standards. The parallel system of Albanian 
education that was built during the 1990s was jettisoned and terminated: the UN 
Department of Education regarded it as too imbued with a Yugoslav and socialist 
legacy (i.e., administrative decentralization, political centralization, hierarchical 
structure, pedagogical teacher-centredness, with homogenized textbooks) not to be 
deemed obsolete, and therefore useless. As Chapter four has shown, while educational 
provision and access have increased (especially for the Albanian-speaking majority 
and in urban areas), the current education system is far from unified or equally 
provided.  
The sector-wide approach that was adopted implied that each level and aspect 
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of education was a key objective to be prioritized. However, a particular focus was 
initially put on teacher training and curricula. Over time, higher education and 
vocational training were prioritized by both the international community and local 
provisional authorities, while community education received external funding and 
attentions. The analysis of the documents of the most relevant international agencies 
illustrates how particular emphasis was put on the modernisation of education, which 
was expected to be responsive and compatible to the new economic environment. In 
this regard, as shown in chapter four, public education was identified as a significant 
tool for promoting the launch of the Kosovo Privatisation Strategy.  
As competencies and responsibilities were trasferred to the local government, 
the priority for Kosovo national authorities became the establishment of an 
education system  that on the one hand reflected European standards and policy 
trends (e.g., life-long learning and inclusive education) and on the other contributed 
to long-term sustainable development through job creation and enhanced social 
cohesion. While a clear understanding of European standards proved hard to be found 
anywhere, the main implications of this posture – and in line with global educational 
trends – were  the shift from a teacher centred/lecturing approach to the promotion 
of an interactive one, the introduction of science as a single subject, and the 
appearance of new subjects such as ‘civics’. However, in practice, the promotion of 
child-centred pedagogies and interactive learning have been resisted by those teachers 
that were expected to introduce such approaches.  
In post-independence East Timor, as competencies and responsibilites were 
gradually transferred to local authorities, the focus shifted towards pedagogy and 
curriculum reform, while the question of access to education remained a priority. 
Although the National Development Plan envisaged the introduction of critical and 
transformative pedagogies, it is not difficult to show that traditional learning and 
teaching practices have remained the norm. Throughout the first years, the system 
was built in absence of a regulatory or national educational act. More recently, quality 
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issues (e.g., low learning outcomes and functional illiteracy) have dominated the 
discourse among those international donors that are involved in education reform. In 
overall terms, one can observe a recent discursive shift from access to quality. 
While reconstruction can be considered as partially successful, the opportunity 
for ‘system transformation’ has been missed (Millo and Barnett 2003: 8): an 
exception that is limited to the early phases of intervention is the promotion of pro-
poor policies (i.e., removal of school and examination fees and that of the uniforms) 
which were implemented with the aim of increasing access and enrolment rates in 
primary education.  
More than a decade after independence, poverty, poor school infrastructure, a 
shortage of quality teachers, language issues, high dropout/repetitions rates and a high 
functional illiteracy remain major challenges in the Timorese education system. 
While gender parity has been for a great extent achieved in primary education, the 
gender gap keeps widening in upper grades and in rural areas. For many years 
emphasis has been laid on primary education while the government that took office 
in 2012 shifted the priority onto pre-school education and technical vocational 
education training.  
The focus on vocational training may suggest that the nexus between 
education, employment and the demographic structure of the Timorese society has 
finally come under the spotlight: yet to date a strategy addressing this link has not 
been put in place, and in East Timor there remains a mismatch between skills and the 
labour market, resulting in high rates of unemployment. Despite the prioritization of 
transformative pedagogical practice in the Strategic National Development Plan and 
existing gaps in the sector, teacher training is no longer a priority. A growing gap 
between what is stated in the official documents regarding educational priorities and 
what is being effectively invested upon in the education sector suggests that 
education, in overall terms, is now less of a priority.  
In Kosovo, the education system is even less of a priority than in East Timor.  
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Notwithstanding the goals and priorities set by the international community upon its 
arrival in Pristina, and later incorporated by national authorities within the Kosovo 
Education Strategic Plan – i.e., the creation of a unified, non-segregated and inclusive 
education system – the biggest challenge remains today the persistence of a 
fragmented system characterized by the presence of territorially divided education 
systems along ethno-national lines. The integration of the Serbian community into a 
unique education system has become an highly politicised and unresolved issue. The 
parallel system of education in Serbian has come to be regarded by the Serbian 
community as an existential challenge: a pillar for their survival in Kosovo, and a 
manifestation of the rejection of an independent Kosovo state.  
In contrast to the objectives set by the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan the 
system cannot be said to provide equal opportunities to relevant and quality education 
to all ethnic groups. Access and integration to date remains partial and vary 
depending on the specific ethnic community. Access and participation of non-
majority communities within the Kosovo education system is hampered by 
insufficient or lack of textbooks in Turkish and Bosnian languages. Quality and 
availability of curricula is also tied to the language in which they are developed. As 
reported by the OSCE (2009b), the lack of a commonly understood language and of a 
non-divisive and shared history is leading to a situation in which a generation of 
youths with different ethnic background who live next to one another will not be able 
communicate with each other.  
For this purpose, the MEST and the OSCE Higher Commissioner on National 
Minorities have been developing two textbooks that aim to boost intercultural 
education: one for learning Albanian as second language for minorities’ students and 
one for civic and intercultural education. Although there have been a number of 
international organizations engaged in multicultural projects to education, they have 
failed to develop a comprehensive and trans-community approach, and have usually 
focused on education issues of a specific community.  
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Unlike in the East Timor case - where for the past fifteen year neither higher 
education nor vocational training have scored among the priorities - in Kosovo 
higher education and vocational training have received considerable funding and 
attention by both the international community and local authorities. It is indeed in 
these two areas that the two cases differ most: rather than global agendas of 
educational policies (which always tend to prioritize primary education), contextual 
and contigent factors may account for such a difference.  
As shown in Chapter four, higher education in Kosovo has been important for 
processes of state making and elite legitimization prior to the war as well as in its 
aftermath. However, the ways in which political elites have invested on higher 
education and vocational training in Kosovo can be regarded as missed opportunities, 
if not a case of political collusion. Even more than in other education levels, the 
development and bifurcation of higher education in Kosovo reflects the existence of 
a deeper and broader conflict between the two main ethno-national groups - i.e., the 
Serbian and the Albanian community.  
The politics of higher education reform in Kosovo has been characterized by 
the political struggle that took place on the one hand within the Albanian political 
and academic elites, and between those elites and the international community on the 
other hand. An asymmetry in donor funding and assistance versus the Pristina-based 
Albanian university fuelled the self-imposed isolation of the Mitrovica-based Serbian 
university and has deepened separation at the level of higher education between the 
Albanian and Serbian communities.  
The Europe-wide reforms induced by the ‘Bologna process’ and the 
transposition of the hegemonic discourse of ‘knowledge-based society’ have informed 
interventions in Kosovo’s higher education sphere. With the Bologna Declaration as 
the benchmark against which progress in higher education reform is assessed, the 
Europeanization of higher education in Kosovo has been carried out in a hasty way 
across formal templates that did not take into account the specificity of the context.  
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As illustrated by chapter four, the liberalization of higher education has paved 
the way to a form of devaluation of knowledge and quality (as well as university 
diplomas): its addressing youth unemployment – a major problem in Kosovo – is 
problematic to say the least. Even though after the independence of 2008 one 
observes the refocusing on vocational training on the part of international donors, 
and although the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan links education to sustainable 
development for its contribution to job creation and social cohesion, neither 
coordination nor a strategy that could properly address the booming young 
population of Kosovo is in sight: the building of skills, the deep mark that 
informality leaves on the market, and the need for a strategy of employment 
generation remain critical aspects that are disconnected from the reform of higher 
education.  
At the same time, one observes a veritable proliferation of private and public 
colleges that postpone the moment in which students enter the job market. Along 
this path, one can observe how unemployment rates are masked by a plethora of 
education initiatives and procrastination tactics, while the explosive link between a 
frustrated, educated youth and unemployment remains untouched. The same 
structural problems that characterized Kosovo during Yugoslavia, such as those 
related to unemployment, underdevelopment, demographics have not been properly 
addressed in and through today’s education reform.  
 
7.1.2  Curriculum reform: for the nation or for the internationals?  
 
In post-conflict situations, education reform is tied to the state’s need to restore 
public trust and regain political legitimacy (Moxham 2008). According to Miller-
Grandvaux (2009), for education to mitigate rather than exacerbate existing divisions 
in post-conflict societies, it has to be reformed by taking into account principles such 
as shared ownership, trasparency of decision making and community participation. 
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Curriculum reform in East Timor has been part of a broader process of 
fostering social cohesion. The key challenge in post-conflict countries is to identify 
the appropriate time and place for these reforms to occur (Shah 2012): however, in 
similar contexts, there are a number of competing imperatives for rapid curriculum 
reform such as the need to show rapid action from the government to meet access 
and quality benchmarks of global educational agendas, or the expectations to reform 
and adapt the curriculum for preparing a labour force for the economic needs (Davies 
and Talbot 2008; Al-Daami and Wallace 2007).  
In East Timor, curriculum reform was postponed for a considerable number of 
years. The transitional curriculum had a strong Indonesian base, while part of it came 
from Portugal. However, initiatives, similar to the Kosovo case, were on an ad hoc 
basis and disregarded the relevance of the context and content. In East Timor, both 
primary curriculum and secondary curriculum were designed and implemented by 
Portuguese universities. However, while the former was UNICEF-led the latter was led 
by the Timorese government. Primary curriculum reform, too, recorded low 
ownership and legitimacy levels: this did not help to bridge the gap between the state 
and its citizens (Colenso 2005 quoted in Shah 2012: 34). After 2012 primary 
curriculum reform that focuses on language and local context suggests that an attempt 
to tackle and address the problematic question of relevant education content is being 
made. 
Despite the fact that curriculum reform in Timor-Leste aimed to a more 
inclusive, democratic and distinctive Timorese educational system, some elements of 
the new curriculum have alienated and fragmented segments of the Timorese society 
(Shah 2012). The expectations and the attempts to encourage social and political 
change through curriculum reform in the immediate aftermath of war was somehow at 
cross purpose with the idea that the reform would serve a nation-building purpose. 
The decision to make Tetum and Portuguese the two official languages of the new 
nation and the way in which the decision was implemented continue to polarise the 
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Timorese society (Moxham 2008; Taylor-Leech 2008). The goal of education 
contributing to social cohesion within the society remains to date an unfulfilled task. 
The process of curriculum reform in Kosovo has been tied to the broader 
political dispute between Kosovo and Serbia over the political status of the province. 
As in the Timorese case, curriculum reform was initiated and enacted by UNICEF in a 
joint co-operation with UNESCO. It was based upon current trends of educational 
development in the West, particularly by introducing the focus on learner-centred 
approaches. As curriculum reform was taken over by local authorities, the objective 
of making Kosovo’s education system compatible with European standards 
represented a continuity with the UNICEF work. In practice, this was translated in 
the adoption of the 5+4+3 education structure which was criticised by local education 
experts as done in a hasty way not allowing time to the system to adapt to change.  
The revised curriculum focused on learner-centeredness, flexible and integrated 
teaching and learning, competency-based education, reflecting the values of human 
rights, social justice and inclusiveness within the broader life-long learning framework. 
Many Kosovo educators questioned its success and implementation as it was detached 
by Kosovo’s educational experiences and context (Tahirsylaj 2013). Underpinning 
curriculum reform is the need and objective to turn Kosovo into a knowledge society 
integrated into broader, mainstream European processes, which will also “[c]ontribute 
to sustainable economic and social development” (MEST 2006: 20).  
The process of having a single curriculum for all Kosovan communities, with 
translation in the different languages has been there since a while, yet to date it 
remains incomplete. For example, the curriculum in Serbian was drafted, but it has not 
been issued. For the other communities, one finds a combination of textbooks 
imported by the Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Bosnia. Currently, there is no 
strategy for integrating the Serbian parallel system of education into the Kosovo one. 
The three subsequent MEST strategies for pre-university education illustrate a 
changing and progressive de facto acknowledgement of the existence of a Serbian 
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parallel system. 
The politics of curriculum reform in Kosovo and the related debates in 
Kosovo and Serbia show that the improvement of the curricula, textbooks and 
didactics more generally are a cause of little concern (Bozzato 2013: 24). Given this 
state of affairs, it is rather unlikely that objectives of fostering inclusion, integration, 
and consolidating cohesion and peace have been or are currently informing curriculum 
reform in Kosovo. While curricula in Kosovo satisfy the educational needs of specific 
communities, they fail to promote mutual understanding, interaction and integration 
among them (OSCE 2009b: 24).  
 
Separation and segregation: language policy and community education 
 
In East Timor, language has been a complex and divisive issue that has hampered 
teacher training/performance and students’ learning outcomes. Its complexity 
depends on colonial legacies and post-war decisions that were taken by the political 
elite and supported by some foreign donors who encouraged the introduction of 
Portuguese as one of the official languages, prioritising it over Tetum. Language 
policy has estranged the broader population because it has been elite-driven. Political 
and policy decisions related to omission or selective prioritization have made the 
implementation of a multi-lingual system of education and curricula, in a country 
lacking capacities and resources, a pretty difficult task. 
A sense of identity, essential for nation building, and transmitted through 
language(s) has remained a problematic concept and process in East Timor, with 
consequences for the implementation of more complex concepts such as human 
rights and the rule of law (Richmond and Franks 2008: 196). Recent developments 
since 2011 point to the redressing of some of these issues that had polarised 
Timorese society in the early years of independence. In the intention of the current 
government, mother tongue instruction will be the focus of the early years of 
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schooling and Tetum will be prioritized as an important national language (MoE 
2011).  
In Kosovo, dealing with and implementing a multi-lingual system of education 
at first sight did not represent a dilemma (nor was it per se a contentious issue), due to 
the Yugoslav legacy of multi-lingual education system and the spatial segregation of 
education along ethnic and linguistic lines. Having premised that, the polarization of 
education policies and practices has had a significant impact on smaller ethnic 
minorities in Kosovo: they were faced with the choice of either being assimilated in 
one the two main education systems (proceeding in parallel) or be excluded from 
education. While each of the two main groups has education in the respective 
mother-tongue, smaller communities rely upon either textbooks from one of the two 
main languages (Serbian and Albanian) or from textbooks that are imported from 
neighbooring countries. Be that as it may, official data tend to conceal ongoing 
polarization and show partial integration of the Bosnian, Turkish, and Roma, Ashkali 
and Egyptian (RAE) communities within the Kosovo system of education, while 
Gorani and Serb communities are not integrated at all (OSCE 2009a). At the same 
time, however, the OSCE reports that communities seem to be moving gradually on 
their own separate ways, a proof that community integration within the education 
system is not sufficient for the integration of minority communities within the 
broader society (OSCE 2009a). 
Early attempts by UNMIK to develop an education system that, by combining 
interactive methodologies and new curricular topics, would promote equity in access 
and multiethnic cooperation and schooling, failed either because of the lack of will by 
the two main Serbian and Albanian communities or for lack of physical security. 
Security issues in post-war Kosovo has affected the education system and made 
segregated and separated schooling a foreign choice too.  Schooling has been further 
separated due to decentralisation policies, which in the Kosovar case has been made 
along ethnic and linguistic lines. As it was analysed in chapter three and four, the 
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respect of the rights and interests of minority communities has led to the promotion 
of decentralization policies along ethnic lines with consequences felt in the 
fragmented and decentralised education system(s). 
 
Omitting history or opening it up to multiple perspectives? 
 
History and historiography have a strong role to play for legitimization narratives, 
and it comes as no surprise that in Kosovo, history curricula and textbooks remain 
among the most contentious and untransparent issues. Much of the conflict over 
politics and education has been around different and competing interpretations of 
Kosovo history by Serbs and Albanians. In the struggle between majority and 
minority over history curricula one finds the mutual mirroring of exclusivist readings 
of history and a lack of communication between historians. They procede in parallel 
as the more general education system(s) in Kosovo. By the end of my observation 
period the Ministry of Education in Kosovo launched an initiative that pursue a 
multi-perspective approach to history. However, at the time of my fieldwork the 
project was still in the piloting phase and it had not reached contemporary history, 
leaving out the most contentious part of Kosovo’s history and memory – the period 
that follows WWII. 
While the development of a history curriculum that discusses the complexity 
of the Indonesian occupation has been identified by the Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation as a cornerstone of peace and reconciliation, primary 
curriculum reform in East Timor has diminished its significance, making history 
education for years part of a broader subject – estudo de meo (study of the self). 
Neither the local government nor donors have directed any effort to the 
development of a complex and endogeneous history curriculum (Shah 2012). 
Simplified historical narratives, typical in post-conflict states, can in the long-term 
divide a nation (Vongalis-Macrow 2006; Weinstein et al. 2007; Murray 2008). 
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Addressing the past was identified by a Secretary-General report following the 2006 
crisis as part of the nation-building process in East Timor (quoted in Shah 2012).  
While in the short-term the need for appealing to simplified narratives tends 
to be recurrent and might be understood, in the long run the addressing of past 
divisions requires the development of a more complex and nuanced historical 
narrative. Weinstein et al. (2007) maintain that an endogenous process should be 
developed through consensus and consultation, ultimately fostering critical thinking 
and public debate. By the end of my observation period, reforms that introduced a 
new curriculum for pre-secondary and secondary education in East Timor placed 
greater attention to the teaching of history and civics. Problematic remains, 
however, the transformation of the national resistance experience, often represented 
as a monolithic effort, into a shared and nuanced historical narrative.  
 
7.2 Conflict, peacebuilding and statebuilding and their relationship to 
education 
 
7.2.1  Same timing, different history and varying conflict sensitivity 
 
While fundamentally different on a number of aspects for most of their modern 
history, both Kosovo and East Timor have been deeply shaped by external actors and 
factors: in different eras they were both remote subjects to colonial occupation and 
imperial administration. In both cases, a long legacy of conflict, external 
intervention and societal mistrust versus political authority has affected social, 
economic and political structures and relations. Lingustic, religious and ethnic features 
have distinguished and positioned Kosovo and East Timor along the peripheries of 
the respective rulers. The process of modern state formation has been externally 
driven, as part of different yet assimilationist nation building projects that had 
different outcomes.   
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Conflict characterized the Timorese society even before Portuguese 
colonisation, which exploited regional and ethno-linguistic divisions to further divide 
and rule the small island for over 400 years. Societal cleavages and divisions within 
the Timorese liberation movement were also manipulated by the Indonesian occupier 
to control the country for a quarter of century. Conflicts occurring during the brief 
civil war (1975) and the ensuing 24 years of occupation were multifaceted and 
complex. While the conflict in East Timor has not been as neatly divisive as in 
Kosovo, there remains a number of persisting historical and current fault-lines of a 
regional, ethno-linguistic and political nature and potential conflict drivers 
underpinned by economic, gender and social inequalities, which have been largely 
overlooked (if not completely ignored) by the international community, within and 
outside the UN mission(s).  
The Indonesian occupation was identified as the main cause of conflict, and 
the withdrawal of Indonesian military forces was seen sic et simpliciter as the removal 
of the conflict cause. Underpinning the commitment of the international 
intervention was the widely shared view that the 24 years of struggle for freedom 
against Indonesia had united the population, transcending existing grievances. This 
resulted in the omission of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity during the first 
years that followed the conflict, with serious consequences for peacebuilding planning, 
social cohesion and education reform.  
The fact that a thorough conflict analysis was nowhere to be found among the 
UN and the international community agencies intervening in East Timor, led to an 
insufficient focus on reconciliation or conflict resolution/transformation in the first 
years after the conflict. In his analysis of international intervention in East Timor, 
Richmond contends that, “[p]olitical and institutional reform had failed to address 
underlying causes or identity issues, or the actual connection of the state to the 
worldview of Timorese communities” (Richmond 2013: 6). Only years later was a 
focus on peacebuilding articulated, following the violent political crisis that detonated 
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in 2006. International and local actors put a major emphasis on short-term 
reconstruction goals of rebuilding the infrastructural and institutional state capacities 
as opposed to longer-term peacebuilding and development. 
By contrast, the Kosovo conflict has been seen as the epitome of an 
intractable, ethno-national conflict, indeed as “[t]he most intractable of all the 
political conflicts in the Balkans” (Malcolm 1998: xxvii). Here too, the Serbian 
military forces withdrew with a consistent number of Serbian refugees. However, a 
small Serbian community remained scattered around Kosovo and confined to small 
enclaves, while one third of Kosovo Serbs were located in northern Kosovo. This 
gave to post-war Kosovo a status of being embroiled in a condition of potentially 
explosive, present, postponed or frozen conflict, with key questions such as the 
political status of the country, and the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and 
Kosovo Serbs regarded by the foreign actors as impossible to be solved. 
Unlike in the Timorese case, here early conflict assessment placed emphasis 
on the main cause which was identified in the deep-seated divisions between ethnic 
Albanians and Serbs. The analysis that I have proposed argues that rather than lack of 
conflict analysis, in the Kosovo case the problem has been the overemphasizing of 
certain conflict causes and dynamics, and the symmetrical neglecting of others that 
are equally important. Put differently, the perspective that shaped international 
intervention in the aftermath of the war was one in which the socio-economic and 
development dimension of conflict was systematically and dismissively overshadowed 
by the ethnic component.  
As chapter three has shown, Kosovo has always been a poor and 
underdeveloped country where socio-economic conditions play a key role in the 
conflict between the two main communities – i.e., Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo 
Albanians. The organization of (higher) education and policies to address (under) 
development have been underlying conflict causes already during Yugoslavia, if not 
since the Ottoman Empire. However, since the end of the 1999 war, the 
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international community has conspicuously failed to identify first, and tackle later 
the very existence of a development question in the country: the entire matter was 
deemed to be part of a generic growth problem, a by-default function of market 
liberalization and privatization; for long time no political economic sensitivity was 
developed, and no corresponding strategy was articulated.   
A certain neglect of social, economic and political inequalities that are rooted 
in societal segmentation and reinforced by the opportunism of elites characterize the 
international community in both countries, thereby preventing to tackle deep 
conflict causes. A partial change in perspective materialized only in the aftermath of 
the violent political crises that shook the two countries, respectively in 2004 
(Kosovo) and 2006 (East Timor). The UN recognized that the stagnation of socio-
economic situations had become part of the ‘big picture’, fuelling causal mechanisms 
were partly underpinning violent conflict. The new perspective, therefore does not 
emerge as the product of a lucid re-assessment of peacebuilding in the light of 
empirical evidence regarding goals, means, and recources: rather, it stems from an 
incident-driven reconsideration.  
Despite the recognition by important international players of the need for 
contextualizing policies and interventions in post-war and fragile context (OECD 
2007, 2010; DFID 2011; DFID and World Bank 2005) the international community 
approached the two countries in a very similar way: the state-building mission was 
designed in New York at the UN headquarters according to an abstract matrix of 
governance functions, and historical institutional and contextual legacies were kept 
very much on the margins of strategic planning. As section 7.2.3 will show, proof of 
this is a similar statebuilding toolkit that was applied in both.  
 
7.2.2  Addressing or reproducing conflict through education? 
 
Education in East Timor has been, from the beginning, shaped by external actors with 
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lasting legacies and differing impacts upon language policy, religion, (the lack of) 
indigeneous knowledge and the broader educational structure. The Portuguese 
emphasised quality of Western education for forming a small and docile elite, while 
Indonesia by contrast focused on quantity - using mass education as a means of 
indoctrination, integration and control spreading the Indonesian language and 
promoting Indonesian national unity. As chapter six has illustrated, education under 
Indonesian rule played a very ambiguous role. Used to assimilate linguistically the 
Timorese population, it soon became also a site of active and passive resistance 
against the Indonesian occupier.  
Similar to other colonial contexts, in East Timor and Kosovo, schooling 
became a crucial battlefield in itself, as well as an arena for mobilization for further 
conflict due to the messages that were produced and reproduced in classrooms. In 
Kosovo, education played an important role in the rise and for the shaping of 
Albanian nationalism: following the massive strikes and firing of mine workers 
between 1988-1991, the struggle over education became the primary site of 
contention between Serbs and Albanians. In Kosovo, national question and national 
education have always coincided: education has been the stage in which the national 
question has been performed by both the Albanian and Serbian sides, involving claims 
about autonomy, statehood, and sovereignty.  
The prohibition of schooling in Albanian language during the Ottoman empire 
and the first phase of Federal Yugoslavia nurtured the idea that education in Albanian 
and respect for the national identity was conditional upon the creation of a nation 
state. The significant openings to bilingualism and autonomy experienced during the 
second phase of Federal Yugoslavia were widely considered as a concession to a 
legitimate aspiration to statehood, not as a step into a different system that would 
transcend nation states. During the 1990s, education became the most oiled 
mechanism, a fully functioning sector in the parallel Albanian state in Kosovo. 
Nonetheless, its existence rested upon a system of segregation and spatial separation 
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along rigid ethnic lines. 
Given its being historically intertwined with a story of conflict, nation building 
and state formation processes that turned violent, education in post-war Kosovo is a 
problematic foundation for peace. By contrast, in East Timor, despite explicit 
emphasis by the local elite on the role of education for the enhancement of national 
identity (as well as for introducing transformative teaching and critical learning 
practices and skills) the education sector has been virtually irrelevant in the building 
of a sustainable and just peace: the education system has been studiously  kept far 
away from deliberately addressing some of the structural deficiencies and fragilities of 
the Timorese state.  
As discussed in Chapter five, education in East Timor has not been linked to a 
strategy for tackling high (urban) unemployment rates in a situation of expanding 
youth demographics. Furthermore, education has only deepened social fragmentation 
by increasing the divide between the elite and the broader population, the East and 
the West and other language and socio-economic disparities. The education reform 
has neither reflected nor was it incorporated in a broader strategy for tackling the 
low-labour intensive economic foundations of a demographically young country that 
has become highly dependent on oil revenues.  
In Kosovo, rather than addressing root causes of the conflict, education 
reverberates and ultimately reinforces the lines of ethnic division: at the same time, 
its reform has not addressed structural elements of vulnerability of the Kosovo 
society such as underdevelopment, unemployment and youth demographics.  
In the aftermath of the war and despite the fact that we are in presence of 
mass education, both cases were respectively the second poorest province of 
Indonesia and the poorest province of the Balkans (arguably of Europe). However, 
while educational attainment and employment policies under Indonesia had kept East 
Timor within a circle of dependency with effects on post-conflict assistance, in 
Kosovo the development of education during the 1990s had paralleled with the 
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development of para-state structures. Thus, albeit in both cases, 
administrative/governmental and educational structures were highly affected and 
destroyed by the conflict(s), in its aftermath Kosovo and East Timor were starting 
from different levels of what was then regarded by the international community as 
the bottom, or better the scratch (i.e., the tabula rasa). 
While in both cases education has a record of strong interaction with (root 
causes of) conflict, its reform in the aftermath of war was affected by different 
legacies that were the product of years of resistance and occupation. In the case of 
East Timor, this is most evident by observing the language policy, especially the 
removal of the largely spoken Bahasa Indonesian as an official language and its 
replacement with Portuguese, of which only a small elite was (and remains) 
proficient: this circumstance makes teaching and learning problematic for the 
majority of teachers and students. Moreover, the almost total infrastructural 
destruction that resulted from the war that affected an already fragile institutional 
system of education (previously reliant upon Indonesian resources) turned East Timor 
and its education increasingly (if not permanently) dependent on foreign assistance.  
Throughout much of Kosovo’s modern history, educational events have been 
proximate causes/triggers for (and instances of) mobilization and conflict. In Kosovo, 
the clearest legacy of such a conflict is the continuation and structuration in a 
reversed way of the segregated and ethnically divided education structure that 
characterized the 1990s, with an impact on language, curriculum reform and content, 
as well as access. Rather than emerging as an arena where root causes of the conflict 
could be identified and transformed, education has become a sphere that is kept 
hostage by existing divisions.  
 
7.2.3  Different paths to statehood: international governance and the tabula rasa 
 
While being very different contexts, Kosovo and East Timor were administered by 
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the international community through missions that were the copy-paste of each 
other, perhaps premised on the dubious assumption that the war had swept away 
political, social and economic structures and legacies along with infrastructural 
destruction, thus removing ‘bottlenecks’ that would act as setbacks along the path in 
which the ‘right path of reform’ would be implemented. Both Kosovo and East 
Timor were small countries where experiments could be attempted: by emerging from 
war and destruction they would oppose little resistence, and therefore they could be 
ultimately considered as empty shells where to inoculate the germs of future pearls. 
The state model the international community aimed to build, in both cases, 
was a liberal democracy. In transplanting the same standard model of liberal 
democracy that they had envisioned for Kosovo a few months earlier, the 
international community failed to recognize the existing forms of traditional 
authority and the structures and systems that had been institutionalized during 
Portuguese colonization earlier and Indonesian rule later (Jones 2010). In both cases, 
political power disputes among the new political elites were overlooked by the newly 
established international architecture. Failing to recognize local authority at the 
beginning favoured the development of parallel (and overlapping) authorities and 
structures. The UN deployed its missions and failed to incorporate local capacities 
and to design any form of accountability towards the local elite or population. This 
hampered capacity building efforts, despite political mechanisms that were developed 
later, for greater Timorisation and Kosovisation.  
Over time, the support of the international community remained focused on 
promoting a limited form of state that was underpinned by a market-driven economic 
model. Perhaps, precisely by over-emphasizing the strengthening and the 
development of formal institutions within a framework of market-driven, limited 
state, the international community failed to address the historical weakness of the 
link between the state and its citizens in these regions, as highlighted among others by 
Montanaro (2009) and Richmond (2011). The mechanistic approach to institution 
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(and state) building followed a model of governance resting upon technical expertise, 
whereby state legitimacy was narrowly understood as being validated by the electoral 
process. State (and international) legitimacy was expected to be built by building the 
capacity to deliver rather than by effectively delivering and providing social services. 
According to the World Bank (2011), institution building and service delivery are 
central to the consolidation of post-conflict legitimacy. While fragility in Kosovo 
has been identified as the lack of state capacity to exercise authority over the 
territory, in both cases, the state stands out as a distinctively weak performer, one 
lacking political will to providing basic services to the population.  
Although UN powers were not intended as merely regulative but also as 
transformative, structural fragilities and root conflict causes in both cases have been 
little transformed. This has been clearly the case in East Timor, where a top-down 
model of liberal governance, focussing on institutional development and 
marketisation, and on rights over needs, has overlooked considerations regarding 
social justice and welfare and has marginalised the political experience, history and 
culture of the Timorese subject (Richmond 2011). Rather than providing social 
services, in both cases, local political leaders have derived their legitimacy for their 
contribution during the war. As with other post-interventionary systems of 
governance, stability has partly come at the expense of building (i.e., accepting the 
emergence of) states that prove to be ineffective in generating economic 
development or public goods.  
Albeit both states have been externally-shaped, unlike in Kosovo, East Timor 
has been central in elaborating a locally-based and locally-led statebuilding process as 
part of the G7+ Agenda for Statebuilding. Although objectives are very similar to 
those elaborated and implemented by the international community in conflict-
affected countries, a greater focus is placed over justice and employment, advocating 
for context-sensitive, country-led and owned peacebuilding and statebuilding 
processes.  
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The two missions, according to Woodward (1999), were almost identical, but 
for the issue of political status. While in East Timor – where intervention was clearly 
identified as the rectification of a path of decolonization - the political path to 
nation and statehood was clear from the beginning, in Kosovo it remained unsolved 
until early 2008, and it is still disputed and contested. The result in the Kosovar case 
is that international governance has contributed to and reinforced existing patterns of 
parallel political authorities. As difference in Kosovo is institutionalized and 
protected through decentralisation, the condition for sovereignty and statehood, goes 
through multiple international authorities which supervise the successful 
accommodation of the claims and the grievances put forward by distinct identity 
groups. This segmentation, in turn, has led to a weak and unfinished process of nation 
building characterized by multiple claims for autonomy and nationhood. 
The reform of post-war education in Kosovo, similar to what one observes in 
the East Timor case, is inserted within such a process of nation building, reflecting 
and reinforcing its problematic incompleteness. In other terms, in order for education 
to serve statebuilding purposes (with its emphasis on security and stability), it had to 
be ‘de-nationalized’ or at least disjointed from the nation building project. The 
paradox is that while throughout much of Kosovo’s modern history, education played 
an important role in terms of nation building and state formation by contributing to 
the rise and shape of Albanian nationalism and by acting as a symbolic producer and 
amplifier of nationhood and as a political expression of Albanian statehood, in the 
post-conflict momentum education became marginal to the externally-driven 
statebuilding efforts and to the process of nation building more in general.  
The reform of education, therefore, has been characterized by tension 
between education as a sphere that may contribute to social cohesion through building 
national identity and education as an area of reforms that should introduce modern 
standards of efficiency and effectiveness while not threatening stability, in a context 
in which both state and nation are contested and problematic notions.  
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The overall aim of the international community was ensuring a peaceful 
multi-ethnic society with a unified education system serving the needs of Kosovo’s 
young society and reflecting European modern standards. As argued in Chapter four, 
the promotion of a multi-ethnic and pluralist society through education has led to a 
multiplication of curricula in different languages and to competing versions of 
history, in a situation in which there is little understanding among local and 
international actors about the ‘European’ or ‘western’ standards to be promoted.  
Similarly, an analysis of the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan suggests that 
local authorities have discursively aimed at building an inclusive education system 
where all Kosovo citizens would be provided with equal access to quality education at 
all levels, and where education would contribute “[t]o the long term sustainable 
development of the country through job creation and enhanced social cohesion” 
(MEST 2011b: 26). It is,  more specifically, in the area of higher education that both 
the international community and local authorities have concentrated resources and 
attention. The sector has been seen by international actors as a vehicle for state 
formation; local authorities have seen it as functional to cultural, social and economic 
development; finally, both see it as a tool for democratisation. In practice, however, 
higher education reform has been an arena for political struggles among and within 
local and international actors. On the one hand it has served to legitimise local elites 
in power, while on the other its liberalization has failed to address the structural 
problems of unemployment, underdevelopment and demographic pressure.  
In East Timor, while during the occupation education was used by Indonesia as 
a means of assimilation and indoctrination, in the aftermath of the conflict local 
elites saw in its decolonization and transformation potential an opportunity not to be 
missed. Expectations concerning the role of education in the process of Timorese 
nation building were already explicit before the referendum on independence. The 
new education system was expected to enhance national identity by emphasizing the 
selective and universal human values (CNRT 1999) and by promoting indigenous 
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forms of learning (Millo 2002).  
After full independence in 2002, education was expected to play a leading role 
in the transformation and construction of a new Timorese society. Social cohesion, 
political legitimacy and economic development were tied to education premised on 
the assumption that an equitable and effective quality education that could provide 
citizens with the knowledge and skills necessary to participate and contribute to 
socio-economic and political development would promote social equity and national 
unity (Caroll and Kupezyk-Romanczuk 2007). The National Development Plan 
(2005) further elaborated the purpose of education in the new state by explicitely 
proposing a key role for the development of individual capacities and the overall 
improvement of the Timorese society.  
Nevertheless, as Chapter six has shown, the opportunity for transformation 
was soon missed. This was particularly the case with primary curriculum reform which 
did not always mirror the needs of the country and the broader population. In the 
intentions of the Ministry of Education, the aim of the primary curriculum – through 
a new system of learning and teaching – was to reflect and contribute to building a 
new post-colonial and post-conflict Timorese national identity (MECYS 2004). 
However, in practice primary curriculum has had limited relevance and reference to 
East Timor’s context and has not promoted forms of indigenous knowledge. 
Moreover, some of the most important aspects of curriculum reform in terms of 
national identity building – i.e., language, religion, history – have estranged the 
broader population from the political elites. For their part, international actors have 
received criticism by local civil society organisations for lacking a coherent national 
vision or strategy for education. Education reform in post-war East Timor has 
responded to reconstruction and humanitarian rationales, but has not been 
incorporated in the broader peacebuilding and statebulding agenda.  
 
7.2.4  Peace as stability: what consequences for education?  
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In East Timor, peacebuilding and reconciliation activities were not formally included 
among the efforts undertaken by local and international actors until the 2006 crisis. 
Since 2006, the UN mandates have included a greater focus on building peace and on 
strengthening social cohesion. Using Richmond’s categorization of peace in post-war 
contexts discussed in chapter one, the type of peace that has been built in East Timor 
and Kosovo contains both elements of “conservative peace” (it required military 
intervention) and elements of “orthodox peace”, since it rests upon externally-driven 
and top-down peacebuilding methods, with a growing emphasis on the role of civil 
society (Richmond and Franks 2008: 191). 
Speaking specifically of the Timorese context, Richmond argues that the 
peace that has been built is a hybrid, “[p]art liberal, part local” (2011: 91) - that is, a 
mediation of what local and international actors aimed for. Hybridity as a theoretical 
device does not add much to the substance of the peacebuilding model in East Timor: 
as a matter of fact, in such contexts pretty much everything could be said to result 
from a more or less mediated form of interaction between international and local 
social forces. By contrast, what is important to observe with a view to a more fine-
grained understanding of the type of peacebuilding process is the fact that the UN and 
the broader range of actors involved in the country did not (i.e., were not able to, 
were not willing to) engage with several contextual issues.  
The peace that emerged from those selective efforts, as argued by Richmond 
among others, is to a significant extent virtual: failing to address conflict roots, it is a 
political condition where the state is subject to frequent political crises, and is 
paralysed by lacking capacities, by problematic levels of unemployment and poverty 
(Richmond and Franks 2008: 191, 197). The virtuality aspect is linked with the fact 
that the state has had little substance if measured against the impact on the everyday 
life experience of the majority of the population and their welfare requirements.  
Similar to the Timorese context, the international community in Kosovo was 
 286 
not involved in promoting reconciliation as much as it was involved in maintaining 
stability and preventing ethnically-motivated violence to re-surface: the pogroms of  
2004 stroke a very sensitive chord in this regard. Unlike in East Timor, the 
international community read the Kosovo conflict and its root causes mainly through 
the ethnic lens. International governance efforts were geared to managing the ethnic 
divide through decentralisation rather than reconciliation – which was considered not 
realistic for the time being.  
This approach, which was informed by a rather shallow acceptance of the 
‘ancient hatreds’ argument of which Balkanist cliché (Todorova 1997) is imbued, has 
reinforced social and ethnic divisions instead of weakening them. External agencies 
assumed that the main transformative tasks that are needed to build genuine and 
positive peace would be carried out by Kosovo’s integration in the international, 
European (i.e., EU) and regional context: however, the Euro-zone crisis that flared up 
by 2010, and the ensuing turbulence in EU governance mechanisms, dampened any 
enthusiasm about Kosovo’s integration trajectories.   
While waiting for liberalization and democratization by default, the inter-
ethnic divide in Kosovo was tackled through the promotion of a form of 
multiculturalism and minority rights protection that in practice consisted in 
territorial decentralisation along ethnic lines (Randazzo and Bargués 2012: 27). In 
other words, the international community adopted a narrow understanding of 
multiculturalism, which - by resting upon an essentialist understanding of ethnic 
identity - did not engage in their transformation: the outcome are ethnically-defined 
and divided municipalities. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, but also along historical necessity, both in Kosovo 
and East Timor the notion of peace has been aligned over time with a narrower 
definition than previously thought and proclaimed: a definition that clearly boils 
down to something closer to stability than development, and that steers the course of 
policy reform clear of emancipation. The field of education has paid a price for this 
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state of affairs.  
In both cases, education has not been a strategic sector in the peacebulding 
agendas. In Kosovo, the role of education as the driving force behind the (Albanian) 
national question was to be mitigated and education had to respond increasingly to 
security and stability imperatives. While before the war education rallied around the 
Albanian national question, in its aftermath it was organized in ways that it would 
contribute to building a tolerant and multi-ethnic society. Nevertheless, it is a fact 
that education has remained one of the main settings of tensions and conflict between 
Albanian and Serbs.  
While education was not explicitely incorporated in the peacebuilding agenda, 
the peacebuilding model that prevailed in Kosovo informed choices and priorities 
made by international actors in education reform. The solution to address what were 
considered the primary causes of the Kosovo conflict – local culture and ethnicity – 
was a governance of decentralization that would accommodate and institutionalize 
differences up to the educational level, preventing any space for cross-level, 
dialectical interaction between different groups.  
Similar to the Kosovo case, despite high expectations about the 
transformative and nation building role, education in East Timor was never formally 
included within a peacebuilding strategy. Although most of the interviews that I 
conducted with local and international officials do link between education to 
peacebuilding, it is not clear under what conditions education may contribute to 
peacebuilding, and indeed no interviewee was able to envision any path through which 
education may play a peacebuilding role.  
In this regard, while curriculum reform aimed at a more inclusive, democratic 
and distinctive Timorese educational system, some elements of it – language, history, 
religion – have alienated and fragmented segments of the Timorese society (Shah 
2012), hampering rather than enhancing the legitimacy and trust of the political elite 
or donor partners.  
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7.3  The governance of education reform between local and international actors 
 
7.3.1 The role of international actors in the reform of post-conflict education  
 
Mapping out the commitment of international actors in educational reform has been 
far from an easy task. The literature and interviews analysed reflects and confirms 
the exogeneity and social engineering of educational development and reconstruction 
in post-conflict international interventions. The governance of education reform, in 
East Timor and Kosovo, shows that the education sector, once a national authorities’ 
prerogative, is today shaped and reformed in the interplay between international and 
local actors that operate in, through and beyond the nation-state. This development 
does not seem to be a concession to circumstances, or a temporary phase, but rather 
the permanent state of affairs in post-war settings that are undergoing externally 
assisted reforms of peacebuilding and statebuilding.  
In both Kosovo and East Timor, the aftermath of the armed hostilities saw a 
preminence of localized response on the part of communities as the UN struggled to 
organize and co-ordinate its efforts to affirm its leadership along the policy-
making/implementation chain. However, in both contexts, local agency and capacity 
were ignored, then sidelined and eventually excluded from policy processes. In the 
past fifteen years, the processes of promoting local ownership while sidelining local 
capacities have characterized the relationship between local and international actors. 
In the early emergency phase – where priorities were set out – education reform 
seems to have similarly consisted and reflected what Verger et al. have called global 
educational policies (GEPs), i.e., a focus on reconstruction and increasing access at 
primary level, increasing efficiency and enhancing management at the systemic level, 
promoting decentralization etc.  
However, different historical legacies and contigent factors – a stronger local 
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agency in the Kosovo case, following years of parallel education – have led to a 
stronger focus on higher education and vocational training in Kosovo and an earlier 
focus on curriculum reform for all levels of education. By contrast, post-conflict 
education in East Timor had inherited strong fragilities at the institutional level and 
widespread level of destruction at the infrastructural level. The degree of permeability 
of international actors and their power to set agendas and priorities were therefore 
higher. In overall terms, one could see a higher compliance versus global education 
policies and trends in the case of East Timor. Notwithstanding differences in local 
agency, resources and focus, in both countries the role and functions of some of the 
main international actors in education reform have been respectively the same. As 
chapter four and six have shown, UNICEF has been responsible in both cases for 
curriculum reform while the World Bank has focused on reconstruction and 
improving management systems.  
In East Timor, education reform, during the emergency and transitional 
phase, was extensively reliant upon donors’ contributions, with clear implications for 
legitimacy. In overall terms, the role and the commitment of international actors in 
education reform has been poorly accountable to citizens, thus undermining UN and 
WB efforts in education, and promoting tensions with the local authorities as well as 
mistrust inside the educational community and larger portions of population. 
Confusing and competing leaderships, and a dual system of authority has hampered 
decision-making and capacity building especially in the Timorese case. The approach 
chosen by multilateral and bilateral partners has gradually evolved and changed since 
the first days after independence: external partners have redefined themselves as 
aiding actors that are supportive of state institutions’ efforts to effectively deliver 
education to its citizens. However, their presence and role has remained consistent 
and has undermined efforts to consolidate local ownership, as the next section will 
further illustrate. 
By contrast, in Kosovo the strong emphasis on dramatic reform and renewal, 
 290 
and UNMIK’s own ‘lead-agencies approach’ – whereby renowned international 
agencies were assigned core tasks within each and every aspect and level of the 
reform of the education system – seems to suggest the creation of a more coherent, 
strategically conceived and coordinated response to the need for educational reform. 
However, here too, overlapping, competing and uncoordinated efforts on the part of 
international donors and partners were not difficult to find. In Kosovo, too, the 
recruitment of a considerable number of international consultants together with the 
lead-agencies approach eventually sidelined local capacities, which were relegated to 
the margins of the education reform picture.  
The few internationally-sponsored attempts at developing political 
mechanisms for making the Serbian and Albanian community work together failed as 
a result of the local Serbs’ decision to boycott the emerging new institution. Overall, 
ethnic Serbian and ethnic Albanian officials were marginalized from the process, as 
they were both regarded to be problematically politicised. Nevertheless, the response 
of the international community was not homogeneous: interviewees were quite 
consistent in pointing out that while the prevailing approach, represented by the 
Daxner period, disregarded local context, past legacy and teachers, a different 
approach to be found among some international officials  showed more sensitity to 
both the context and historical continuities.  
Throughout my fieldwork visits in both countries one of the most challenging 
issues has been identifying or unravelling sites of resistance or alternative 
agendas/visions of education by social forces other than the local government or 
international agencies. As education has been marginal to post-conflict 
reconstruction, peacebuilding and statebuilding, there have been little efforts or 
examples of local civil society organizations either involved in the reform of 
education, or contesting dominant agendas and discourses. I have encountered critical 
reflections out of informal interviews, especially in the case of Kosovo, and there 
have been single voices that have criticised the reform and role of international 
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actors or local actors in education. 
Another question that is less explored is the relationship between policy-
making at the ground level and re-articulation of agendas at the global level. I was 
especially interested in investigating at the ground level the extent to which the 
UNICEF-funded Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding launched in 
2011, did have an impact on UNICEF’s discourses and programming in the education 
sectors in East Timor and Kosovo. As shown in Chapter two, in both cases I could 
gain no access for interview with any past or current UNICEF officials. This being 
duly noted, the broader change in the discourse that international actors articulate at 
global level with regard to education and its multifaceted role in post-conflict and 
conflict-affected situations did not seem to have a deep impact on the discourse and 
above all the practice that the very same international agencies articulated ‘in 
theatre’ and on the ground: here, where I could observe actual developments, 
education remains disjointed from peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.  
 
7.3.2  Capacity problems and the vicious circle of dependency 
 
In both Kosovo and East Timor a ‘capacity gap’ has framed interventions and 
assistance throughout the past fifteen years. In East Timor, the ‘capacity missing’ 
issue is both reality and discourse: by referring to it donors have legitimized their 
intervention in educational reform for years.  Richmond claims that in the case of 
East Timor “ [t]he ‘lack of capacity’ became a mantra that internationals deployed 
to legitimate their control of governance, as elsewhere” (2011: 86). Local actors – 
while recognising the lack-of-capacity problem at multiple levels – have also pointed 
at the lack of local language skills, cultural understanding of society and empathy by 
international actors (Ibid.). International advisers and consultants would often lack 
institutional and contextual grounding and their rapid and continuous rotation would 
result in contradictory inputs at times in contradiction with goverment policy. 
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Institution and capacity-building processes have been hampered by lack of 
coordination among international and local actors and by a model/approach of 
technical expertise that did not favor mentoring and skills-transfering to national 
counterparts (Engel and Vieira 2011: 7). Therefore, rhetorical emphasis on 
coordination was not translated into a practical will to actually improve coordination.  
Capacity building was identified by the UNDP as the appropriate response to 
the development of civil society (2006: 47), whose emergence has been painfully 
slow (Richmond and Franks 2008: 194) but it applied to all sectors at each level, 
including education. It has shaped the discourse of the main donors and development 
agencies whose preassumption was that East Timor was to be rebuilt from scratch. 
Real or perceived lack of capacity has been first determined by the fact that many 
officials that were working in the civil service left the country along with the 
Indonesians; second, formal job market requirement and external (donor) standards do 
not match levels of education; third, donors’ expectations for quick results lead 
international advisors to carry required tasks themselves without involving East 
Timorese civil servants who are deemed to lack the needed administrative and 
executive capacities (Richmond and Franks 2008: 194).  
While for East Timor the role of the international community has been 
critical in the development and evolution of the state apparatus that were built 
following its independence in 2002 (Shah 2011), in the specific field of education the 
role and modes of international assistance has been embroiled in a vicious circle of 
dependency. In East Timor one observes a high degree of confusion regarding the 
difference between capacity building and technical assistance. Moreover, the 
persisting discourse of the significance of local ownership clashes with the degrees of 
penetration – ‘for lack of local capacity’ or ‘local capacity absorption limits’ – of 
international assistance in education reform.  
Interviews with international staff draw a clear line between technical and 
political decisions: the former as part of externally-driven capacity building efforts, 
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the latter as a prerogative and expression of local ownership. Yet, by reducing to 
technical skills and sequences the fundamentally political nature of assistance in 
education, the risk (and often the outcomes) that one observes is the depoliticization 
of decisions that ultimately imply responsibility and accountability. Accountability 
and legitimacy issues aside, this situation has led to conflicting and uncoordinated 
efforts in education reform processes.  
In this regard, one of the most contentious aspects in the process remains the 
role of international advisors and consultants, a fact that has important consequences 
for policy-making and implementation. In East Timor, external consultants have 
substantially shaped and influenced the entire decision-making process: this has 
hampered local ownership by failing to invest on the building of local capacity and, in 
turn, by reinforcing dependency. The capillarity of the presence of consultants and 
advisors in the system remains significant, although increasingly disputed and 
confronted. The elaboration of strategic choices (and therefore the extent to which 
external advisors or organizations influence decision and policy making) is 
increasingly depending on the (local) leadership in each of the directorates of the 
Ministry of Education. 
In Kosovo, despite a similar strong (oftern rhetorical) emphasis on local 
ownership, after more than a decade of technical assistance there remain clear 
deficiencies in local capacity. In overall terms, one can argue that early curriculum 
and higher education reforms were externally driven, to the expenses of institutional 
memory and context. Yet, over time local actors increased their ownership in the 
higher education sector. As with other post-conflict settings, donor assistance has 
been chaotic and has lacked coordination, but the EU-funded Sector Wide Approach 
was finally introduced with the specific purpose of increasing ownership: nonetheless, 
it it not possible to claim that an improvement of ownership levels can be detected, a 
circumstance that is often officially explained with ‘low absorption levels’. The 
vicious circle is ultimately unbroken. 	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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
If anything comes through  
in spite of all [...],  
it is a miracle,  
and probably no book is born  
entire and uncrippled 
as it was conceived. 
 
(Virginia Woolf, A room of one’s own) 
 
 
 
1. Globalised education between peripherality, agency and hybridity 
 
Externally assisted post-war reconstruction processes in Kosovo and East Timor have 
accompanied the emergence of national education systems, whereby education reform 
is negotiated between international donors and local elites along multiple layers of 
governance, and where priorities are set by a heterogeneous international community 
that lacks a strategic vision on education and whose coordination with local 
authorities shows significant limits. In similar contexts, the education sector appears 
in the shape of a service developed and provided by a plethora of local, national and 
international actors, at the margins of the projects of building small and peripheral 
states. Although marginal in the statebuilding and peacebuilding enterprises, the 
education sector is an example of complex and hybrid governance: the suprising 
multiplicity of actors and interventions one encounters in studying it makes it an 
interesting site of contestation among different agendas. The analysis that I have 
proposed here has offered the opportunity to study international statebuilding 
interventions from a sector-based approach.  
The politics of educational intervention in Kosovo and East Timor confirms 
the features of extra-territoriality and de-nationalization that have been 
characterizing education policy-making in increasingly large portions of the world, as 
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argued by Susan Robertson (2012) among others. However, as this research has 
shown, far from being the exception of the post-war phase, aspects of exogeneity and 
hybridity in the governance of education reform have become the norm. The 
governance of education reform, increasingly beyond and above state sovereignty, 
suggests that education, once historically central to nation building and state 
formation, is increasingly less of a national prerogative or exclusively bound to state 
imperatives and interests in externally-assisted countries. To follow Turner and 
Kühn’s definition and problematization of the conundrum of international 
intervention (2016) – which happens so regularly in everyday domestic politics that 
cannot be regarded as an exception to the discourse of sovereignty – one is led to 
conclude that being marginal to international statebuilding intervention has not made 
education an exception to such conundrum.  
Both in Kosovo and East Timor, rather than leading the education system out 
of a condition of fragility, interventions have perpetuated a situation of dependency 
on various forms of international assistance to education reform. The governance of 
education reform stands out as an example confirming typical contradictory 
dynamics of promoting local ownership and sidelining local capacities (or institution-
building versus local empowerment). Such tension has underpinned the relationship 
between local and international actors and further confirms similar dynamics found in 
other sectors of internationally-driven peacebuilding and statebuilding as highlighted 
by Lemay-Hébert (2012) and Richmond and Franks (2008) among others.  
In both cases, the role and engagement of external actors has been substantial 
over time. A difference stands out: in East Timor both before the referendum and 
after the declaration of independence (2002), a locally-articulated vision for the role 
of education in the new state is found: education was expected to be a driving force 
for the transformation and construction of a post-colonial and post-conflict 
Timorese society. Social integration, political legitimacy and economic development 
were tied to education: an effective education system was expected to provide citizens 
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with the knowledge and skills necessary to participate and contribute to socio-
economic and political development, promoting social equity and national unity 
(Caroll and Kupczyk-Romanczuk 2007). This turned out to be a discontinuous goal, 
mainly due to the lack of vision and coordination on the part of the international 
community, which overlooked the potential of that blueprint. Nothing of this can be 
detected in Kosovo, in spite of the key role education had for the agency of the 
national liberation movement.   
In both cases this suggests that when education is part of externally-driven 
statebuilding interventions, its transformative potential is lost in the projectised and 
technicised reform. Education’s simultaneous incorporation and marginalisation both 
in external statebuilding efforts and internal state formation processes undermine the 
many ways that education might contribute to positive social change. Its reform, 
carried out by a plethora of actors lacking a strategic vision is detached by broader 
processes and education’s links to other sectors key to peacebuilding and statebuilding 
are neither recognized nor addressed.  
The fact that education was part of the two most ambitious projects of 
statebuilding has not made education reform any different from what one may 
observe in other post-war settings. As with other emergency, humanitarian and 
conflict-affected contexts, the set of interventions promoted in both Pristina and 
Dili by the international community reflect more general global education policies 
and trends identified by Verger et al. (2012): a focus on reconstruction (mainly 
physical rebuilding of educational infrastructure) and educational provision (in 
particular increasing access at the primary level); increasing efficiency and 
management capacities at the systemic level; and the promotion of decentralization.  
The focus on reconstruction and increasing access at primary education has 
been more prominent in East Timor, whose government postponed curricula and 
institutional development to the medium-term, suggesting that local Timorese elites 
have been more compliant with global agendas and priorities. Put differently, the 
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degree of permeability to international action (and international agenda setting) is 
higher in East Timor. Such a degree of permeability is proportional to the high level 
of infrastructural destruction and the magnitude of institutional fragilities inherited 
from the country’s past. 
By contrast, reconstruction and reform were launched simultaneously in 
Kosovo within the framework of a more ambitious, grand-scale experiment of 
rebuilding and system renovation. Here, stronger agency by local elites, after years of 
parallel education experimented during the 1990s, has led to a sharper focus on higher 
education. Such a focus stands out, given the fact that this sector has never been top 
of the agenda for international actors involved in post-conflict contexts. Quite 
surprisingly, in the Kosovo case, both the international community and local 
authorities converged on an early focus on curriculum reform for all levels of 
education.  
 The two cases illustrate the limits of the World Culture Theory to explain the 
differing focus of international actors on educational levels or curriculum reform 
despite similar international interventions and assistance. This is due to the fact that 
as argued by Robertson and Dale (2015), Rappleye (2015) and Silova an Rappleye 
(2015) and confirmed by this study, the World Culture Theory overlooks and 
neglects contextual issues, power relations and the role of agency that may account 
for a differing focus within the reform of the education system as well as the power 
and permeability of international actors to set their agendas.  
More specifically, in East Timor early childhood, secondary, higher and 
vocational education, along with non-formal and adult literacy have been overlooked 
by both national and donors-funded projects. Only recently has the government 
shifted its reform focus on early childhood and vocational training. By contrast, in 
Kosovo, the overall aim by the international community was the creation of a unified 
and efficient education system: efficient, modern and inclusive quality education for 
all has been introjected as an overarching goal by national authorities, as illustrated by 
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the adoption of the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan. In Kosovo, every sector – thus 
all sectors of education – were labeled top priority, although greater attention was 
placed on improving minority access to education and teacher training; over time, as 
the local elite gained more power, most of the resources have been allocated to higher 
education. 
In both countries, quantitative aspects such as access and enrolment rates 
received more attention than qualitative aspects such as (functional) literacy or the 
broader connection with the economic structure and labour market. In line with global 
educational trends, in both cases one observes a shift from a teacher-
centered/lecturing approach to an interactive, child-centred learning model: the 
introduction of science as a single subject and the introduction of new subjects such as 
civics. In East Timor, the local elite had early envisaged the introduction of critical 
and transformative pedagogies. Yet, in both cases, traditional forms of teacher-
centered learning have remained the norm.  
In Kosovo, the international community from day one sought to develop a 
unified education system that could be able to accommodate difference and the multi-
ethnic nature of the new state. This was done by promoting decentralization, 
although lacking a comprehensive and transcommunity approach and underpinned by 
an analysis of the conflict that placed too much emphasis on the ethnic issue, 
overlooking the broader development problematique. It comes as no surprise that the 
same structural issues that characterized Kosovo during Yugoslavia – unemployment, 
underdevelopment and demographic boom – have not been addressed in and through 
education.  
Characterized by a young demographic structure and high rates of 
unemployment, both countries know no match between education and skills: an 
explicit strategy linking education to economic development and labout market is 
missing in both cases. The reform and development of higher education and 
vocational training – two aspects on which two cases diverge very clearly – appear to 
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be nonetheless equally disconnected from realities such as widespread informality (in 
Kosovo), a low-labour intensive economic structure (in East Timor), and – more 
generally – seem to be stumbling ahead in addressing market needs through 
employment generation. Higher education in Kosovo has been important for 
processes of state-breaking, state-making and elite legitimization both before and 
after the war. However, the ways in which Kosovo’s political elites have captured the 
higher education field and made use of it represent a case of missed opportunities and, 
ultimately, political collusion. Moreover, the development and bifurcation of the 
education system reflect and exacerbate the conflict between the two main ethnic 
communities. 
While – at least on paper - education was expected to lead nation building 
processes, contribute to social cohesion and underpin individual and collective 
development, in practice the space for reaching such goals has been limited in both 
East Timor and Kosovo. A possible explanation for this might be that education has 
gradually become less of a priority for international donors and national elites. 
Indeed, there exists an observable discrepancy between stated goals/expectations and 
actual outcomes and more broadly between global discourses, on the one hand, and 
practices on the ground on the other.  
In Kosovo these gaps are illustrated by the international community’s 
commitment to the goal of creating a unified, non-segregated and inclusive education, 
a discourse that was later appropriated by national authorities for inclusive and quality 
education for all. However, in practice, Kosovo’s education is characterized by the 
presence of fragmented and territorially divided education systems, each following 
ethno-national demarcations. In East Timor, this is exemplified by the crucial role of 
education in bulding a distinctive Timorese identity (a lofty aspiration that is 
explicitly articulated in official documents), while in practice the development and 
implementation of education curricula have been carried out by Portuguese 
universities and foreign experts in absence of any reference and relevance to the local 
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context, leading to no construction of distinctive identity.  
More generally, the growing recognition by a plethora of international donors 
such as UNICEF, World Bank and UNESCO of the complex and important role that 
education should play in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings has not boosted 
education programs in those countries assisted and shaped by international state 
building interventions. This study has shown that education remains marginal in 
processes of nation building and state formation in conflict-affected settings.  
The critical cultural political economy of education approach (Robertson and 
Dale 2015) that has informed this study has allowed to unravel the different 
narratives, discourses and imaginaries that have characterized the discourse and 
practice of educational reform in the two case studies notwithstanding similar 
international interventions. In East Timor the Education for All (EFA) and the 
Millennium Development Goals have constituted the frameworks (and benchmarks) 
that inform educational objectives and reform, while the notion of capacity building 
has underpinned and justified the international presence in the education sector. In 
Kosovo, Europeanization, modernization and life-long learning have shaped the 
landscape of educational policy-making and reform. In both cases, a similar 
‘knowledge-based society/economy’ imaginary is reverberated in discourses on 
education. Yet, the marginalization of education in the new states tends to make this 
imaginary an empty shell: ultimately, the marginality of education stands as a 
symptom of peripherality.  
This study has addressed a gap that existed in the scholarly debate on 
peacebuilding and statebuilding processes regarding the specific role of education in 
post-conflict countries affected by international interventions. It showed how the 
sector was at the margins of both processes. Moreover, it has showed how the 
marginalization of education within international statebuilding interventions has 
similarly affected the agendas of local elites in both countries. Irrespective of 
contextual and contigent differences, local political elites have not aimed at building a 
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strong nation or national identity through education: their commitment to this goal 
did not go beyond the consolidation of their grip to power.  
 
2. Education between limited states and peace-as-stability 
 
Education has been a marginal sector within the broader political economy of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, and in fact a mere reflection of the principles and 
practices that underpin them. Put differently, rather than affecting the processes of  
consolidating peace and building the state – for example, by igniting change and 
promoting social justice – intervention in education in East Timor and Kosovo has 
reflected, legitimised and enhanced the prevailing models of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, dragging along their dilemmas, their pitfalls and their shortcomings.  
The entire process of intervention in the two countries is characterized by an 
understanding of peace, development and reconciliation programs as by-default 
processes and functions of the strengthening of formal state institutions and free 
market. While in East Timor this has been conducive to a form of virtual peace that 
is disconnected from the everyday life experience and welfare requirements of the 
vast majority of the population (Richmond and Franks 2008), in Kosovo it has 
resulted in a peace characterized by both the absence of conflict and (ethnic) 
interaction among homogenized and yet polarized communities (Randazzo and 
Bargués 2012).  
In both cases, peace has assumed overtime a narrow form of stability, with 
relatively low levels of violent clashes, persistent political crisis and structural 
vulnerabilities/inequalities that are left unaddressed, a condition close to Galtung’s 
definition of negative peace (1996). One of the several dilemmas facing post-war 
contexts is the imperative of stability and the prevention of relapse into war (Paris 
and Sisk 2009). In Kosovo and East Timor, the imperative of stability that has 
underpinned statebuilding and peacebuilding processes have dictated priorities and 
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determined choices in education reform and content.  
Chapter three, four, five and six have shown that Kosovo and East Timor 
education has also been marginal to the nation building process. In such contexts the 
process of nation building - mediated between local and international actors - is often 
suspended, postponed, or incomplete, with impacts for what is taught or not being 
taught, and to whom. Confirming previous work done by Jones (2011) on the post-
conflict education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo case here analysed 
confirms that in settings where the ethnicity component has been a significant 
component of the conflict itself, the process of curriculum reform and development 
is unstable, incomplete and conflictual. In particular, the debate over national history 
is a case in point. As in other post-war contexts such as Rwanda and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where identity and ‘ethnic factors’ have played an important role in 
the conflict, history is either omitted or reduced to quick fact browsing. In both cases, 
education has not contributed to social cohesion or reconciliation by building a strong 
and complex national identity (Clark 2010).  
This study confirms that the Western trajectory of education and state 
formation has not had an impact in contexts where the main aim is not the building 
of a strong nation and state but, as Hameiri and Kühn (2011) have argued, the 
governing and the managing of externally-maintained fragile governments, 
permanently sitting on the fulcrum between conflict, insecurity and instability. In a 
context of all-encompassing peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions, education 
reform has been treated as business as usual, presenting similar features as in other 
contexts of emergency and post-war humanitarian response.  
In East Timor there have been high expectations about education, even 
though such expectations did not push education all the way into any peacebuilding 
and statebuilding strategy. Most of the interviews with international and local actors 
confirm that education was built and reformed with the expectation that it would 
contribute to peacebuilding. However, none of the interviewees were able to specify 
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any plausible path through which this may have happened in the Timorese context: 
to praraphrase, ‘after all, education is good, nobody is in principle against education’. 
And, by the way, ‘peace is good too’: so they must be related to one another. 
Moreover, as Chapter five has shown, building peace was not even a priority in the 
Timorese case, at least until the 2006 violent riots. What emerges from my fieldwork 
is a disarming lack of political will and absence of a strategy concerning 
‘peacebuilding and statebuilding through education’. When it comes to its link with 
peacebuilding/statebuilding, if one were to conceptualize education policy in East 
Timor it could be called an anti-policy of education, as there is discrepancy between 
conception, expectations and outcomes, with a clear lack of strategy of how a given 
process would produce expected outcomes.  
In Kosovo, as argued by Randazzo and Bargués (2012), the international 
community has adopted a divisive version of multiculturalism, based upon a narrow 
understanding of the notion of identity, mainly in ethnic terms. This has led to the 
creation of a multi-ethnic society which is kept fictionally homogenised within 
ethnic groups but it is practically polarized among diverse groups. In the education 
field, this has entailed the decentralisation of education governance and curricula, 
which is in continuity with broader global trends in educational reform as argued by 
Poppema (2012), Robertson and Dale (2015), Dale (2009) among others. The 
promotion of a multi-ethnic and pluralist society through education has led to a 
multiplication of curricula in different languages. Albeit not all available for lack of 
funds and political willingness, where some education integration exists this has not 
resulted in a integration between different communities. Emphasis on equal rights and 
extensive decentralised autonomies for the different communities, along with a strong 
focus on stability and security, has made education segregation a clear choice that 
anyone can gauge on the ground.  
In Kosovo, the fact that education has been marginal to peacebuilding and 
statebuilding projects has not made education a safer space for ethnic interaction. 
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Perhaps because it was too central to conflict and nation building dynamics for 
providing with such an opportunity. Moreover, in Kosovo, with the exception of 
higher education, the sector has been marginal for the local elite and for the state 
making process. In East Timor, where education has historically been less contigual 
with conflict, it has not provided with the space for addressing conflict drivers either. 
The study of education reform in Kosovo and East Timor suggests that the 
focus on formal state institutions and institutional development tends to hamper 
local ownership and perpetuate vicious circles of dependency even in those sectors 
that are considered to be key to addressing fragility by building individual and social 
skills and human development. Education reform in both cases shows that the 
international community ended up sidelining the contribution and the capacity of 
local communities. By focusing over time on political elites and on the strengthening 
of formal state institutions, the international community contributed to solidifying 
the ‘capacity gap’ that it sought to fight. 
In embarking on this study I expected that I could demonstrate that education  
is crucial for social transformation and cohesion: however, by reflecting upon the 
limits that I could observe in the way education was incorporated in statebuilding and 
peacebuilding interventions I have to draw conclusion on the failure to exploit the 
potential of education for broader social change and justice. Part of the problem could 
be in the fact that the objective of international statebuilding intervention is not to 
transform the root causes, but to contain the risk of a relapse into war. Be that as it 
may, the fact that education, on a macro-historical scale, was marginal to the 
processes of nation building is probably to be understood as a result of its 
incorporation to the (neo-)liberal projects of statebuilding and peacebuilding: 
neoliberalism does not entail a key role for public education in state formation.   
At the end of this reflection, the problem of where to locate cohesion in the 
shaping of a national community seems to remain urgent, especially for new born 
states. As a matter of fact, for classical political science, thinking about state 
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formation and the education sector means thinking the nation. Stein Rokkan’s 
‘comparative macro-history of the territories of Western Europe’ sees the formation 
of the nation as the result of a long-term process that can be understood only through 
the medium of the state and its institutional framework (1987: 75; 1975). In this 
perspective – that extends sequential modernization schemes to extra-European 
contexts and that I would not hesitate to call ‘modernist’ – nationalism stands out as 
the by-product of state making, irrespective of whether it is deliberately propagated 
by the political center, or by a periphery that seeks to resist cultural homogenization 
and assimilation. Nationalism, in this perspective, has to do with those political 
activities “[t]hat aim to make the boundaries of the nation – a culturally distinctive 
collectivity aspiring to self-governance – coterminous with those of the state” 
(Hechter 1999: 7 quoted in Jaffrelot 2003: 7). Against this background, I believe that 
we observe changes in the way in which education relates to statebuilding and 
nationalism in new states, and that we need further research to better substantiate the 
direction of ongoing changes.   
When thinking about the trajectory of the relationship between new states 
and education Ernest Gellner’s theory of nations and nationalism (1983) is somehow 
unavoidable. My study shows first of all that even in small states emerging after wars 
that take place in times of globalization and sustained international intervention, new 
education systems are configurated in line with the modern nation scheme: a pyramid 
at whose base there are primary schools, staffed by teachers, led by the product of 
advanced graduate schools. With Gellner, one is therefore tempted to conclude that 
the education pyramid provides the criterion for the minimum size for a viable 
political unit. According to Gellner, who wrote that “[t]he limits of the culture within 
which they were educated are also those of the world within which they can morally 
and professionally, breathe” (1983: 36), the minimal size of a nation are defined as 
the minimal scale of an efficient educational apparatus (Jaffrelot 2003: 44).  
Questions for future research - to which the present study has sought to 
 307 
contribute only through insights based on partial evidence – regard how the nation 
relates to the state and how both relate to education in a late-modern age - that is, an 
era dominated by information technology, transplanetary economic exchange, and 
new forms of mobility and intervention that often bypass state control, and exert 
formidable pressure on small, young, peripheral states. 
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